Intel® Software Guard Extensions

Developer Reference for Windows® OS

Intel® Software Guard Extensions (Intel® SGX) is an Intel technology for application developers seeking to protect select code and data from disclosure or modification. Intel® SGX makes such protections possible through the use of enclaves. Enclaves are protected areas of execution. Application code can be put into an enclave through special instructions and software made available to developers by the Intel® SGX SDK.

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## Revision History

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<th>Description</th>
<th>Revision Date</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Intel(R) SGX Win 1.1 release</td>
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Introduction

Intel provides the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions (Intel(R) SGX) SDK Developer Reference for software developers who wish to harden their application’s security using Intel Software Guard Extensions technology.

This document covers an overview of the technology, tutorials, tools, sample code as well as API reference.

Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK from Intel is a collection of APIs, sample source code, libraries and tools that enables the software developer to write and debug Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions applications in C/C++.

NOTE

Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions (Intel(R) SGX) technology is only available on 6th Generation Intel(R) Core(TM) Processor or newer.

Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Technology Overview

Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions is an Intel technology whose objective is to enable a high-level protection of secrets. It operates by allocating hardware-protected memory where code and data reside. The protected memory area is called an enclave. Data within the enclave memory can only be accessed by the code that also resides within the enclave memory space. Enclave code can be invoked via special instructions. An enclave can be built and loaded as a Microsoft* Windows* DLL.

NOTE:

The enclave file can be disassembled, so the algorithms used by the enclave developer will not remain secret.

Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions technology has a hard limit on the protected memory size, typically 64 MB or 128 MB. As a result, the number of active enclaves (in memory) is limited. Depending on the memory footprint of each enclave, use cases suggest that 5-20 enclaves can reside in memory simultaneously.

Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Security Properties

- Intel designs the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions to protect against software attacks:
  - The enclave memory cannot be read or written from outside the enclave regardless of current privilege level and CPU mode
(ring3/user-mode, ring0/kernel-mode, SMM, VMM, or another enclave). The abort page is returned in such conditions.

- An enclave can be created with a debug attribute that allows a special debugger (Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions debugger) to view its content like a standard debugger. Production enclaves (non-debug) cannot be debugged by software or hardware debuggers.

- The enclave environment cannot be entered via classic function calls, jumps, register manipulation or stack manipulation. The only way to call an enclave function is via a new instruction that performs several protect checks. Classic function calls initiated by enclave code to functions inside the enclave are allowed.

- CPU mode can only be 32 or 64 bit when executing enclave code. Other CPU modes are not supported. An exception is raised in such conditions.

- Intel designs the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions to protect against known hardware attacks:

  - The enclave memory is encrypted using industry-standard encryption algorithms with replay protection.
  - Tapping the memory or connecting the DRAM modules to another system will only give access to encrypted data.
  - The memory encryption key changes every power cycle randomly (for example, boot/sleep/hibernate). The key is stored within the CPU and it is not accessible.
  - Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions is not designed to handle side channel attacks or reverse engineering. It is up to the Intel(R) SGX developers to build enclaves that are protected against these types of attack.

Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions uses strong industry-standard algorithms for signing enclaves. The signature of an enclave characterizes the content and the layout of the enclave at build time. If the enclave's content and layout are not correct per the signature, then the enclave will fail to be initialized and, hence, will not be executed. If an enclave is initialized, it should be identical to the original enclave and will not be modified at runtime.
Application Design Considerations

An Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions application design is different from non-Intel(R) SGX application as it requires dividing the application into two logical components:

- Trusted component. The code that accesses the secret resides here. This component is also called an enclave. More than one enclave can exist in an application.
- Untrusted component. The rest of the application including all its modules.¹

The application writer should make the trusted part as small as possible. It is suggested that enclave functionality should be limited to operate on the secret data. A large enclave statistically has more bugs and (user created) security holes than a small enclave.

The enclave code can leave the protected memory region and call functions in the untrusted zone (by a special instruction). Reducing the enclave dependency on untrusted code will also strengthen its protection against possible attacks.

Embracing the above design considerations will improve protection as the attack surface is minimized.

The application designer, as the first step to harnessing Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK in the application, must redesign or refactor the application to fit these guidelines. This is accomplished by isolating the code module(s) that access any secrets and then moving these modules to a separate package/library. The details of how to create such an enclave are detailed in the tutorials section. You can also see the demonstrations on creating an enclave in the sample code that are shipped with the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK.

Terminology and Acronyms

| AE | Architectural enclaves. Enclaves that are part of the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions framework. They include the quoting |

¹From an enclave standpoint, the operating system and VMM are not trusted components, either.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>enclave (QE)</td>
<td>provisioning enclave (PvE), launch enclave (LE), provision certification enclave (PCE) and the platform service enclave (PSE).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attestation</td>
<td>Prove authenticity. In case of platform attestation, prove the identity of the platform.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Certificate Authority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECALL</td>
<td>Enclave call. A function call that enters the enclave.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECF</td>
<td>Enclave Configuration File.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECDH</td>
<td>Elliptic curve Diffie–Hellman.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDL</td>
<td>Enclave Definition Language.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intel(R) EPID</td>
<td>Intel(R) Enhanced Privacy ID.</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIPS</td>
<td>Federal Information Processing Standards developed by NIST for use in computer systems government-wide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIPS 140-2</td>
<td>Standard that defines security requirements for cryptographic modules and is required for sales to the Federal Governments.</td>
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<tr>
<td>HSM</td>
<td>Hardware Security Module.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attestation Service</td>
<td>Attestation Service for Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISV</td>
<td>Independent Software Vendor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KE</td>
<td>Key Exchange.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LE</td>
<td>Launch enclave, an architectural enclave from Intel, involved in the licensing service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonce</td>
<td>An arbitrary number used only once to sign a cryptographic communication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCALL</td>
<td>Outside call. A function call that calls an untrusted function from an enclave.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCE</td>
<td>Provisioning certification enclave, an architectural enclave from Intel, involved in the Intel® Enhanced Privacy ID (Intel® EPID) Provision service to provide provisioning certificate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSE</td>
<td>Platform service enclaves, architectural enclaves from Intel. Including PSE-pr (long-term paring) and PSE-Op (session management).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intel(R) SGX PSW</td>
<td>Platform Software for Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PvE</td>
<td>Provisioning enclave, an architectural enclave from Intel, involved in the Intel(R) Enhanced Privacy ID (Intel(R) EPID) Provision service to handle the provisioning protocol.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QE</td>
<td>Quoting enclave, an architectural enclave from Intel, involved in the quoting service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intel(R) SGX</td>
<td>Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SigRL</td>
<td>Signature revocation list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMK</td>
<td>Session MAC key.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Service Provider.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVN</td>
<td>Security version number. Used to version security levels of both hardware and software components of the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions framework.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCB</td>
<td>Trusted computing base. Portions of hardware and software that are considered safe and uncompromised. A system protection is improved if the TCB is as small as possible, making an attack harder.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCS</td>
<td>Thread Control Structure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLS</td>
<td>Thread Local Storage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLS</td>
<td>Transport Layer Security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tRTS</td>
<td>Trusted Run Time System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>uRTS</td>
<td>Untrusted Run Time System</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Setting up an Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Project
This topic introduces how to use the following features of Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK:

- Using Microsoft* Visual Studio* Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Wizard
- Using Microsoft* Visual Studio* Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Add-in
- Enclave Project Files
- Microsoft* Visual Studio* Project Settings

**NOTE**
The Visual Studio 2015 Add-in Tool has been designed to work with Visual Studio 2015 Professional Environment. While Visual Studio 2015 is the recommended environment, the tools may also be installed with the Community and Enterprise versions of Visual Studio 2015.

**Using Microsoft* Visual Studio* Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Wizard**
Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK installs a Microsoft* Visual Studio* software wizard to aid developers in rapid development of Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions. This wizard can be used to create an enclave project, which then has the proper settings to take advantage of the various components that are shipped with the Intel(R) SGX SDK.

**Creating an Enclave**

   
The New Project dialog box opens.

2. Select Templates-->Visual C++-->Intel(R) SGX Enclave Project. Enter name, location, and solution name in the appropriate fields like any other Microsoft* Visual Studio* project.
Figure 1 Intel(R) SGX Wizard: New Project Creation

3. Click OK and the welcome dialog appears.
4. Click **Next** to go to the Enclave Settings page.
5. Configure the enclave with proper settings

- **Project Type:**
  - Enclave – Create an enclave project.
  - Enclave library – Create a static library for an enclave project.

- **Additional Libraries:**
  - C++ 11 – Link C++ 11 with the enclave project.
  - EDL File - Create an EDL file in enclave project.

- **Signing Key:**
  - Import an existing signing key to the enclave project. A random key will be generated if no file is selected. The Enclave signer will sign the enclave with the key file (see File Formats).
When the enclave project is created, the wizard ensures that the enclave project has proper settings.

**NOTE:**
The Wizard requires Visual C++ tools installed, which is no longer done by default in Visual Studio 2015. Please make sure the C++ tools are installed before using the Wizard to create an enclave project.

**NOTE:**
The Wizard creates an enclave project with several files. See Enclave Project Files for a detailed file list.
Figure 4 Intel(R) SGX Wizard: Solution Explorer

**Using Microsoft* Visual Studio* Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Add-in**

The Microsoft* Visual Studio* add-in is provided to the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions developer for configuring an enclave or importing an enclave to untrusted components conveniently and efficiently. This add-in has three main features:
• **Enclave Settings** helps to maintain the enclave configuration settings
• **Enclave Signing** helps to perform enclave two-step signing for release mode.
• **Import Enclave** helps to select the enclaves to be imported to the untrusted components. Then the untrusted components can make use with the enclave.

**Enclave Settings**

**Enclave settings** helps you to create and maintain the enclave configuration file. The enclave configuration file is part of the enclave project and describes the information of the enclave metadata. See **Enclave Configuration File** for details.

**Enclave Settings** gives the user the option to update the following enclave settings:

- ProdID
- ISVSVN
- StackMaxSize
- HeapMaxSize
- TCSNum
- TCSPolicy
- DisableDebug
- MiscSelect
- MiscMask

**To configure enclave settings:**

Open the solution that contains the enclave project. Right click the enclave project. Select **Intel(R) SGX Configuration -> Enclave Settings**. A dialog will be shown which allows the modification of the enclave settings. Here is a sample of the dialog.
The Basic Settings box provides users the interface to modify the basic enclave settings. The following list gives an explanation of each configuration element.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Tag in the Enclave Configuration File</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Product ID</td>
<td>ISV assigned Product ID</td>
<td>&lt;ProdID&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISV SVN</td>
<td>ISV assigned SVN</td>
<td>&lt;ISVSVN&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thread Stack Size</td>
<td>The stack size per trusted thread (in bytes)</td>
<td>&lt;StackMaxSize&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Heap Size</td>
<td>The heap size for the enclave (in bytes)</td>
<td>&lt;HeapMaxSize&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thread Number</td>
<td>The number of trusted threads</td>
<td>&lt;TCSNum&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thread Bound Policy</td>
<td>TCS management policy</td>
<td>&lt;TCSPolicy&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 Settings in the Enclave Configuration File

The Advanced Settings dialog shows the interface to modify the advanced features. Given that users have enough knowledge of these advanced features, click the button Advanced..., then the following window appears:
Figure 6 Intel(R) SGX Configuration: Advanced Enclave Settings

Check the Debug selection if you want to ensure the enclave cannot be launched in debug mode. The setting corresponds to the element `<DisableDebug>` of the Enclave Configuration File. The code/data memory inside an enclave launched in debug mode is accessible by the debugger or other software outside of the enclave. Thus, it does not have the same memory access protection as an enclave launched in non-debug mode. An enclave can only be debugged if it is launched in debug mode. If the selection is checked, the enclave built with this configuration cannot be debugged.

You can set the bits value for the Misc Select and Misc Mask in the Advanced Settings dialog. These settings respectively correspond to the element `<MiscSelect>` and `<MiscMask>` of the Enclave Configuration File. The `<MiscSelect>` and `<MiscMask>` are for functionality extension in the future. Currently only 0 for can be set for Misc Select by default. The recommendation is keeping the default settings.

Enclave Preferred Load Address

You may use the linker options `/BASE` and `/FIXED` to build an enclave. `/FIXED` tells the uRTS and the driver to load the enclave at the preferred load address only, which can be specified with the option `/BASE`.

When you use `/BASE`, the enclave PE's OptionalHeader.ImageBase is set with the preferred load address. When you specify `/FIXED`, the linker does not generate a relocation section for the enclave and the enclave PE's Header.Characteristics will have IMAGE_FILE_RELOCS_STRIPPED set.
Additionally the PE's `OptinalHeader.DLLCharacteristics` will not have `IMAGE_DLL_CHARACTERISTICS_DYNAMIC_BASE` set, to indicate the enclave DLL cannot be relocated at load time.

When you sign the enclave, if `sgx_sign.exe` detects that an enclave has `IMAGE_FILE_RELOCS_STRIPPED` set in the enclave PE's `Header.Characteristics`, it will verify that the enclave does not have a relocation section and that `IMAGE_DLL_CHARACTERISTICS_DYNAMIC_BASE` is not set in the PE `OptinalHeader.DLLCharacteristics`. In addition, `sgx_sign.exe` ensures that the selected `BASE` naturally aligns with the enclave size. If any of these three requirements fail, `sgx_sign.exe` reports an error. The loader `sgx_urts.dll` only attempts to load an enclave after the enclave passes the same three tests. You may still receive an error from `sgx_urts.dll` if the enclave cannot be loaded at the preferred load address.

**Enclave Signing**

With the enclave launch control, the enclave signing key for release mode must be stored in secure manner, such as a platform manages by an HSM. All the release mode enclaves should use two-step signing mechanism. **Enclave Signer Usage Examples** describes a command line example for this two-step signing process. **Enclave Signing** provides a GUI to help developers to perform the two-step signing process more easily and more conveniently.

**Step 1: Generate Enclave Signing Material**

Open the solution that contains the enclave project. Right click the enclave project. Select **Intel(R) SGX Configuration -> Enclave Signing**. The **Enclave Signing** dialog appears. The following graphic shows a GUI sample for generating the enclave signing material.
Enclave Signing

You can choose the following 2-step signing process to sign the enclave with your own signing facility.

**Step 1: Generate Enclave Signing Material**

Specify the name and the location for the signing material. The unsigned enclave file will be copied to the same location as the output file.

- **Name:** Enclave.hex
- **Location:** `C:\Program Files (x86)\Intel\IntelSGXSDK\src\Sar`

![Generate Signing Material]

**Step 2: Generate Signed Enclave File**

Specify the file locations and then generate the signed enclave file.

- **Signing Material File:** `C:\Program Files (x86)\Intel\IntelSGXSDK`
- **Enclave File:** `C:\Program Files (x86)\Intel\IntelSGXSDK`
- **Public Key File:** `C:\Program Files (x86)\Intel\IntelSGXSDK`
- **Signature File:** `C:\Program Files (x86)\Intel\IntelSGXSDK`

![Generate a Signed Enclave]

**Figure 7 Intel(R) SGX Configuration: Generate Enclave Signing Material**

The default name and location for the output enclave signing material are specified. You can change the name and location. Click the button **Generate Signing Material** to generate the enclave signing material.

After finishing Step 1, you need to use your own signing facility, which can access your private signing key to sign the output enclave signing material, then bring the resulting signature file back for Step 2.

**NOTE**

By default, a Post Build Event for generating enclave signing material is added during enclave creation with Microsoft* Visual Studio* in Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Wizard. Thus, for the release mode, the enclave signing material is generated automatically after you compile the enclave project.
Step 2: Generate a Signed Enclave File

If you have finished generating the enclave signing material and have prepared the resulting signature file, you can generate the signed enclave file. To generate the final signed enclave file, select the radio button next to Step 2 - Generate Signed Enclave File.

Enclave Signing

You can choose the following 2-step signing process to sign the enclave with your own signing facility.

- Step 1: Generate Enclave Signing Material
  - Specify the name and the location for the signing material. The unsigned enclave file will be copied to the same location as the output file.
  - Name: Enclave.hex
  - Location: C:\Program Files (x86)\Intel\SGXSDK\src\Sar

- Step 2: Generate Signed Enclave File
  - Specify the file locations and then generate the signed enclave file.
  - Signing Material File: C:\Program Files (x86)\Intel\SGXSDK
  - Enclave File: C:\Program Files (x86)\Intel\SGXSDK
  - Public Key File: 
  - Signature File: 

Generate a Signed Enclave

Figure 8 Intel(R) SGX Configuration: Generate a Signed Enclave File

The default location for the signing material and the enclave file are specified. Check whether the specified paths are correct for the signing material and the enclave file. Click the button Select... next to Public Key File to specify the corresponding public key. Click the button Select... next to Signature File to specify the resulting signature file.
After specifying all the correct files, click the button **Generate Signed Enclave**, then the final signed enclave file is generated under the same folder of the specified enclave file.

**Import Enclave**

**Import Enclave** helps to select the enclaves to be imported to the untrusted components. Then the untrusted components can make use of the enclaves.

**Import Enclave** provides the following functions:

- Allows selecting an enclave from the list of enclaves created with the Intel(R) SGX Wizard in the same solution.
- Supports browsing/searching for 3rd party provided enclaves which are defined by EDL files.
- Provides the option to remove any enclave selected to be hosted by an application.
- Adds/removes the enclave's _u.h and _u.c files to/from the untrusted component project, for each enclave that is added to/removed from the application.
- Sets up the project settings for the untrusted component.

**To import enclaves:**

Open the solution that contains both the enclave project and the untrusted application project that will host the enclave. Right click the untrusted application project. Select **Intel(R) SGX Configuration -> Import Enclave**. The following sample dialog will be shown. In this example, the enclave project name is **sample_enclave** and the hosting project is a Win32 console application.
Include EDLs
This field displays the EDL files that are included in the solution or that have been imported. Select the EDL files required for current project.

- `sample_enclave`
  `- sample_enclave.edl`
  `- Imported`

Search Path Settings
Specify any additional search paths for EDL files. Separate multiple paths with semicolons.

OK Cancel Apply

Figure 9 Intel(R) SGX Configuration: Import Enclave

The **Include EDLs** section in the **Import Enclave** dialogue contains all the enclaves in this solution and any enclaves imported from outside the solution. Each enclave is represented by an Enclave Definition Language (EDL) file. EDL is a minimal IDL used to describe the enclave interface. See [Enclave Definition Language Syntax](#) for a detailed description. Select the EDL files corresponding to the enclaves to be imported into the application.

To import an enclave that is not in the solution, you can click **Import EDL...** to select a new EDL file. The imported enclaves are listed in the **Imported** field.
You need to select any of the imported EDL files representing the enclaves you wish to import into the application.

![Import Enclave](image)

Figure 10 Intel(R) SGX Configuration: Import EDL File

If the selected EDL files require additional search paths for any embedded EDL files, specify the search paths in the **Search Path Settings**.

To put the actions into effect, click **OK**. Then two files will be added to the untrusted application project: `sample_enclave_u.c` and `sample_enclave_u.h`. They contain the declarations and definitions of the untrusted wrapper functions used to call enclave functions. In addition, the properties of
the untrusted application project are modified to recreate the files when the project is rebuilt. The files are not expected to be modified by the user. To cancel the actions, click **Cancel**.

To remove an imported enclave from the untrusted application, unselect the corresponding EDL file and click **OK**. Then the corresponding settings in the untrusted application are removed.

**Changing the Compiler**

You are recommended to use the Intel® Compiler to compile your enclaves. The Release Notes included in the Intel® SGX SDK package list the specific Intel Compiler versions that are recommended for this particular Intel SGX SDK release. However, if you prefer compiling your enclaves with the Visual Studio* compiler, you can change the compiler by following these steps.

If you have the Intel Composer installed on your machine, you may take advantage of the Intel Compiler plug-in for Visual Studio to switch between compilers. Right click the solution or enclave project and select **Intel Compiler -> Use Visual C++**. The plug-in will automatically configure the selected solution/project(s) to use the Microsoft* Visual C++* compiler.
Otherwise, you have to manually change the compiler. Edit the Project Properties and select **Configuration Properties -> General -> Platform Toolset**. Change from **Intel C++ Compiler XE 16.0** to **Visual Studio 2015 (v140)**. It is recommended that you select **Configuration -> All Configurations** and **Platform -> All Platforms** before changing the Platform Toolset.
Figure 12 Changing the compiler by manually editing the project properties

Enclave Project Files

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions wizard is used to create enclave projects. It creates several files with names derived from the project name.

Assuming the enclave project name is `sample_enclave`, here is the list of files generated by the wizard.

Source files:
• sample_enclave.cpp – main source file, to be filled with user functions and variables. The user can add additional source files.
• sample_enclave_t.c – trusted auto-generated wrapper functions. Do not modify this file as every build recreates it.
• sample_enclave.edl – enclave definition language (EDL) file. Declares which functions are exported (trusted) and imported (untrusted) by the enclave. EDL syntax is explained in a separate chapter.

Header files:
• sample_enclave_t.h – trusted auto-generated header for wrapper functions. Do not modify this file as every build recreates it.

Resource files:
• sample_enclave.config.xml – specifies the enclave configuration. Details are explained in a separate section.
• sample_enclave.private.pem – RSA private key used to sign the enclave.

**NOTE:**
The private key must be kept secret and safe. If it is exposed, the key could be used by malware writers to create a valid signed enclave. If you do not want to expose the private key in the enclave project, you can use sgx_sign to sign the enclave in a separate environment. See Enclave Signing Tool for a detailed description.

**Microsoft* Visual Studio* Project Settings**
This section introduces the following project settings:

- Recommended Project Settings for an Enclave Project
- Recommended Project Settings for an Untrusted Application

To configure the project settings in Microsoft* Visual Studio*, right click the project name in Solution Explorer and select Properties from the context menu.

**Recommended Project Settings for an Enclave Project**
For an enclave, default project settings are recommended, with the following exceptions:
C/C++->General->Additional Include Directories:
$(SGXSDKInstallPath)include;$(SGXSDKInstallPath)include\t-
libc;$(SGXSDKInstallPath)include\stlport;

Linker->General->Additional Library Directories:
$(SGXSDKInstallPath)bin\$(Platform)\$(Configuration)

Linker->Input->Additional Dependencies:
HW Configuration: sgx_trts.lib; sgx_tservice.lib; sgx_
tstdc.lib; sgx_tlibcxx.lib; sgx_tcrypto.lib
Simulation Configuration: sgx_trts_sim.lib; sgx_tservice_ sim.lib; sgx_tstdc.lib; sgx_tlibcxx.lib; sgx_tcrypto.lib

Linker->Input->Ignore All Default Libraries:Yes (/NODEFAULTLIB)
Linker->Advanced->No Entry Point:Yes

To sign the enclave during the build process, set a custom build step in the project settings:

Build Events->Post-Build Event->Command Line:
"$(SGXSDKInstallPath)bin\win32\release\sgx_sign.exe"
sign -key "$(ProjectDir)sample_enclave_private.pem" -
enclave "$(OutDir)sample_enclave.dll" -out "$(OutDir)sample_ enclave.signed.dll" -config "$(ProjectDir)sample_ enclave.config.xml"

Build Events->Post-Build Event->Use In Build:Yes

**NOTE:**
The signing command line is a sample command. Change the command line based on the actual enclave name.

**NOTE:**
A few compiler options are not supported when enclave code is compiled. See sections Unsupported MSVC* Options for Enclaves and Unsupported Intel (R) Compiler Options for Enclaves for a detailed list.

Recommended Project Settings for an Untrusted Application

Use the default project settings for an untrusted application, with the following additional settings:

**C/C++->General->Additional Include Directories:** $(SGXSDKInstallPath)include;

**Linker->General->Additional Library Directories:** $(SGXSDKInstallPath)bin\$(Platform)\$(Configuration)

**Linker->Input->Additional Dependencies:**

HW Configuration: sgx_uae_service.lib; sgx_urts.lib

Simulation Configuration: sgx_uae_service_sim.lib; sgx_urts_sim.lib

**Supported Application Types**

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK supports a number of application types and user accounts on the Windows* OS. Users of regular, guest and administrator accounts may run an enclave application in the form of a DLL to load and interface with an Intel(R) SGX enclave. User-level driver and system services that execute in the security context of a user account also have access to the functionality provided by the Intel(R) SGX software stack.
Using Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK Tools
This topic introduces how to use the following tools that the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides:

- **Edger8r Tool**
  Generates interfaces between the untrusted components and enclaves.

- **Enclave Signing Tool**
  Generates the enclave metadata, which includes the enclave signature, and adds such metadata to the enclave image.

- **Enclave Debugger**
  Helps to debug an enclave.

- **Performance Measurement using Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier**
  Helps to measure the performance of the enclave code.

- **Enclave Memory Measurement Tool**
  Helps to measure the usage of protected memory by the enclave at runtime.

- **CPUSVN Configuration Tool**
  Helps to simulate the CPUSVN upgrade/downgrade scenario without modifying the hardware.

**Edger8r Tool**
The Edger8r tool ships as part of the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK. It generates edge routines by reading a user-provided Enclave Description Language (EDL) file. These edge routines define the interface between the untrusted application and the enclave. Normally, the tool runs automatically as part of the enclave build process. However, an advanced enclave writer may invoke the Edger8r manually.

When given an EDL file, for example, `demo.edl`, the Edger8r by default generates four files:

- `demo_t.h` – Contains prototype declarations for trusted proxies and bridges.
- `demo_t.c` – Contains function definitions for trusted proxies and bridges.
• demo_u.h – Contains prototype declarations for untrusted proxies and bridges.
• demo_u.c – Contains function definitions for untrusted proxies and bridges.

Here is the command line description for the Edger8r tool:

**Syntax:**

```
sgx_edger8r [options] <.edl file> [another .edl file ...]
```

**Arguments:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>[Options]</th>
<th>Descriptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>--use-prefix</td>
<td>Prefix the untrusted proxy with the enclave name.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--header-only</td>
<td>Generate header files only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--search-path &lt;path&gt;</td>
<td>Specify the search path of EDL files.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--untrusted</td>
<td>Generate untrusted proxy and bridge routines only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--trusted</td>
<td>Generate trusted proxy and bridge routines only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--untrusted-dir &lt;dir&gt;</td>
<td>Specify the directory for saving the untrusted code.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--trusted-dir &lt;dir&gt;</td>
<td>Specify the directory for saving the trusted code.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--preprocessor</td>
<td>Specify the path to the compiler, which is used to preprocess the EDL file.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--help</td>
<td>Print help message showing the command line and options.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If neither `--untrusted` nor `--trusted` is specified, the Edger8r generates both.

Here, the `path` parameter has the same format as the PATH environment variable, and the enclave name is the base file name of the EDL file (demo in this case).

---

**CAUTION:**

The ISV must run the Edger8r tool in a protected malware-free environment to ensure the integrity of the tool so that the generated code is not compromised. The ISV is ultimately responsible for the code contained in the enclave and should review the code that the Edger8r tool generates.
Enclave Signing Tool

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides a tool named `sgx_sign` for you to sign enclaves. In general, signing an enclave is a process that involves producing a signature structure that contains enclave properties such as the enclave measurement, see Enclave Signature Structure below. Once an enclave is signed in such structure, the modifications to the enclave file (such as code, data, signature, and so on.) can be detected. The signing tool also evaluates the enclave image for potential errors and warns users about potential security hazards. `sgx_sign` is typically set up by one of the configuration tools included in the Intel(R) SGX SDK and runs automatically at the end of the build process. During the loading process, the signature is checked to confirm that the enclave has not been tampered with and has been loaded correctly. In addition, the signing tool can also be used to report metadata information for a signed enclave and to generate the SIGStruct file needed to whitelist the enclave signer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Header</td>
<td>HEADERTYPE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HEADERLEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HEADERVERSION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TYPE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MODVENDOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SIZE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KEYSIZE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MODULUSSIZE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ENPONENTSIZE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SWDEFINED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RESERVED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signature</td>
<td>MODULUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EXPONENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SIGNATURE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Command-Line Syntax

To run `sgx_sign`, use the following command syntax:

\[
\text{sgx\_sign } \langle \text{command} \rangle \ [\text{args}]
\]

All valid commands are listed in the table below. See [Enclave Signer Usage Examples](#) for more information.

### Table 3 Signing Tool Commands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Arguments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sign</td>
<td>Sign the enclave using the private key in one step.</td>
<td>Required:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-enclave, -key, -out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Optional:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-config, -dumpfile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gendata</td>
<td>The first step of the 2-step signing process. Generate the enclave signing</td>
<td>Required:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>material to be signed by an external tool. This step dumps the signing</td>
<td>-enclave, -out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>material, which consists of the header and body sections of the enclave</td>
<td>Optional:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>signature structure (see the Table Enclave Signature Structure in this</td>
<td>-config</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>topic), into a file (256 bytes in total).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>catsig</td>
<td>The second step of the 2-step signing process.</td>
<td>Required:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Generate the signed enclave with the input signature and public key. The input signature is generated by an external tool based on the data generated by the gendata command. At this step, the signature and buffer sections are generated. The signature and buffer sections together with the header and body sections complete the enclave signature structure (see the Table Enclave Signature Structure in this topic).

- **dump**
  Get the metadata information for a signed enclave file and dump it to a file specified by -dumpfile option
  
  Required: -enclave, -dumpfile

All the valid command options are listed below:

**Table 4 Signing Tool Arguments**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arguments</th>
<th>Descriptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-enclave &lt;file&gt;</td>
<td>Specify the enclave file to be signed or already signed. It is a required argument for the four commands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-config &lt;file&gt;</td>
<td>Specify the enclave configuration file It is an invalid argument for dump command and an optional argument for the other three commands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-out &lt;file&gt;</td>
<td>Specify the output file. It is required for the following three commands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-key &lt;file&gt;</td>
<td>Specify the signing key file. See File Formats for detailed description.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-sig &lt;file&gt;</td>
<td>Specify the file containing the signature corresponding to the enclave.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sign</td>
<td>The signed enclave file.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gendata</td>
<td>The file with the enclave signing material.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>catsig</td>
<td>The signed enclave file.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sign</td>
<td>Private key.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gendata</td>
<td>Not applicable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>catsig</td>
<td>Public key.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Optional: -config, -dumpfile
to the enclave signing material. Only valid for catsig command.

-unsigned <file>
  Specify the file containing the enclave signing material generated by gendata. Only valid for the catsig command.

dumpfile
  Specify a file to dump metadata information. It is a required argument for the dump command and an optional argument for sign and catsig.

-ignore-rel-error
  By default, sgx_sign provides an error for enclaves with text relocations. You can ignore the error and continue signing by providing this option. But it is recommended that you eliminate the text relocations instead of bypassing the error with this option.

The arguments, including options and filenames, can be specified in any order. Options are processed first, then filenames. Use one or more spaces or tabs to separate arguments. Each option consists of an option identifier, a dash (-), followed by the name of the option. The <file> parameter specifies the absolute or relative path of a file.

Users can start sgx_sign from a system command prompt or integrate the command line into a Post Build Event under the enclave project properties in Microsoft* Visual Studio* IDE. To follow the different command character set rules in different platforms, sgx_sign Command-Line is case-insensitive in Windows* OS.

sgx_sign generates the output file and returns 0 for success. Otherwise, it generates an error message and returns -1.

Enclave Signing Key Management
An enclave project supports different signing methods needed by ISVs during the enclave development life cycle.

- Single-step method using the ISV's test private key:
  The signing tool supports a single-step signing process, which requires the access to the signing key pair on the local build system. However, there is a requirement that any white-listed enclave signing key must be managed in a hardware security module. Thus, the ISV's test private key stored in the build platform will not be white-listed and enclaves signed
with this key can only be launched in *debug or prerelease* mode. In this scenario, the ISV manages the signing key pair, which could be generated by the Microsoft* Visual Studio Wizard when the enclave project is created or by the ISV using his own means. Single-step method is the default signing method for non-production enclave applications, which are created with the Intel SGX project *debug and prerelease* profiles.

- **2-step method using an external signing tool:**
  1. First step: At the end of the enclave build process, the signing tool generates the enclave signing material. The ISV may also generate the enclave signing material file by an option available in the Microsoft* Visual Studio Add-in.

     The ISV takes the enclave signing material file to an external signing platform/facility where the private key is stored, signs the signing material file, and takes the resulting signature file back to the build platform.

  2. Second step: The ISV selects the *Second Step Signing* option from the Microsoft* Visual Studio Add-in to add the hash of the public key and signature to the enclave’s metadata section.

     The 2-step signing process protects the signing key in a separate facility. Thus it is the default signing method for the Intel SGX project *release* profile. This means it is the only method for signing production enclave applications.

### File Formats

There are several files with various formats followed by the different options. The file format details are listed below.

**Table 5 Signing Tool File Formats**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>File</th>
<th>Format</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enclave file</td>
<td>DLL</td>
<td>A standard DLL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signed enclave file</td>
<td>DLL</td>
<td><em>sgx_sign</em> generates the signed enclave file, which includes the signature, to the enclave file.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Configuration file</td>
<td>XML</td>
<td>See <a href="#">Enclave Configuration File</a>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key file</td>
<td>PEM</td>
<td>Key file should follow the PEM format which contains an unencrypted RSA 3072-bit key. The public exponent must be 3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enclave hex</td>
<td>RAW</td>
<td>A dump file of the enclave signing material data to be</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
file | signed with the private RSA key.
--- | ---
Signature file | RAW A dump file of the signature generated at the ISV’s signing facility. The signature should follow the RSA-PKCS1.5 padding scheme. The signature should be generated using the v1.5 version of the RSA scheme with an SHA-256 message digest.
Metadata file | RAW A dump file containing the SIGStruct metadata for the signed enclave. This file is submitted when requesting that a production enclave be whitelisted by Intel.

**Signing Key Files**

The enclave signing tool only accepts key files in the PEM format and that are unencrypted. When an enclave project is created for the first time, you have to choose either using an already existing signing key or automatically generating one key for you. When you choose to import a pre-existing key, ensure that such key is in PEM format and unencrypted. If that is not the case, convert the signing key to the format accepted by the Signing Tool first. For instance, the following command converts an encrypted private key in PKCS#8/DER format to unencrypted PEM format:

```bash
openssl pkcs8 -inform DER -in private_pkcs8.der -outform PEM -out private_pkcs1.pem
```

Depending on the platform OS, the openssl* utility might be installed already or it may be shipped with the Intel(R) SGX SDK.

**Enclave Signer Usage Examples**

The following are typical examples for signing an enclave using the one-step or the two-step method. When the private signing key is available at the build platform, you may follow the one-step signing process to sign your enclave. However, when the private key is only accessible in an isolated signing facility, you must follow the two-step signing process described below.

- **One-step signing process:**
  Signing an enclave using a private key available on the build system:

```bash
sgx_sign sign -enclave enclave.dll -config config.xml -out enclave_signed.dll -key private.pem
```

- **Two-step signing process:**
  Signing an enclave using a private key stored in an HSM, for instance:
1. Generate the enclave signing material.
   
   ```
   sgx_sign gendata -enclave enclave.dll -config config.xml -out enclave_hash.hex
   ```

2. At the signing facility, sign the file containing the enclave signing material (enclave_hash.hex) and take the resulting signature file (signature.hex) back to the build platform.

3. Sign the enclave using the signature file and public key.
   
   ```
   sgx_sign catsig -enclave enclave.dll -config config.xml -out enclave_signed.dll -key public.pem -sig signature.hex -unsigned enclave_hash.hex
   ```

The configuration file config.xml is optional. If you do not provide a configuration file, the signing tool uses the default configuration values.

The following example is for generating a report of metadata information for a signed enclave:

```
sgx_sign dump -enclave enclave_signed.dll -dumpfile metadata_info.txt
```

A single enclave signing tool is provided, which allows for operating with 32-bit and 64-bit enclaves.

**OpenSSL* Examples**

The following command lines are typical examples using OpenSSL*.

1. Generate a 3072-bit RSA private key. Use 3 as the public exponent value.

   ```
   openssl genrsa -out private_key.pem -3 3072
   ```

2. Produce the public part of a private RSA key.

   ```
   openssl rsa -in private_key.pem -pubout -out public_key.pem
   ```
3. Sign the file containing the enclave signing material.

```bash
openssl dgst -sha256 -out signature.hex -sign private_key.pem -keyform PEM enclave_hash.hex
```

**Enclave Debugger**

Only a debug mode enclave can be debugged with the Intel(R) SGX debugger:

- The enclave must be built as debuggable. See Enclave Settings to unselect **Ensure the enclave cannot be launched in debug mode** in the enclave **Advanced Configuration**.
- In the application, the enclave must be loaded in the debug mode. To load an enclave in the debug mode, the debugger flag (the second parameter of `sgx_create_enclave`) must be **TRUE**.

To utilize the Intel(R) SGX debugger to debug an enclave, you must change the Microsoft* Visual Studio* project properties for the Intel® SGX application.

1. Right click the untrusted application project and select **Project Properties**.
2. Go to Properties->Configuration Properties->Debugging and select **Intel(R) SGX Debugger** as shown below.
3. After you select the **Intel(R) SGX Debugger**, edit the **Working Directory** and type $(OutDir)$.

**Figure 13 Intel(R) SGX Debugger Enabling**

**Starting and Debugging an Enclavized Application from within Microsoft* Visual Studio**

Once the Intel(R) SGX Debugger has been selected for the application project, setting breakpoints and/or stepping into an enclave works exactly as normal application debugging does in Microsoft* Visual Studio*.

**Attaching to and Debugging an Enclave inside a Running Process**

Use the following steps to attach to and debug an enclave inside a running process:
1. In Microsoft* Visual Studio*, select DEBUG-> Attach to process> Select-> Intel(R) SGX code.
2. Highlight the process that you would like to attach to and debug; then click the Select button.
3. In the pop-up dialog, Select Code Type, select Debug these code types; then check Intel(R) SGX.
4. Click OK in the Select Code Type dialog, and click Attach in the Attach to Process dialog.

When the Intel(R) SGX Debugger is used as remote debugger, the host machine needs both Intel(R) SGX SDK and Intel(R) SGX Debugger installed; the target machine needs the Intel(R) SGX Debugger and Microsoft* Visual Studio* remote debugger server:

1. On the target machine, launch the Remote Debugging Monitor (mvsmon.exe) that was installed as part of Microsoft* Visual Studio*.
2. On the host machine, select DEBUG-> Attach to process-> Select-> Intel(R) SGX code in Microsoft* Visual Studio* and set the qualifier as the target machine name or IP address.

**NOTE:**
The remote machine may have multiple versions of the Remote Debugging Monitor. Ensure that the version of the Remote Debugging Monitor being run corresponds to a version of Microsoft* Visual Studio* that was configured during the installation of the Intel(R) SGX SDK.


The Intel(R) SGX Debugger can be used to debug both an enclave project and an untrusted application, but cannot be used to debug the uRTS and tRTS, which are part of Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK. When a breakpoint occurs inside the uRTS or tRTS, the debugger is not able to display any symbols and the button step out does not work. To fix this issue, manually add one more breakpoint outside the uRTS and tRTS.

The Intel(R) SGX Debugger only supports native C/C++ code. It is not able to debug managed code or native/managed code mix mode. If the enclave is used in mix mode, the only way to debug it is by using the debugger attach feature.
Performance Measurement using Intel® VTune(TM) Amplifier

You can use Intel® VTune™ Amplifier Application 2016 Update 2 to measure the performance of Intel SGX applications, including the enclave. Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier application supports a new analysis type called SGX Hotspots that can be used to profile the Intel SGX Enclave Applications. You can use the default settings of SGX Hotspots to profile the application and the enclave code. Precise event based sampling (PEBS) helps to profile the Intel SGX enclave code. The _PS events represent precise events. You can add _PS events to the collection to profile enclave code. Non precise events would not help with profiling Intel SGX enclave code.

You can use Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier to measure the performance of enclave code only when the enclave has been launched as a debug enclave. To launch the enclave as a debug enclave, pass a value of 1 as the second parameter to the sgx_create_enclave function which loads and initializes the enclave as shown below. Use the pre-defined macro SGX_DEBUG_FLAG as the parameter, which equals 1 in the DEBUG and the PRE-RELEASE mode.

```c
sgx_create_enclave(ENCLAVE_FILENAME, SGX_DEBUG_FLAG, &token, &updated, &global_eid, NULL);
```

**NOTE:**
Only use Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier to measure the performance in the DEBUG and PRE-RELEASE mode because a DEBUG_FLAG value of 1 cannot be passed in to create an enclave in RELEASE configuration.

Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier provides two options to profile applications:

- Run the applications using Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier. If you use this approach, you do not have to do anything special.
- Attach to an already running process or enclave application. If you use this approach, define the environment variable as follows:

  - 32bit:
    ```
    INTEL_LIBITTNOTIFY32 = <VTune Installation Dir>\bin32\runtime\ittnotify_collector.dll
    ```
  - 64bit:
    ```
    INTEL_LIBITTNOTIFY64 = <VTune Installation Dir>\bin64\runtime\ittnotify_collector.dll
    ```
Once an enclave is loaded, the invoked ITT API of Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier in the uRTS passes information about the enclave to Intel® VTune™ Amplifier and profiles Intel SGX enclave applications. When you attach Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier to the application after invoking ITT API of Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier, the module information about the enclave is cached in the ITT dynamic library and is used by the Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier application during attach to process. The following table describes the different scenarios of how Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier is used to profile the enclave application.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier Invocation</th>
<th>Additional Configuration</th>
<th>ITT API Result</th>
<th>uRTS Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Launch the application with Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier is profiling</td>
<td>Set Debug OPTIN bit and invoke Module mapping API.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late attach <em>before</em> invoking ITT API for Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier profiling check in <em>sgx_cereate_enclave</em></td>
<td>ITT environment variable is set.</td>
<td>Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier is profiling</td>
<td>Set Debug OPTIN bit and invoke Module mapping API.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ITT environment variable is not set.</td>
<td>Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier is not profiling</td>
<td>Do not set Debug OPTIN bit and do not invoke Module mapping API. Even though Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier is running, it cannot profile enclaves. You need to set the environment variable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late attach <em>after</em> invoking ITT API for Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier profiling check in <em>sgx_cereate_enclave</em></td>
<td>ITT environment variable is set.</td>
<td>Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier is profiling</td>
<td>Set Debug OPTIN bit and Invoke Module mapping API. The ITT dynamic library caches the module information and provides it to the Intel (R) VTune(TM) Amplifier during attach to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process</td>
<td>Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier is not profiling</td>
<td>Do not set Debug OPTIN bit and do not invoke Module mapping API.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITT environment variable is not set.</td>
<td>Even though Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier is running here it cannot profile enclaves. You need to set the environment variable.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launch the application without Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Do not set Debug OPTIN bit and do not invoke Module mapping API.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Enclave Memory Measurement Tool**

An enclave is an isolated environment. The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides a tool called `sgx_emmt` to measure the real usage of protected memory by the enclave at runtime.

Currently the enclave memory measurement tool provides the following two functions:

1. Get the stack peak usage value for the enclave.
2. Get the heap peak usage value for the enclave.

The tool reports the size of both stack and heap in KB. Once you get accurate stack and heap usage information for your enclaves, you can rework the enclave configuration file based on this information to make full use of the protected memory. See [Enclave Configuration File](#) for details.

The tool is a separate application under Windows* OS. To measure the protected memory consumption by one enclave, leverage this tool to launch a test application which in turns loads the enclave. Use the following syntax for `sgx_emmt`:

```
sgx_emmt [--enclave=<enclave list>] application_name <application args>
```

**Arguments:**

--enclave:
This is an optional argument. It follows the measurement targets which are specified by `<enclave list>`. If users do not provide this parameter, the tool will collect the protected memory usage information for each measurable enclave. If more than one enclave needs to be measured, all the enclave names should be listed in `<enclave list>` separated by comma (,) without any blank space.

**application:**

It is the required argument which indicates the test application name. The application arguments are provided in `<application args>` if there are any.

**Examples:**

Assume a test application name is `myApp` with two input parameters. The test application manages three enclaves named `myEnclave1,myEnclave2, myEnclave3`.

1. Measure all the enclaves:
   
   ```
   sgx_emmt myApp.exe app_arg1 app_arg2
   ```

2. Measure two enclave targets:
   
   ```
   sgx_emmt --enclave-e=myEnclave1.signed.dll,myEnclave2.signed.dll myApp.exe app_arg1 app_arg2
   ```

**NOTE:**

The enclave memory measurement tool works based on the assumption that the measurement targets are measurable enclaves and the symbol files of the measurement targets can be found by default. A measurable enclave should meet the following requirements:

1. The enclave should be a debuggable enclave. This means that the `<DisableDebug>` configuration parameter in the enclave configuration file should be set to 0.
2. This tool requires the enclave debug information. The enclave module should generate the debug information (`/Zi/ZI/Z7 and /DEBUG`) at build time.
3. The enclave should be launched in debug mode. To launch the enclave in debug mode, set the debug flag to 1 when calling `sgx_create_enclave` to load the enclave.
**NOTE:**
Two versions of `sgx_emmt` are provided in the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK: 32bit version and 64bit version. Cross utilizing the tool will cause a measurement failure. By default, the 64bit version is utilized. To measure 32bit enclaves, use the 32bit version `sgx_emmt` manually.

**NOTE:**
To enable the symbol files to be found by default, locate the symbol files where they are generated or place the symbol files at current working directory.

**CPUSVN Configuration Tool**
CPUSVN stands for Security Version Number of the CPU, which affects the key derivation and report generation process. CPUSVN is not a numeric concept and will be upgraded/downgraded along with the hardware upgrade/-downgrade. To simulate the CPUSVN upgrade/downgrade without modifying the hardware, the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides a CPUSVN configuration tool for you to configure the CPUSVN. The CPUSVN configuration tool is for Intel(R) SGX simulation mode only and can be launched as a command line tool or as a GUI tool. It depends on your input.

**Command-Line Syntax**
To run the Intel(R) SGX CPUSVN configuration tool, use the following syntax:

```
sgx_config_cpusvn [Command]
```

The valid commands are listed in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-upgrade</td>
<td>Simulate a CPUSVN upgrade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-downgrade</td>
<td>Simulate a CPUSVN downgrade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-reset</td>
<td>Restore the CPUSVN to its default value.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If the `[Command]` is omitted, the tool will be launched as a GUI tool and the following dialog will be shown. Then, you can simulate the CPUSVN upgrade/-downgrade/reset by clicking the corresponding button.
Figure 14 CPUSVN Configuration Tool Dialog
Enclave Development Basics
This topic introduces the following enclave development basics:

- Writing Enclave Functions
- Calling Functions inside the Enclave
- Calling Functions outside the Enclave
- Linking Enclave with Libraries
- Linking Application with Untrusted Libraries
- Enclave Definition Language Syntax
- Loading and Unloading an Enclave

The typical enclave development process includes the following steps:

1. Use IDE plug-in wizard to generate an enclave project. See Using Microsoft* Visual Studio* Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Wizard for additional details.
2. Define the interface between the untrusted application and the enclave in the EDL file.
3. Implement the application and enclave functions.
4. Build the application and enclave. In the build process, Edger8r Tool generates trusted and untrusted proxy/bridge functions. Enclave Signing Tool generates the metadata and signature for the enclave.
5. Run and debug the application in simulation and hardware modes. See Enclave Debugger for more details.
6. Prepare the application and enclave for release.

Writing Enclave Functions
From an application perspective, making an enclave call (ECALL) appears as any other function call when using the untrusted proxy function. Enclave functions are plain C/C++ functions with several limitations.

The user can write enclave functions in C and C++ (native only). Other languages are not supported.

Enclave functions can rely on special versions of the C/C++ runtime libraries, STL, synchronization and several other trusted libraries that are part of the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK. These trusted libraries are specifically designed to be used inside enclaves.
The user can write or use other trusted libraries, making sure the libraries follow the same rules as the internal enclave functions:

1. Enclave functions can't use all the available 32-bit or 64-bit instructions. To check a list of illegal instructions inside an enclave, see Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Programming Reference.
2. Enclave functions will only run in user mode (ring 3). Using instructions requiring other CPU privileges will cause the enclave to fault.
3. Function calls within an enclave are possible if the called function is statically linked to the enclave (the function needs to be in the enclave image file). Windows* Dynamic libraries are not supported.

CAUTION:
The enclave signing process will fail if the enclave image contains any unresolved dependencies at build time.

Calling functions outside the enclave is possible using what are called OCALLs. OCALLs are explained in detail in the Calling Functions outside the Enclave section.

Table 7 Summary of Intel(R) SGX Rules and Limitations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Supported</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Languages</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Native C/C++. Enclave interface functions are limited to C (no C++).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/C++ calls to other DLLs</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Can be done by explicit external calls (OCALLs).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/C++ calls to System provided C/C++/STL standard libraries</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>A trusted version of these libraries is supplied with the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK and they can be used instead.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OS API calls (for example, WIN32)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Can be done by explicit external calls (OCALLs).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C++ frameworks</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Including MFC*, QT*, Boost* (partially – as long as Boost runtime is not used).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call C++ class methods</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Including C++ classes, static and inline functions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrinsic functions</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Supported only if they use supported instruc-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The allowed functions are included in the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Support Level</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inline assembly</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Same as the intrinsic functions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Template functions</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Only supported in enclave internal functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ellipse (...)</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Only supported in enclave internal functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Varargs (va_list)</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Only supported in enclave internal functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synchronization</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides a collection of functions/objects for synchronization: spin-lock, mutex, and condition variable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threading support</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Creating threads inside the enclave is not supported. Threads that run inside the enclave are created within the (untrusted) application. Spin-locks, trusted mutex and condition variables API can be used for thread synchronization inside the enclave.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thread Local Storage (TLS)</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Only implicitly viadeclspec(thread), Thread_local, or thread_local. No dynamic allocation of TLS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynamic memory allocation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Enclave memory is a limited resource. Maximum heap size is set at enclave creation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C++ Exceptions</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Although they have an impact on performance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEH Exceptions</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides an API to allow you to register functions, or exception handlers, to handle a limited set of hardware exceptions. See Custom Exception Handling for more details.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Calling Functions inside the Enclave**

After an enclave is loaded successfully, you get an enclave ID, which is provided as a parameter when the ECALLs are performed. Optionally, OCALLs can be performed within an ECALL. For example, assume that you need to compute some secret inside an enclave, the EDL file might look like the following:
// demo.edl
enclave {
    // Add your definition of "secret_t" here
    trusted {
        public void get_secret([out] secret_t* secret);
    };
    untrusted {
        // This OCALL is for illustration purposes only.
        // It should not be used in a real enclave,
        // unless it is during the development phase
        // for debugging purposes.
        void dump_secret([in] const secret_t* secret);
    };
};

With the above EDL, the sgx_edger8r will generate an untrusted proxy function for the ECALL and a trusted proxy function for the OCALL:

Untrusted proxy function (called by the application):
sgx_status_t get_secret(sgx_enclave_id_t eid, secret_t* secret);

Trusted proxy function (called by the enclave):
sgx_status_t dump_secret(const secret_t* secret);

The generated untrusted proxy function will automatically call into the enclave with the parameters to be passed to the real trusted function get_secret inside the enclave. To initiate an ECALL in the application:

// An enclave call (ECALL) will happen here
secret_t secret;
sgx_status_t status = get_secret(eid, &secret);

The trusted functions inside the enclave can optionally do an OCALL to dump the secret with the trusted proxy dump_secret. It will automatically call out of the enclave with the given parameters to be received by the real untrusted function dump_secret. The real untrusted function needs to be implemented by the developer and linked with the application.
Checking the Return Value

The trusted and untrusted proxy functions return a value of type `sgx_status_t`. If the proxy function runs successfully, it will return `SGX_SUCCESS`. Otherwise, it indicates a specific error described in the Error Codes section. You can refer to the sample code shipped with the SDK for examples of proper error handling.

Calling Functions outside the Enclave

In some cases, the code within the enclave needs to call external functions which reside in untrusted (unprotected) memory to use operating system capabilities outside the enclave such as system calls, I/O operations, and so on. This type of function call is named OCALL.

These functions need to be declared in the EDL file in the untrusted section. See Enclave Definition Language Syntax for more details.

The enclave image is loaded very similarly to how Windows*OS loads DLLs. The function address space of the application is shared with the enclave so the enclave code can indirectly call functions linked with the application that created the enclave. Calling functions from the application directly is not permitted and will raise an exception at runtime.

**CAUTION:**

The wrapper functions copy the parameters from protected (enclave) memory to unprotected memory as the external function cannot access protected memory regions. In particular, the OCALL parameters are copied into the untrusted stack. Depending on the number of parameters, the OCALL may cause a stack overrun in the untrusted domain. The exception that this event will trigger will appear to come from the code that the `sgx_eder8r` generates based on the enclave EDL file. However, the exception can be easily detected using the Intel(R) SGX debugger.

**CAUTION:**

The wrapper functions will copy buffers (memory referenced by pointers) only if these pointers are assigned special attributes in the EDL file.

**CAUTION:**

Certain trusted libraries distributed with the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provide an API that internally makes OCALLs. Currently, the Intel(R)
Software Guard Extensions mutex, condition variable, and CPUID APIs from sgx_tstdc.lib make OCALLs. Similarly, the trusted support library sgx_tservice.lib, which provides services from the Platform Services Enclave (PSE-Op), also makes OCALLs. Developers who use these APIs must first import the needed OCALL functions from their corresponding EDL files. Otherwise, developers will get a linker error when the enclave is built. See the Importing EDL Libraries for details on how to import OCALL functions from a trusted library EDL file.

**CAUTION:**

To help identify problems caused by missing imports, all OCALL functions used in the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK have the suffix ocall. For instance, the linker error below indicates that the enclave needs to import the OCALLs `sgx_thread_wait_untrusted_event_ocall()` and `sgx_thread_set_untrusted_event_ocall()` that are needed in `sethread_mutex.obj`, which is part of sgx_tstdc.lib.

```
sgx_tstdc.lib(sethread_mutex.obj) : error LNK2001: unresolved external symbol _sgx_thread_wait_untrusted_event_ocall

sgx_tstdc.lib(sethread_mutex.obj) : error LNK2001: unresolved external symbol _sgx_thread_set_untrusted_event_ocall
```

**CAUTION:**

Accessing protected memory from unprotected memory will result in abort page semantics. This applies to all parts of the protected memory including heap, stack, code and data.

Abort page semantics:

An attempt to read from a non-existent or disallowed resource returns all ones for data (abort page). An attempt to write to a non-existent or disallowed physical resource is dropped. This behavior is unrelated to exception type abort (the others being Fault and Trap).

OCALL functions have the following limitations/rules:

- OCALL functions must be C functions, or C++ functions with C linkage.
- Pointers that reference data within the enclave must be annotated with pointer direction attributes in the EDL file. The wrapper function will perform shallow copy on these pointers. See Pointers for more information.
Exceptions will not be caught within the enclave. The user must handle
them in the untrusted wrapper function.
OCALLs cannot have an ellipse (...) or a va_list in their prototype.

Example 1: The definition of a simple OCALL function

Step 1 – Add a declaration for foo in the EDL file

```c
// foo.edl
enclave {
    untrusted {
        [cdecl] void foo(int param);
    };
}
```

Step 2 (optional but highly recommended) – write a trusted, user-friendly
wrapper. This function is part of the enclave's trusted code.

The wrapper function ocall_foo function will look like:

```c
// enclave's trusted code
#include "foo_t.h"
void ocall_foo(int param)
{
    // it is necessary to check the return value of foo()
    if (foo(param) != SGX_SUCCESS)
        abort();
}
```

Step 3 – write an untrusted foo function.

```c
// untrusted code
void foo(int param)
{
    // the implementation of foo
}
```

The sgx_edger8r will generate an untrusted bridge function which will call
the untrusted function foo automatically. This untrusted bridge and the tar-
get untrusted function are part of the application, not the enclave.
Library Development for Enclaves

Trusted library is the term used to refer to a static library designed to be linked with an enclave. The following list describes the features of trusted libraries:

- Trusted libraries are components of an Intel(R) SGX-based solution. They typically undergo a more rigorous threat evaluation and review process than a regular static library.
- A trusted library is developed (or ported) with the specific purpose of being used within an enclave. Therefore, it should not contain instructions that are not supported by the Intel(R) SGX architecture.
- A subset of the trusted library API may also be part of the enclave interface. The trusted library interface that could be exposed to the untrusted domain is defined in an EDL file. If present, this EDL file is a key component of the trusted library.
- A trusted library may have to be shipped with an untrusted library. Functions within the trusted library may make OCALLs outside the enclave. If an external function that the trusted library uses is not provided by the libraries available on the platform, the trusted library will require an untrusted support library.

In summary, a trusted library, in addition to the .lib file containing the trusted code and data, may also include an .edl file as well as an untrusted .lib file.

This topic describes the process of developing a trusted library and provides an overview of the main steps necessary to build an enclave that uses such a trusted library.

1. The ISV provides a trusted library including the trusted functions (without any edge-routines) and, when necessary, an EDL file and an untrusted support library. To develop a trusted library, an ISV should create an enclave project and choose the library option in the Intel(R) SGX Wizard. This ensures the library is built with the appropriate settings. The ISV might delete the EDL file from the project if the trusted library only provides an interface to be invoked within an enclave. The ISV should create a standard static library project for the untrusted support library, if required.
2. Add a “from/import” statement with the library EDL file path and name
to the enclave EDL file. The import statement indicates which trusted functions (ECALLs) from the library may be called from outside the enclave and which untrusted functions (OCALLs) are called from within the trusted library. You may import all ECALLs and OCALLs from the trusted library or select a specific subset of them.

A library EDL file may import additional library EDL files building a hierarchical structure. For additional details, See Importing EDL Libraries.

3. During the enclave build process, the sgx_edger8r generates proxy/bridge code for all the trusted and untrusted functions. The generated code accounts for the functions declared in the enclave EDL file as well as any imported trusted library EDL file.

4. The trusted library and trusted proxy/bridge functions are linked to the enclave code.

**NOTE:**

If you use the wildcard option to import a trusted library, the resulting enclave contains the trusted bridge functions for all ECALLs and their corresponding implementations. The linker will not be able to optimize this code out.

5. The Intel(R) SGX application is linked to the untrusted proxy/bridge code. Similarly, when the wildcard import option is used, the untrusted bridge functions for all the OCALLs will be linked in.

**Avoiding Name Collisions**

An application may be designed to work with multiple enclaves. In this scenario, each enclave would still be an independent compilation unit resulting in a separate DLL file.

Enclaves, like regular DLL files, should provide a unique interface to avoid name collisions when an untrusted application is linked with the edge-routines of several enclaves. The sgx_edger8r prevents name collisions among OCALL functions because it automatically prepends the enclave name to the names of the untrusted bridge functions. However, ISVs must ensure the uniqueness of the ECALL function names across enclaves to prevent collisions among ECALL functions.

Despite having unique ECALL function names, name collision may also occur as the result of developing an Intel(R) SGX application. This happens because an enclave cannot import another DLL file. When two enclaves import the same
ECALL function from a trusted library, the set of edge-routines for each enclave will contain identical untrusted proxy functions and marshaling data structures for the imported ECALL. Thus, the linker will emit an error when the application is linked with these two sets of edge-routines. To build an application with more than one enclave when these enclaves import the same ECALL from a trusted library, ISVs have to:

1. Provide the `--use-prefix` option to `sgx_edger8r`, which will prepend the enclave name to the untrusted proxy function names. For instance, when an enclave uses the local attestation trusted library sample code included in the Intel(R) SGX SDK, the enclave EDL file must be parsed with the `--use-prefix` option to `sgx_edger8r`. See Local Attestation for additional details.
2. Prefix all ECALLs in their untrusted code with the enclave name, matching the new proxy function names.

**Linking Enclave with Libraries**

This topic introduces how to link an enclave with the following types of libraries:

- Dynamic libraries
- Static Libraries
- Simulation Libraries

**Dynamic Libraries**

An enclave DLL must not depend on any dynamically linked library in any way. The enclave loader has been intentionally designed to prohibit dynamic linking of libraries within an enclave. The protection of an enclave is dependent upon obtaining an accurate measurement of all code and data that is placed into the enclave at load time; thus, dynamic linking would add complexity without providing any benefit over static linking.

---

**CAUTION:**

The enclave image signing process will fail if the enclave file has any unresolved dependencies. It means that an enclave must have an empty IAT (Import Address Table).

**Static Libraries**

You can link with static libraries as long as they do not have any dependencies.
The Intel SGX SDK provides the following collection of trusted libraries.

**Table 8 Trusted Libraries included in the Intel® SGX SDK**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sgx_trts.lib</td>
<td>Intel® SGX Runtime library</td>
<td>Must link when running in HW mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sgx_trts_sim.lib</td>
<td>Intel® SGX Runtime library (simulation mode)</td>
<td>Must link when running in simulation mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sgx_tstdc.lib</td>
<td>Standard C library (math, string, and so on.)</td>
<td>Must link</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sgx_tccxx.lib,</td>
<td>Standard C++ libraries, STL</td>
<td>Optional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sgx_tstdcxx.lib</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sgx_tservice.lib</td>
<td>Data seal/unseal (encryption), trusted Architectural Enclaves</td>
<td>Must link when using HW mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>support, Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (EC DH) library, and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>so on.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sgx_tservice_sim.lib</td>
<td>The counterpart of sgx_tservice.lib for simulation mode</td>
<td>Must link when using simulation mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sgx_tcrypto.lib</td>
<td>Cryptographic library</td>
<td>Must link</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sgx_tkey_exchange.lib</td>
<td>Trusted key exchange library</td>
<td>Optional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sgx_tprotected_fs.lib</td>
<td>Protected File System library</td>
<td>Optional</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Simulation Libraries**

The Intel(R) SGX SDK provides simulation libraries to run application enclaves in simulation mode (Intel(R) SGX hardware is not required). There are an untrusted simulation library and a trusted simulation library. The untrusted simulation library provides the functionality that the untrusted runtime library requires to manage an enclave linked with the trusted simulation library, including the simulation of the Intel(R) SGX instructions executed outside the enclave: ECREATE, EADD, EEXTEND, EINIT, EREMOVE, and EENTER. The trusted simulation library is primarily responsible for simulating the Intel(R) SGX
instructions that can execute inside an enclave: EEXIT, EGETKEY, and EREPORT.

**NOTE**
Simulation mode does not require the Intel SGX support in the CPU. However, the processor must support the Intel(R) Streaming SIMD Extensions 4.1 instructions at least.

**Linking Application with Untrusted Libraries**
The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides the following collection of untrusted libraries.

**Table 9 Untrusted Libraries included in the Intel(R) SGX SDK**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sgx_urts.lib</td>
<td>Provides functionality for applications to manage enclaves</td>
<td>Must link when running in HW mode. sgx_urts.dll is included in Intel(R) SGX PSW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sgx_urts_sim.dll</td>
<td>uRTS library used in simulation mode</td>
<td>Dynamically linked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sgx_urts_sim.lib</td>
<td>The counterpart of sgx_urts.lib for simulation mode</td>
<td>Must link when running in simulation mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sgx_uae_service.lib</td>
<td>Provides both enclaves and untrusted applications access to services provided by the AEs</td>
<td>Must link when running in HW mode. sgx_uae_service.dll is included in Intel(R) SGX PSW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sgx_uae_service_sim.dll</td>
<td>Untrusted AE support library used in simulation mode</td>
<td>Dynamically linked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sgx_uae_service_sim.lib</td>
<td>The counterpart of sgx_uae_service.lib for simulation mode</td>
<td>Must link when running in simulation mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sgx_ukey_exchange.lib</td>
<td>Untrusted key exchange library (built with /MD)</td>
<td>Optional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sgx_ukey_exchangemt.lib</td>
<td>Untrusted key exchange library (built with /MT)</td>
<td>Optional</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Intel® Software Guard Extensions Developer Reference for Windows* OS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Library Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Required Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sgx_status.dll</td>
<td>Provides functionality for applications to register Enclave Signing Key White List Certificate Chain</td>
<td>Optional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sgx_capable.dll</td>
<td>Provides functionality for applications to query Intel SGX device status and the version of PSW installed, or to enable the Intel SGX device.</td>
<td>Optional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sgx_uprotected_fs.lib</td>
<td>Provides implementation for system calls outside an enclave required by Intel(R) Protected File System library.</td>
<td>Optional</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Loading Untrusted Intel® SGX DLLs

The Intel® SGX DLLs shipped with the Intel® SGX PSW (sgx_urts.dll and sgx_uae_service.dll) are installed in the system directory. You must lock down the Intel® SGX application installation directory. Otherwise, you must explicitly load these two DLLs.

Suppose an attacker gains control over the directory where the application is installed and inserts a malicious copy of an Intel® SGX DLL in that directory. If the application implicitly loads the Intel® SGX DLLs, then the bad copy will get loaded before the original Intel® SGX DLLs from the system path.

To make sure that an Intel® SGX application is loading the Intel® SGX DLLs from the system directory, the application should explicitly load the two DLLs in the following order:

1. sgx_uae_service.dll
2. sgx_urts.dll

Enclave Definition Language Syntax

Enclave Definition Language (EDL) files are meant to describe enclave trusted and untrusted functions and types used in the function prototypes. Edger8r Tool uses this file to create C wrapper functions for both enclave exports (used by ECALLs) and imports (used by OCALLs).

EDL Template

enclave {
    //Include files
    //Import other edl files
// Data structure declarations to be used as parameters of the
// function prototypes in edl

trusted {
   // Include header files if any
   // Will be included in enclave_t.h
   // Trusted function prototypes
};

untrusted {
   // Include header files if any
   // Will be included in enclave_u.h
   // Untrusted function prototypes
};

The trusted block is optional only if it is used as a library EDL, and this EDL
would be imported by other EDL files. However the untrusted block is always
optional.

Every EDL file follows this generic format:

enclave {

   // An EDL file can optionally import functions from
   // other EDL files
   from "other/file.edl" import foo, bar;  // selective importing
   from "another/file.edl" import *;     // import all functions

   // Include C headers, these headers will be included in the
   // generated files for both trusted and untrusted routines
   include "string.h"
   include "mytypes.h"

   // Type definitions (struct, union, enum), optional
   struct mysecret {
      int key;
      const char* text;
   };
   enum boolean { FALSE = 0, TRUE = 1 };

   // Export functions (ECALLs), optional for library EDLs
   trusted {
      // Include header files if any
      // Will be included in enclave_t.h
      // Trusted function prototypes
   };

   };


public void set_secret([in] struct mysecret* psecret);

void some_private_func(enum boolean b); // private ECALL (non-root ECALL).
};

// Import functions (OCALLs), optional untrusted {

//Include header files if any
//Will be included in enclave_u.h
//Will be inserted in untrusted header file
"untrusted.h"

//Untrusted function prototypes
// This OCALL is not allowed to make another ECALL.
void ocall_print();

// This OCALL can make an ECALL to function
// "some_private_func".
int another_ocall([in] struct mysecret* psecret)
  allow(some_private_func);
};

Comments
Both types of C/C++ comments are valid.

Example
enclave {
  include "stdio.h" // include stdio header
  include "./../util.h" /* this header defines some custom public
              types */
};

Include Headers
Include C headers which define types (C structs, unions, typedefs, etc.); otherwise auto generated code cannot be compiled if these types are referenced in EDL. The included header file can be global or belong to trusted functions or untrusted functions only.

A global included header file doesn't mean that the same header file is included in the enclave and untrusted application code. In this case, the enclave will use the stdio.h from the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK. While the application code will use the stdio.h shipped with the host compiler.
Using the `include` directive is convenient when developers are migrating existing code to the Intel SGX technology, since data types are defined already in this case. Similar to other IDL languages like Microsoft® interface definition language (MIDL®) and CORBA® interface definition language (OMG-IDL), a user can define data types inside the EDL file and `sgx_edgeR8r` will generate a C header file with the data type definitions. For a list of supported data types with in EDL, see Basic Types.

**Syntax**

```
include “filename.h”
```

**Example**

```
enclave {
    include “stdio.h” // global headers
    include “../../util.h”

    trusted {
        include “foo.h” // for trusted functions only
    }

    untrusted {
        include “bar.h” // for untrusted functions only
    }
}
```

**Keywords**

The identifiers listed in the following table are reserved for use as keywords of the Enclave Definition Language.

**Table 10 EDL Reserved Keywords**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Types</th>
<th>Data Types</th>
<th>Data Types</th>
<th>Data Types</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>char</td>
<td>short</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>float</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>int8_t</td>
<td>int16_t</td>
<td>int32_t</td>
<td>int64_t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>size_t</td>
<td>wchar_t</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>uint8_t</td>
<td>uint16_t</td>
<td>uint32_t</td>
<td>uint64_t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unsigned</td>
<td>struct</td>
<td>enum</td>
<td>long</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Pointer Parameter Handling**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pointer Parameter Handling</th>
<th>Pointer Parameter Handling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in</td>
<td>out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>user_check</td>
<td>count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>size</td>
<td>readonly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>isptr</td>
<td>sizefunc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>string</td>
<td>wstring</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Others**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Basic Types**

EDL supports the following basic types:

- `char`, `short`, `long`, `int`, `float`, `double`, `void`, `int8_t`, `int16_t`, `int32_t`, `int64_t`, `size_t`, `wchar_t`, `uint8_t`, `uint16_t`, `uint32_t`, `uint64_t`, `unsigned`, `struct`, `enum`, `union`.

It also supports `long long` and 64-bit `long double`.

Basic data types can be modified using the C modifiers:

- `const`, `*`, `[]`.

Additional types can be defined by including a C header file.

**Structures, Enums and Unions**

Basic types and user defined data types can be used inside the structure/union except it differs from the standard in the following ways:

**Unsupported Syntax:**

```c
enclave{
    // 1. Each member of the structure has to be defined separately
    struct data_def_t{
        int a, b, c; // Not allowed
        // It has to be int a; int b; int c;
    };

    // 2. Bit fields in structures/unions are not allowed.
    struct bitfields_t{
        short i : 3;
        short j : 6;
        short k : 7;
    };

    // 3. Nested structure definition is not allowed
    struct my_struct_t{
```
int out_val;
float out_fval;
struct inner_struct_t{
    int in_val;
    float in_fval;
};

};

Valid Syntax:

enclave {
    include "user_types.h" // for ufloat: typedef float ufloat

    struct struct_foo_t {
        uint32_t struct_foo_0;
        uint64_t struct_foo_1;
    };

    enum enum_foo_t {
        ENUM_FOO_0 = 0,
        ENUM_FOO_1 = 1
    };

    union union_foo_t {
        uint32_t union_foo_0;
        uint32_t union_foo_1;
        uint64_t union_foo_3;
    };

    trusted {

        public void test_char(char val);
        public void test_int(int val);
        public void test_long(long long val);

        public void test_float(float val);
        public void test_ufloat(ufloat val);
        public void test_double(double val);
        public void test_long_double(long double val);

        public void test_size_t(size_t val);
        public void test_wchar_t(wchar_t val);

        public void test_struct(struct struct_foo_t val);
        public void test_struct2(struct struct_foo_t val);

        public void test_enum(enum enum_foo_t val);
        public void test_enum2(enum enum_foo_t val);

        public void test_union(union union_foo_t val);
        public void test_union2(union union_foo_t val);
    };
}
Pointers
EDL defines several attributes that can be used with pointers:
in, out, user_check, string, wstring, size, count, size_func, isptr, readonly.

Each of them is explained in the following topics.

**CAUTION:**
The pointer attributes explained in this topic apply to ECALL and OCALL function parameters exclusively, not to the pointers returned by an ECALL or OCALL function. Thus, pointers returned by an ECALL or OCALL function are not checked by the edge-routines and must be verified by the enclave and application code.

**Pointer Handling**
Pointers should be decorated with either a pointer direction attribute `in, out` or a `user_check` attribute explicitly. The `[in]` and `[out]` serve as direction attributes.

- `[in]` – when `[in]` is specified for a pointer argument, the parameter is passed from the calling procedure to the called procedure. For an ECALL the `in` parameter is passed from the application to the enclave, for an OCALL the parameter is passed from the enclave to the application.
- `[out]` – when `[out]` is specified for a pointer argument, the parameter is returned from the called procedure to the calling procedure. In an ECALL function an `out` parameter is passed from the enclave to the application and an OCALL function passes it from the application to the enclave.
- `[in]` and `[out]` attributes may be combined. In this case the parameter is passed in both directions.

The direction attribute instructs the trusted edge-routines (trusted bridge and trusted proxy) to copy the buffer pointed by the pointer. In order to copy the buffer contents, the trusted edge-routines have to know how much data needs to be copied. For this reason, the direction attribute is usually followed by a `size`, `count` or `size_func` modifier. If neither of these is provided nor
the pointer is NULL, the trusted edge-routine assumes a count of one. When a buffer is being copied, the trusted bridge must avoid overwriting enclave memory in an ECALL and the trusted proxy must avoid leaking secrets in an OCALL. To accomplish this goal, pointers passed as ECALL parameters must point to untrusted memory and pointers passed as OCALL parameters must point to trusted memory. If these conditions are not satisfied, the trusted bridge and the trusted proxy will report an error at runtime, respectively, and the ECALL and OCALL functions will not be executed.

You may use the direction attribute to trade protection for performance. Otherwise, you must use the user_check attribute described below and validate the data obtained from untrusted memory via pointers before using it, since the memory a pointer points to could change unexpectedly because it is stored in untrusted memory. However, the direction attribute does not help with structures that contain pointers. In this scenario, you have to validate and copy the buffer contents, recursively if needed, yourself.

**Example**

```java
enclave {
    trusted {
        public void test_ecall_user_check([user_check] int * ptr);
        public void test_ecall_in([in] int * ptr);
        public void test_ecall_out([out] int * ptr);
        public void test_ecall_in_out([in, out] int * ptr);
    }
    untrusted {
        void test_ocall_user_check([user_check] int * ptr);
        void test_ocall_in([in] int * ptr);
        void test_ocall_out([out] int * ptr);
        void test_ocall_in_out([in, out] int * ptr);
    }
};
```

**Unsupported Syntax:**

```java
enclave {
    trusted {
```
// Pointers without a direction attribute
// or 'user_check' are not allowed
public void test_ecall_not(int * ptr);

// Function pointers are not allowed
public void test_ecall_func([in] int (*func_ptr)());
}

In the example shown above:

For ECALL:

- **[user_check]**: In the function `test_ecall_user_check`, the pointer `ptr` will not be verified; you should verify the pointer passed to the trusted function. The buffer pointed to by `ptr` is not copied to inside buffer either.
- **[in]**: In the function `test_ecall_in`, a buffer with the same size as the data type of `ptr(int)` will be allocated inside the enclave. Content pointed to by `ptr`, one integer value, will be copied into the new allocated memory inside. Any changes performed inside the enclave will not be visible to the untrusted application.
- **[out]**: In the function `test_ecall_out`, a buffer with the same size as the data type of `ptr(int)` will be allocated inside the enclave, but the content pointed to by `ptr`, one integer value will not be copied. Instead, it will be initialized to zero. After the trusted function returns, the buffer inside the enclave will be copied to the outside buffer pointed to by `ptr`.
- **[in, out]**: In the function `test_ecall_in_out`, a buffer with the same size will be allocated inside the enclave, the content pointed to by `ptr`, one integer value, will be copied to this buffer. After returning, the buffer inside the enclave will be copied to the outside buffer.

For OCALL:

- **[user_check]**: In the function `test_ocall_user_check`, the pointer `ptr` will not be verified; the buffer pointed to by `ptr` is not copied to an outside buffer. Besides, the application cannot read/modify the memory pointed to by `ptr`, if `ptr` points to enclaves memory.
- **[in]**: In the function `test_ocall_in`, a buffer with the same size as the data type of `ptr(int)` will be allocated in the 'application' side (untrusted
Content pointed to by `ptr`, one integer value, will be copied into the newly allocated memory outside. Any changes performed by the application will not be visible inside the enclave.

- **[out]:** In the function `test_ocall_out`, a buffer with the same size as the data type of `ptr(int)` will be allocated on the application side (untrusted side) and its content will be initialized to zero. After the untrusted function returns, the buffer outside the enclave will be copied to the enclave buffer pointed to by `ptr`.
- **[in, out]:** In the function `test_ocall_in_out`, a buffer with the same size will be allocated in the application side, the content pointed to by `ptr`, one integer value, will be copied to this buffer. After returning, the buffer outside the enclave will be copied into the inside enclave buffer.

The following table summarizes behavior of wrapper functions when using the in/out attributes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ECALL</th>
<th>OCALL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>user_check</strong></td>
<td>Pointer is not checked. Users must perform the check and/or copy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>in</strong></td>
<td>Buffer copied from the application into the enclave. Afterwards, changes will only affect the buffer inside enclave. Safe but slow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>out</strong></td>
<td>Trusted wrapper function will allocate a buffer to be used by the enclave. Upon return, this buffer will be copied to the original buffer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>in, out</strong></td>
<td>Combines in and out behavior. Data is copied back and forth.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 11 Behavior of wrapper functions when using the in/out attributes**

EDL cannot analyze C typedefs and macros found in C headers. If a pointer type is aliased to a type/macro that does not have an asterisk (*), the EDL parser may report an error or not properly copy the pointer’s data.

In such cases, declare the function prototype to use types that have an asterisk.

**Example:**

```c
// Error, PVOID is not a pointer in EDL
```
void foo([in, size=4] PVOID buffer);
// OK
void foo([in, size=4] void* buffer);
// OK, “isptr” indicates “PVOID” is pointer type
void foo([in, isptr, size=4] PVOID buffer);
// OK, opaque type, copy by value
// Actual address must be in untrusted memory
void foo(HWND hWnd);

**Pointer Handling in ECALLs**

In ECALLs, the trusted bridge checks that the marshaling structure does not overlap with the enclave memory, and automatically allocates space on the trusted stack to hold a copy of the structure. Then it checks that pointer parameters with their full range do not overlap with the enclave memory. When a pointer to the untrusted memory with the *in* attribute is passed to the enclave, the trusted bridge allocates memory inside the enclave and copies the memory pointed to by the pointer from outside to the enclave memory. When a pointer to the untrusted memory with the *out* attribute is passed to the enclave, the trusted bridge allocates a buffer in the trusted memory, zeroes the buffer contents to clear any previous data and passes a pointer to this buffer to the trusted function. After the trusted function returns, the trusted bridge copies the contents of the trusted buffer to untrusted memory. When the *in* and *out* attributes are combined, the trusted bridge allocates memory inside the enclave, makes a copy of the buffer in the trusted memory before calling the trusted function, and once the trusted function returns, the trusted bridge copies the contents of the trusted buffer to the untrusted memory. The amount of data copied out is the same as the amount of data copied in.

**NOTE:**

When an ECALL with a pointer parameter with *out* attribute returns, the trusted bridge always copies data from the buffer in enclave memory to the buffer outside. You must clear all sensitive data from that buffer on failure.

Before the trusted bridge returns, it frees all the trusted heap memory allocated at the beginning of the ECALL function for pointer parameters with a direction attribute. Attempting to use a buffer allocated by the trusted bridge after it returns results in undefined behavior.
**Pointer Handling in OCALLs**

For OCALLs, the trusted proxy allocates memory on the outside stack to pass the marshaling structure and checks that the pointer parameters with their full range are within enclave. When a pointer to trusted memory with the `in` attribute is passed from an enclave (an OCALL), the trusted proxy allocates memory outside the enclave and copies the memory pointed by the pointer from inside the enclave to the untrusted memory. When a pointer to the trusted memory with the `out` attribute is passed from an enclave (an OCALL), the trusted proxy allocates a buffer on the untrusted stack, and passes a pointer to this buffer to the untrusted function. After the untrusted function returns, the trusted proxy copies the contents of the untrusted buffer to the trusted memory. When the `in` and `out` attributes are combined, the trusted proxy allocates memory outside the enclave, makes a copy of the buffer in the untrusted memory before calling the untrusted function, and after the untrusted function returns the trusted proxy copies the contents of the untrusted buffer to the trusted memory. The amount of data copied out is the same as the amount of data copied in.

When the trusted proxy function returns, it frees all the untrusted stack memory allocated at the beginning of the OCALL function for the pointer parameters with a direction attribute. Attempting to use a buffer allocated by the trusted proxy after it returns results in undefined behavior.

**Attribute: user_check**

In certain situations, the restrictions imposed by the direction attribute may not support the application needs for data communication across the enclave boundary. For instance, a buffer might be too large to fit in enclave memory and needs to be fragmented into smaller blocks that are then processed in a series of ECALLs, or an application might require passing a pointer to trusted memory (enclave context) as an ECALL parameter.

To support these specific scenarios, the EDL language provides the `user_check` attribute. Parameters declared with the `user_check` attribute do not undergo any of the checks described for `[in]` and `[out]` attributes. However, you must understand the risks associated with passing pointers in and out the enclave, in general, and the `user_check` attribute, in particular. You must ensure that all the pointer checking and data copying are done correctly or risk compromising enclave secrets.
Buffer Size Calculation

The generalized formula for calculating the buffer size using these attributes:

\[ \text{Total number of bytes} = \text{count} \times \text{size} \]

- The above formula holds when both count and size/sizefunc are specified.
- size can be specified by either size or sizefunc attribute.
- If count is not specified for the pointer parameter, then it is assumed to be equal to 1, i.e., count=1. Then total number of bytes equals to size/sizefunc.
- If size is not specified, then the buffer size is calculated using the above formula where size is sizeof (element pointed by the pointer).

Attribute: size

The size attribute is used to indicate the buffer size in bytes used for copy depending on the direction attribute ([in]/[out]) (when there is no count attribute specified). This attribute is needed because the trusted bridge needs to know the whole range of the buffer passed as a pointer to ensure it does not overlap with the enclave memory, and to copy the contents of the buffer from untrusted memory to trusted memory and/or vice versa depending on the direction attribute. The size may be either an integer constant or one of the parameters to the function. size attribute is generally used for void pointers.

Example

enclave{
    trusted {
        // Copies '100' bytes
        public void test_size1([in, size=100] void* ptr, size_t len);

        // Copies 'len' bytes
        public void test_size2([in, size=len] void* ptr, size_t len);
    }
};

Unsupported Syntax:
enclave{
    trusted {

// size/count/sizefunc attributes must be used with
// pointer direction ([in, out])
void test_attribute_cant([size=len] void* ptr, size_t len);
};
};

Attribute: sizefunc

The sizefunc attribute modifier depends on a user defined trusted function which is called by the edge-routines to get the number of bytes to be copied. The sizefunc has similar functionality as the sizeof() operator. An example of where sizefunc can be used is for marshaling variable-length structures, which are buffers whose total size is specified by a combination of values stored at well-defined locations inside the buffer (although typically it is at a single location). To prevent “check first, use later” type of attacks, sizefunc is called twice. In the first call, sizefunc operates in untrusted memory. The second time, sizefunc operates in the data copied into trusted memory. If the sizes returned by the two sizefunc calls do not match, the trusted bridge will cancel the ECALL and will report an error to the untrusted application. Note that sizefunc must not be combined with the size attribute. sizefunc cannot be used with out alone, however sizefunc with both in and out is accepted. Additionally, users cannot define sizefunc as strlen or wcslen. In all these scenarios, the sgx_edger8r will throw an error. Strings should not be passed with the sizefunc modifier, but with the string or wstring keyword. sizefunc can be used with the count attribute which gives the total length to be equal to sizefunc * count. The following is the prototype of the trusted sizefunc that you need to define inside the enclave:

size_t sizefunc_function_name(const parameter_type * p);

Where parameter_type is the data type of the parameter annotated with the sizefunc attribute. If you do not provide the definition of the sizefunc function, the linker will report an error.

**NOTE**

The function implementing a sizefunc should validate the input pointer carefully, before using it. Since the function is called before the pointer is checked by the generated code.

**Example**

enclave{
    trusted {

// Copies get_packet_size bytes
// User must provide a function definition that matches
// size_t get_packet_size(const void* ptr);
void test_sizefunc([in, sizefunc=get_packet_size] void* ptr);

// Copies (get_packet_size * cnt) bytes
void test_sizefunc2(
    [in, sizefunc=get_packet_size, count=cnt] void* ptr,
    unsigned cnt);
}

Unsupported Syntax:
enclave{
    include "user_types.h"

    trusted {
        // Cannot use sizefunc and size together
        void test_sizefunc_size(
            [in, size=100, sizefunc=packet_len] header* h);

        // Cannot use strlen or wcslen as sizefunc
        void test_sizefunc_strlen([in, sizefunc=strlen] header* h);
        void test_sizefunc_wcslen([in, sizefunc=wcslen] header* h);
    }
};

Attribute: count

The count attribute is used to indicate a block of sizeof element pointed by
the pointer in bytes used for copy depending on the direction attribute. The count and size attribute modifiers serve the same purpose. The number of bytes copied by the trusted bridge or trusted proxy is the product of the count and the size of the data type to which the parameter points. The count may be either an integer constant or one of the parameters to the function.

The size and count attribute modifiers may also be combined. In this case, the trusted edge-routine will copy a number of bytes that is the product of the count and size parameters (size*count) specified in the function declaration in the EDL file.

Example

enclave{
    trusted {
        // Copies cnt * sizeof(int) bytes
        public void test_count([in, count=cnt] int* ptr, unsigned
            cnt);
    }
}
/ Copies cnt * len bytes
public void test_count_size([in, count=cnt, size=len] int*
ptr, unsigned cnt, size_t len);
);

};

Strings

The attributes \texttt{string} and \texttt{wstring} indicate that the parameter is a NULL terminated C string or a NULL terminated \texttt{wchar_t} string, respectively. To prevent "check first, use later" type of attacks, the trusted edge-routine first operates in untrusted memory to determine the length of the string. Once the string has been copied into the enclave, the trusted bridge explicitly NULL terminates the string. The size of the buffer allocated in trusted memory accounts for the length determined in the first step as well as the size of the string termination character.

\textbf{NOTE}

The \texttt{string} and \texttt{wstring} attributes must not be combined with any other modifier such as \texttt{size, count} or \texttt{sizefunc}. \texttt{string} and \texttt{wstring} cannot be used with \texttt{out} alone. In all these cases, the \texttt{sgx_edge8r} will report an error. However, \texttt{string} and \texttt{wstring} with both \texttt{in} and \texttt{out} are accepted.

Example

enclave {

trusted {

    // Cannot use [out] with "string/wstring" alone
    // Using [in], or [in, out] is acceptable
    public void test_string([in, out, string] char* str);

    public void test_wstring([in, out, wstring] char* wstr);

    public void test_const_string([in, string] const char* str);

    }

};

Unsupported Syntax:

enclave {

    include "user_types.h"  //for typedef void const * pBuf2;

    trusted {


```c
// string/wstring attributes must be used
// with pointer direction
void test_string_cant([string] char* ptr);

// string/wstring attributes cannot be used
// with [out] attribute
void test_string_out([out, string] char* str);

// sizefunc can’t be used for strings, use [string/wstring]
void test_string_sizefunc_cant(
    [in, string, sizefunc=packet_len] header* h);
};

In the first example, when the string attribute is used for function test_string, strlen(str)+1 is used as the size for copying the string in and out of the enclave. The extra byte is for null termination.

In the function test_wstring, wcslen(str)+1 (two-byte units) will be used as the size for copying the string in and out of the enclave.

**User Defined Data Types**

The Enclave Definition Language (EDL) supports user defined data types, but should be defined in a header file. Any basic datatype which is typedef’ed into another becomes a user defined data type.

Some user data types need to be annotated with special EDL attributes, such as isptr, isary and readonly. If one of these attributes is missing when a user-defined type parameter requires it so, the compiler will emit a compilation error in the code that sgx_edger8r generates.

- When there is a user defined data type for a pointer, isptr is used to indicate that the user defined parameter is a pointer. See Pointers for more information.

- When there is a user defined data type for arrays, isary is used to indicate that the user defined parameter is an array. See Arrays for more information.

- When an ECALL or OCALL parameter is a user defined type of a pointer to a const data type, the parameter should be annotated with the readonly attribute.

**Example**

enclave {
```
include "user_types.h" // for typedef void * pBuf;
   // and typedef void const * pBuf2;
   // and typedef int uArray[10];

trusted {

   public void test_isptr(
       [in, isptr, size=len] pBuf pBufptr,
       size_t len);

   public void test_isptr_readonly(
       [in, out, isptr, readonly, size=len] pBuf2
       pBuf2ptr,
       size_t len);

   public void test_isary([in, isary, size=len] uArray arr,
       size_t len);
};
}

Unsupported Syntax:

enclave {

   include "user_types.h" //for typedef void const * pBuf2;
   // and typedef int uArray[10];

trusted {
   // Cannot use [out] when using [readonly] attribute
   void test_isptr_readonly_cant(
       [in, out, isptr, readonly, size=len] pBuf2
       pBuf2ptr,
       size_t len);
   // User-defined array types need "isary"
   public void test_miss_isary([in, size=len] uArray arr,
       size_t len);
};
}

In the function test_isptr_readonly, pBuf2 (typedef void const * pBuf2) is a user defined pointer type, so isptr is used to indicate that it is a user defined type. Also, the pBuf2ptr is readonly, so you cannot use the out attribute. The size attribute indicates the number of bytes to be copied to the enclave memory.

const Keyword

The EDL language accepts the const keyword with the same meaning as the const keyword in the C standard. However, the support for this keyword is limited in the EDL language. It may only be used with pointers and as the outermost qualifier. This satisfies the most important usage in Intel(R) SGX, which
is to detect conflicts between const pointers (pointers to const data) with the out attribute. Other forms of the const keyword supported in the C standard are not supported in the EDL language.

Arrays
The Enclave Definition Language (EDL) supports multidimensional, fixed-size arrays to be used in data structure definition and parameter declaration. Zero-length array and flexible array member, however, are not supported. The special attribute isary is used to designate function parameters that are of a user defined type array.

Example
enclave {
    include "user_types.h"  //for uArray - typedef int uArray[10];
    trusted {
        public void test_array([in] int arr[4]);
        public void test_array_multi([in] int arr[4][4]);
        public void test_isary([in, isary, size=len] uArray arr, size_t len);
    }
};

Unsupported Syntax:
enclave {
    include "user_types.h"  //for uArray - typedef int uArray[10];
    trusted {
        // Flexible array is not supported
        public void test_flexible(int arr[][4]);

        // Zero-length array is not supported.
        public void test_zero(int arr[0]);

        // User-defined array types need "isary"
        public void test_miss_isary([in, size=len] uArray arr, size_t len);
    }
};
Support for arrays also includes attributes \([\text{in}], [\text{out}]\) and \([\text{user\_check}]\), which are similar in usage to the pointers.

**Preprocessor Capability**

The EDL language supports macro definition and conditional compilation directives. To provide this capability, the \texttt{sgx\_edger8r} first uses the compiler preprocessor to parse the EDL file. Once all preprocessor tokens have been translated, the \texttt{sgx\_edger8r} then parses the resulting file as regular EDL language. This means that developers may define simple macros and use conditional compilation directives to easily remove debug and test capabilities from production enclaves, reducing the attack surface of an enclave. See the following EDL example.

```c
#define SGX_DEBUG

enclave {
    trusted {
        // ECALL definitions
    }
    untrusted {
        // OCALL definitions
    }
    #ifdef SGX_DEBUG
    
        void print([\text{in, string}] const char * str);
    
    #endif
}
```

The current \texttt{sgx\_edger8r} does not propagate macro definitions from the EDL file into the generated edge-routines. As a result, you need to duplicate macro definitions in both the EDL file as well as in the compiler arguments or other source files.

We recommend you only use simple macro definitions and conditional compilation directives in your EDL files.

The \texttt{sgx\_edger8r} starts searching the PATH for the Intel(R) compiler. If it does not find the Intel compiler, then it searches for the Microsoft* Visual Studio compiler. The \texttt{sgx\_edger8r} uses the first compiler it finds. However, if the \texttt{sgx\_edger8r} does not find any compiler in the PATH, it then looks for the Visual Studio compiler in the registry. If the \texttt{sgx\_edger8r} still cannot find a compiler, it will then generate a warning message and will parse the EDL directly to parse macros and conditional compilation directives that might be
in the EDL file. You may override the default search behavior or even specify a different preprocessor with the \texttt{--preprocessor} option.

\textbf{Function Calling Convention for OCALLs}

Untrusted functions can optionally receive attributes that affect their calling convention and DLL linkage. You can find details on these calling conventions at http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/984x0h58

The \texttt{cdecl} calling convention is the default as defined by the C standard.

Improper use of the \texttt{cdecl, stdcall} or \texttt{fastcall} keywords may result in a linker error.

OCALL functions (untrusted) may be implemented in DLLs, the keyword \texttt{dllimport} is used to specify this attribute. Improper use of the \texttt{dllimport} keyword will result in a compilation warning.

The calling convention is specified using the following keywords:

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|}
\hline
\textbf{Value} & \textbf{Stack Cleanup} & \textbf{Parameter Passing} \\
\hline
cdecl & Caller & Pushes parameters on the stack (right to left) \\
stdcall & Callee & Pushes parameters on the stack (right to left) \\
fastcall & Callee & Stored in registers, then pushed on stack (right to left) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

These calling conventions affect 32-bit builds only. 64-bit builds have a single calling convention, \texttt{fastcall}.

\textbf{Example}

The trusted function \texttt{test\_calling\_convs()} can use the standard functions like file operations and others by using untrusted functions (OCALLs).

\begin{verbatim}
enclave {

    include "sgx_stdio_stubs.h" //for FILE and other definitions

    trusted {
        public void test\_calling\_convs(void);
    };

    untrusted {

        [cdecl, dllimport] FILE * fopen(
            [in,string] const char * filename,
            [in,string] const char * mode);

    }

}\end{verbatim}
[cdecl, dllimport] int fclose([user_check] FILE * stream);

[cdecl, dllimport] size_t fwrite(
    [in, size=size, count=count] const void * buffer,
    size_t size,
    size_t count,
    [user_check] FILE * stream);

[fastcall] void test_fast_call([in]void* ptr);

[stdcall] void test_std_call(void);

};

Unsupported Syntax:

enclave {

    untrusted {
        // Compiler warning without [cdecl,dllimport]
        size_t fwrite([in, size=size, count=count] const void* ptr,
            size_t size,
            size_t count,
            [user_check] FILE * stream);

        // Compiler error without [stdcall]
        // Redefinition due to different type modifiers
        void test_std_call(void);
    }
};

Propagating errno in OCALLs

OCALLs may use the propagate_errno attribute. When you use this attribute, the sgx_edger8r produces slightly different edge-routines. The errno variable inside the enclave, which is provided by the trusted Standard C library, is overwritten with the value of errno in the untrusted domain before the OCALL returns. The trusted errno is updated upon OCALL completion regardless whether the OCALL was successful or not. This does not change the fundamental behavior of errno. A function that fails must set errno to indicate what went wrong. A function that succeeds, in this case the OCALL, is allowed to change the value of errno.

Example

enclave {


include "sgx_stdio_stubs.h" //for FILE and other definitions

trusted {
    public void test_file_io(void);
};

untrusted {
    [cdecl, dllimport] FILE * fopen(
        [in,string] const char * filename,
        [in,string] const char * mode) propagate_errno;

    [cdecl, dllimport] int fclose([user_check] FILE * stream)
        propagate_errno;

    [cdecl, dllimport] size_t fwrite(
        [in, size=size, count=count] const void * buffer,
        size_t size,
        size_t count,
        [user_check]FILE * stream) propagate_errno;
};

Importing EDL Libraries

You can implement export and import functions in external trusted libraries, akin to static libraries in the untrusted domain. To add these functions to an enclave, use the enclave definition language (EDL) library import mechanism.

Use the EDL keywords from and import to add a library EDL file to an enclave EDL file is done.

The from keyword specifies the location of the library EDL file. Relative and full paths are accepted. Relative paths are relative to the location of the EDL file.

The import keyword specifies the functions to import. An asterisk (*) can be used to import all functions from the library. More than one function can be imported by writing a list of function names separated by commas.

Syntax

from "lib_filename.edl" import func_name, func2_name;

Or

from "lib_filename.edl" import *;

Example

enclave {

A library EDL file may import another EDL file, which in turn, may import another EDL file, creating a hierarchical structure as shown below:

```plaintext
// enclave.edl
enclave {
    from "other/file_L1.edl" import *; // Import all functions
}

// Trusted library file_L1.edl
enclave {
    from "file_L2.edl" import *

    trusted {
        public void test_int(int val);
    }
}

// Trusted library file_L2.edl
enclave {
    from "file_L3.edl" import *

    trusted {
        public void test_ptr(int* ptr);
    }
}

// Trusted library file_L3.edl
enclave {

    trusted {
        public void test_float(float flt);
    }
}
```
Granting Access to ECALLs
The default behavior is that ECALL functions cannot be called by any of the untrusted functions.

To enable an ECALL to be directly called by application code as a root ECALL, the ECALL should be explicitly decorated with the `public` keyword to be a public ECALL. Without this keyword, the ECALLs will be treated as private ECALLs, and cannot be directly called as root ECALLs.

**Syntax**

```plaintext
tested 

    public <function prototype>; 

};
```

An enclave EDL must have one or more public ECALLs, otherwise the Enclave functions cannot be called at all and `sgx_edger8r` will report an error in this case.

To grant an OCALL function access to an ECALL function, specify this access using the `allow` keyword. Both public and private ECALLs can be put into the allow list.

**Syntax**

```plaintext
untrusted 

    <function prototype> allow (func_name, func2_name, ...); 

};
```

**Example**

```plaintext
enclave 

    tested 

        public void clear_secret(); 
        public void get_secret([out] secret_t* secret); 
        void set_secret([in] secret_t* secret); 

    }; 

    untrusted 

        void replace_secret(
            [in] secret_t* new_secret, 
            [out] secret_t* old_secret 
        ) 
        allow (set_secret, clear_secret); 

    

    
```
In the above example, the untrusted code is granted different access permission to the ECALLs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ECALL</th>
<th>called as root ECALL</th>
<th>called from replace_secret</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>clear_secret</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>get_secret</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>set_secret</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Enclave Configuration File**

The enclave configuration file is an XML file containing the user defined parameters of an enclave. This XML file is part of the enclave project. A tool named `sgx_sign` uses this file as an input to create the signature and metadata for the enclave. Here is an example of the configuration file:

```xml
<EnclaveConfiguration>
    <ProdID>100</ProdID>
    <ISVSVN>1</ISVSVN>
    <StackMaxSize>0x50000</StackMaxSize>
    <HeapMaxSize>0x100000</HeapMaxSize>
    <TCSNum>1</TCSNum>
    <TCSPolicy>1</TCSPolicy>
    <DisableDebug>0</DisableDebug>
    <MiscSelect>0</MiscSelect>
    <MiscMask>0xFFFFFFFF</MiscMask>
</EnclaveConfiguration>
```

The table below lists the elements defined in the configuration file. All of them are optional. Without a configuration file or if an element is not present in the configuration file, the default value will be used.

**Table 13 Enclave Configuration Default Values**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tag</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Default Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ProdID</td>
<td>ISV assigned Product ID.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISVSVN</td>
<td>ISV assigned SVN.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCSNum</td>
<td>The number of TCS. Must be greater than 0.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCSPolicy</td>
<td>TCS management policy.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 – TCS is bound to the untrusted thread.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 – TCS is not bound to the untrusted thread.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>StackMaxSize</td>
<td>The maximum stack size per thread.</td>
<td>0x40000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parameter</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HeapMaxSize</td>
<td>The maximum heap size for the process. Must be 4KB aligned.</td>
<td>0x1000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DisableDebug</td>
<td>Enclave cannot be debugged.</td>
<td>0 - Enclave can be debugged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiscSelect</td>
<td>The desired Extended SSA frame feature.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiscMask</td>
<td>The mask bits of MiscSelect to enforce.</td>
<td>0xFFFFFFFF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MiscSelect and MiscMask are for future functional extension. Currently, MiscSelect must be 0. Otherwise the corresponding enclave may not be loaded successfully.

To avoid wasting the valuable protected memory resource, you can properly adjust the StackMaxSize and HeapMaxSize by using the measurement tool sgx_emmt. See Enclave Memory Measurement Tool for details.

A Visual Studio Add-in named Intel® SGX Configuration is provided for users to edit their configuration file conveniently. See Using Intel® SGX Configuration Add-in for details.

If there is no enough stack for the enclave, ECALL returns the error code SGX_ERROR_STACK_OVERRUN. This error code gives the information to enclave writer that the StackMaxSize may need further adjustment.

**Enclave Project Configurations**

Depending on the development stage you are at, choose one of the following project configurations to build an enclave:

- **Simulation**: The simulation mode works in the same way as the debug mode except the fact that true hardware is not exercised, instead the Intel(R) SGX instructions are simulated in software. Single-step signing is the default method to sign a simulation enclave.

- **Debug**: When the **Debug** configuration option is selected for an enclave project in Microsoft® Visual Studio, the enclave is compiled in the debug mode and the resulting enclave file will contain debug information and symbols. Choosing this project configuration also allows the enclave to be launched in the enclave debug mode. This is facilitated by enabling the **SGX_DEBUG_FLAG** that is passed as one of the parameters to the
sgx_create_enclave function. Single-step method is the default signing method for this project configuration. The signing key used in this mode does not need to be white-listed.

- Prerelease: When you choose the Prerelease configuration option for an enclave project, Visual Studio will build the enclave in release mode with compiler optimizations applied. Under this configuration, the enclave is launched in enclave debug mode. A preprocessor flag EDEBUG is defined in the preprocessor settings of the Microsoft Visual Studio enclave project for this mode. When the EDEBUG preprocessor flag is defined, it enables the SGX_DEBUG_FLAG, which in turn, launches the enclave in the enclave debug mode. Single-step method is also the default signing method for the Prerelease project configuration. Like in the Debug configuration, the signing key does not need to be white-listed either.

- Release: The Release configuration option for a Visual Studio enclave project compiles the enclave in the release mode and launches the enclave in the enclave release mode. This is done by disabling the SGX_DEBUG_FLAG. SGX_DEBUG_FLAG is only enabled when NDEBUG is not defined or EDEBUG is defined. In the debug configuration NDEBUG is undefined and hence SGX_DEBUG_FLAG is enabled. In the prerelease configuration NDEBUG and EDEBUG are both defined, which enables SGX_DEBUG_FLAG. In the release mode, configuration NDEBUG is defined and hence it disables SGX_DEBUG_FLAG thereby launching the enclave in enclave release mode. Two-step method is the default signing method for the Release configuration. The enclave needs to be signed with a white-listed key.

For additional information on the different enclave signing methods, see Enclave Signing Tool and Enclave Signer Usage Examples

**Loading and Unloading an Enclave**

Enclave source code is built as a dynamic link library. To use an enclave, the enclave.dll should be loaded into protected memory by calling the API sgx_create_enclave(). The enclave.dll must be signed by sgx_sign.exe. When loading an enclave for the first time, the loader will get a launch token and save it back to the in/out parameter token. The user can save the launch token into a file, so that when loading an enclave for the second time, the application can get the launch token from the saved file. Providing a valid launch token can enhance the load performance. To unload an enclave, the
user must call \texttt{sgx\_destroy\_enclave()} interface with parameter \texttt{sgx\_enclave\_id\_t}.

The sample code to load and unload an Enclave is shown below.

```c
#include <stdio.h>
#include <tchar.h>
#include "sgx\_urts.h"

#define ENCLAVE\_FILE \_T("Enclave.signed.dll")

int main(int argc, char* argv[])
{
    sgx\_enclave\_id\_t eid;
    sgx\_status\_t ret = SGX\_SUCCESS;
    sgx\_launch\_token\_t token = {0};
    int updated = 0;

    // Create the Enclave with above launch token.
    ret = sgx\_create\_enclave(ENCLAVE\_FILE, SGX\_DEBUG\_FLAG, &token,
                               &updated, &eid, NULL);
    if (ret != SGX\_SUCCESS) {
        printf("App: error %#x, failed to create enclave.\n", ret);
        return -1;
    }

    // A bunch of Enclave calls (ECALL) will happen here.

    // Destroy the enclave when all Enclave calls finished.
    if (SGX\_SUCCESS != sgx\_destroy\_enclave(eid))
        return -1;

    return 0;
}
```

**Handling Power Events**

The protected memory encryption keys that are stored within an Intel SGX-enabled CPU are destroyed with every power event, including suspend and hibernation.
Thus, when a power transition occurs, the enclave memory will be removed and all enclave data will not be accessible after that. As a result, when the system resumes, any subsequent ECALL will fail returning the error code SGX_ERROR_ENCLAVE_LOST. This specific error code indicates the enclave is lost due to a power transition.

An Intel SGX application should have the capability to handle any power transition that might occur while the enclave is loaded in protected memory. To handle the power event and resume enclave execution with minimum impact, the application must be prepared to receive the error code SGX_ERROR_ENCLAVE_LOST when an ECALL fails. When this happens, one and only one thread from the application must destroy the enclave, sgx_destroy_enclave(), and reload it again, sgx_create_enclave(). In addition, to resume execution from where it was when the enclave was destroyed, the application should periodically seal and save enclave state information on the platform and use this information to restore the enclave to its original state after the enclave is reloaded.

The Power Transition sample code included in the SDK demonstrates this procedure.

**NOTE:**

On Windows* 10, an Intel® SGX application must call sgx_destroy_enclave() for the OS to reclaim protected memory or EPC pages from enclaves that have been removed due to power events. Not destroying an enclave will result in EPC memory leakage that could prevent subsequent enclaves from loading. When this happens sgx_create_enclave() will return the error code SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC.
Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK Sample Code

After installing the Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK, the sample code can be found from \$(SGXSDKInstallPath)src. You can open the sample projects in Microsoft® Visual Studio® 2015. It is suggested to use Intel® C++ Compiler XE 16.0 to compile the sample projects, which is the default setting in the project properties. If you would like to build your project with the Visual Studio® compiler, see Changing the Compiler for details.

- The SampleEnclave project shows how to create an enclave.
- The PowerTransition project shows how to handle the power transition for an Intel SGX project.
- The Cxx11SGXDemo project shows how to use C++11 library inside the enclave.
- The LocalAttestation project shows how to use the Intel Elliptical Curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange library to establish a trusted channel between two enclaves running on the same platform.
- The RemoteAttestation project shows how to use the Intel remote attestation and key exchange library in the remote attestation process.
- The SealedData project demonstrates how to use the APIs to encrypt and integrity-protect enclave secrets to store them on disk.

Sample Enclave

The project SampleEnclave is designed to show you how to write an enclave from scratch. This topic demonstrates the following basic aspects of enclave features:

- Initialize and destroy an enclave
- Create ECALLs and/or OCALLs
- Call trusted libraries inside the enclave

The code is shipped with the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK in \$(SGXSDKInstallPath)src\SampleEnclave. You can open the project in Microsoft® Visual Studio 2015.

**NOTE:**
If the sample project is located in a system directory, administrator privilege is required to open it. You can copy the project folder to your directory if administrator permission cannot be granted.

Configure and Enable Intel(R) SGX

Some OEM systems support configuration and enabling of Intel(R) SGX in the BIOS via an SW Control Interface. The Intel SGX PSW exposes an API that ALL applications should call prior to creating an application. The API `sgx_enable_device` configures and enables the Intel SGX device if the platform has NOT been previously enabled. If the BIOS configures Intel SGX as result of the call, then a reboot is required for the BIOS configuration to take affect (Intel SGX will not be available for use until after the reboot). Please, refer to the `query_sgx_status` function in the Sample Application for use of this API. See `sgx_enable_device` for additional details.

Initialize an Enclave

Before establishing any trusted transaction between an application and an enclave, the enclave itself needs to be correctly created and initialized by calling `sgx_create_enclave` provided by the uRTS library.

Saving and Retrieving the Launch Token

A launch token needs to be passed to `sgx_create_enclave` for enclave initialization. If the launch token was saved in a previous transaction, it can be retrieved and used directly. Otherwise, you can provide an all-0 buffer. `sgx_create_enclave` will attempt to create a valid launch token if the input is not valid. After the enclave is correctly created and initialized, you may need to save the token if it has been updated. The fourth parameter of `sgx_create_enclave` indicates whether or not an update has been performed.

The launch token should be saved in a per-user directory or a registry entry in case it would be used in a multi-user environment.

For example, the token can be saved in either of the following locations:

- `CSIDL_LOCAL_APPDATA` - the file system directory where application-specific data is stored
- `HKEY_CURRENT_USER` - the registry entry that contains the profile for the user who is currently logged on to the computer.

ECALL/OCALL Functions
This sample demonstrates basic EDL syntax used by ECALL/OCALL functions, as well as using trusted libraries inside the enclave. You may see Enclave Definition Language Syntax for syntax details and Trusted Libraries for C/C++ support.

Destroy an Enclave
To release the enclave memory, you need to invoke sgx_destroy_enclave provided by the sgx_urts library. It will recycle the EPC memory and untrusted resources used by that enclave instance.

Power Transition
If a power transition occurs, the enclave memory will be removed and all the enclave data will be inaccessible. Consequently, when the system is resumed, each of the in-process ECALLS and the subsequent ECALLs will fail with the error code SGX_ERROR_ENCLAVE_LOST which indicates the enclave is lost due to a power transition.

An Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions project should have the capability to handle the power transition which might impact its behavior. The project named PowerTransition describes one method of developing Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions projects that handle power transitions. See ECALL-Error-Code Based Retry for more info.

PowerTransition demonstrates the following scenario: an enclave instance is created and initialized by one main thread and shared with three other child threads; The three child threads repeatedly ECALL into the enclave, manipulate secret data within the enclave and backup the corresponding encrypted data outside the enclave; After all the child threads finish, the main thread destroys the enclave and frees the associated system resources. If a power transition happens, one and only one thread will reload the enclave and restore the secret data inside the enclave with the encrypted data that was saved outside and then continues the execution.

The PowerTransition sample code is shipped with the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK. You can find the source code in the $(SGXSDKInstallPath)src\PowerTransition directory. The sample code can be built with Microsoft* Visual Studio 2015 using the corresponding project in Microsoft* Visual Studio 2015.

NOTE:
If the sample project locates in a system directory, administrator privilege is required to open it. You can copy the project folder to your directory if administrator permission cannot be granted.

**ECALL-Error-Code Based Retry**

After a power transition, an Intel(R) SGX error code SGX_ERROR_ENCLAVE_LOST will be returned for the current ECALL. To handle the power transition and continue the project without impact, you need to destroy the invalid enclave to free resources first and then retry with a newly created and initialized enclave instance, as depicted in the following figure.

![Power Transition Handling Flow Chart](image)

**Figure 15 Power Transition Handling Flow Chart**

**ECALLs in Demonstration**

*PowerTransition* demonstrates handling the power transition in two types of ECALLs:

1. Initialization ECALL after enclave creation.
2. Normal ECALL to manipulate secrets within the enclave.

**Initialization ECALL after Enclave Creation**

*PowerTransition* illustrates one initialization ECALL after enclave creation which is shown in the following figure:
Figure 16 Enclave Initialization ECall after Enclave Creation Flow Chart

sgx_create_enclave is a key API provided by the uRTS library for enclave creation. For sgx_create_enclave, a mechanism of power transition handling is already implemented in the uRTS library. Therefore, it is unnecessary to manually handle power transition for this API.

**NOTE:**
To concentrate on handling a power transition, PowerTransition assumes the enclave file and the launch token are located in the same directory as the application. See Sample Enclave for how to store the launch token properly.

**Normal ECall to Process Secrets within the Enclave**
This is the most common ECall type into an enclave. PowerTransition demonstrates the power transition handling for this type of ECall in a child thread after the enclave creation and initialization by the main thread, as depicted in the figure below. Since the enclave instance is shared by the child threads, it is required to make sure one and only one child thread to re-creates and re-initializes the enclave instance after the power transition and the others utilize the re-created enclave instance directly. PowerTransition confirms this point by checking whether the Enclave ID is updated.
NOTE:
During the ECALL process, it is recommended to back up the confidential data as cipher text outside the enclave frequently. Then we can use the backup data to restore the enclave to reduce the power transition impacts.

C++11 Demo
The project Cxx11SGXDemo is designed to illustrate some of the C++11 library features supported inside the enclave provided by the Intel® SGX SDK and the compiler features supported by the Intel® Parallel Studio XE 2016 Composer Edition for C++. This sample provides practical use cases for each of the C++11 features currently supported.

The code is shipped with the Intel SGX SDK and is located in $(SGXSDKInstallPath)src\Cxx11SGXDemo. You must open the project in Microsoft* Visual Studio 2015.

NOTE:
If the sample project is located in a system directory, administrator privileges are required to open the project. You can copy the project folder to your directory if an administrator permission cannot be granted.

The sample covers a subset of C++11 features inside the enclave as listed in the table below.

**Table 14 Overview of C++11 features covered**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Headers</th>
<th>#include &lt;typeinfo&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#include &lt;functional&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#include &lt;algorithm&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#include &lt;unordered_set&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#include &lt;unordered_map&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#include &lt;initializer_list&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#include &lt;tuple&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#include &lt;memory&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#include &lt;atomic&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#include &lt;mutex&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#include &lt;condition_variable&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#include &lt;map&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classes</td>
<td>std::function, std::all_of, std::any_of, std::none_of,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>std::initializer_list, std::unordered_set,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>std::unordered_map, std::unordered_multiset,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>std::unordered_multimap, std::tuple,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>std::shared_ptr, std::unique_ptr, std::auto, std::mutex,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>std::condition_variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compiler features</td>
<td>lambda expressions, auto, decltype,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>strongly typed enum classes,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>range-based for statements,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>static_assert, new virtual function controls,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>delegating constructors, variadic templates,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
substitution failure is not an error (SFINAE),
value references and move semantics, nullptr type

**Attestation**

In the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions architecture, attestation refers to the process of demonstrating that a specific enclave was established on the platform. The Intel(R) SGX Architecture provides two attestation mechanisms:

- One creates an authenticated assertion between two enclaves running on the same platform referred to as local attestation.
- The second mechanism extends local attestation to provide assertions to 3rd parties outside the platform referred to as remote attestation. The remote attestation process leverages a quoting service.

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides APIs used by applications to implement the attestation process.

**Local Attestation**

Local attestation refers to two enclaves on the same platform authenticating to each other using the Intel SGX REPORT mechanism before exchanging information. In an Intel(R) SGX application, multiple enclaves might collaborate to perform certain functions. After the two enclaves verify the counterpart is trustworthy, they can exchange information on a protected channel, which typically provides confidentiality, integrity and replay protection. The local attestation and protected channel establishment uses the REPORT based Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange* protocol.

You can find a sample solution shipped with the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK at $(SGXSDKInstallPath)src\LocalAttestation directory. To compile, you only need to open the project with Microsoft* Visual Studio 2015.

**NOTE:**

If the sample project locates in a system directory, administrator privilege is required to open it. You can copy the project folder to your directory if administrator permission cannot be granted.

The sample code shows an example implementation of local attestation, including protected channel establishment and secret message exchange using enclave to enclave function call as an example.
Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Library and Local Attestation Flow

The local attestation sample in the SDK uses the Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange library to establish a protected channel between two enclaves. The DH key exchange APIs are described in sgx_dh.h. The key exchange library is part of the Intel(R) SGX application SDK trusted libraries. It is statically linked with the enclave code and exposes APIs for the enclave code to generate and process local key exchange protocol messages. The library is combined with other libraries and is built into the final library called sgx_tservice.lib that is part of the SDK release.
Figure 18 Local Attestation Flow with the DH Key Exchange Library

The figure above represents the usage of DH key exchange library. A local attestation flow consists of the following steps:

1. ISV Enclave 1 calls the Intel ECDH key exchange library to initiate the session with the initiator role.
2. The Enclave 1 does an OCALL into the untrusted code requesting the Diffie-Hellman Message 1 and session id.
3. The untrusted code does an ECALL into Enclave 2.
4. Enclave 2 in turn calls the ECDH key exchange library to initiate the session with the responder role.
5. Enclave 2 calls the key exchange library to generate DH Message 1 ga || TARGETINFO Enclave 2.
6. DH Message 1 is sent back from Enclave 2 to Enclave 1 through an ECALL return to the untrusted code followed by an OCALL return into Enclave 1.
7. Enclave 1 processes the Message 1 using the key exchange library API and generates DH Message 2 gb || [Report Enclave 1(h(ga || gb))]SMK.
8. DH Message 2 is sent to the untrusted side through an OCALL.
9. The untrusted code does an ECALL into Enclave 2 giving it the DH Message 2 and requesting DH Message 3.
10. Enclave 2 calls the key exchange library API to process DH Message 2 and generates DH Message 3 [ReportEnclave2(h(gb || ga)) || Optional Payload]SMK.
11. DH Message 3 is sent back from Enclave 2 to Enclave 1 through an ECALL return to the untrusted code followed by an OCALL return into Enclave 1.
12. Enclave 2 uses the key exchange library to process DH Message 3 and establish the session.
13. Messages exchanged between the enclaves are protected by the AEK.

Protected Channel Establishment

The following figure illustrates the interaction between two enclaves, namely the source enclave and the destination enclave, to establish a session. The application initiates a session between the source enclave and the destination enclave by doing an ECALL into the source enclave, passing in the enclave id of the destination enclave. Upon receiving the enclave id of the destination enclave, the source enclave does an OCALL into the core untrusted code which then does an ECALL into the destination enclave to exchange the messages required to establish a session using ECDH Key Exchange protocol.
Figure 19 Secure Channel Establishment Flow with the DH Key Exchange Library

Secret Message Exchange and Enclave to Enclave Call

The following figure illustrates the message exchange between two enclaves. After the establishment of the protected channel, session keys are used to encrypt the payload in the message(s) being exchanged between the source and destination enclaves. The sample code implements interfaces to encrypt
the payload of the message. The sample code also shows the implementation of an enclave calling a function from another enclave. Call type, target function ID, total input parameter length and input parameters are encapsulated in the payload of the secret message sent from the caller (source) Enclave and the callee (destination) enclave. As one enclave cannot access memory of another enclave, all input and output parameters, including data indirectly referenced by a parameter needs to be marshaled across the two enclaves. The sample code uses Intel(R) SGX SDK trusted cryptographic library to encrypt the payload of the message. Through such encryption, message exchange is just the secret and in case of the enclave to enclave call is the marshaled destination enclave's function id, total parameter length and all the parameters. The destination enclave decrypts the payload and calls the appropriate function. The results of the function call are encrypted using the session keys and sent back to the source enclave.
Figure 20 Secret Message Exchange Flow with the DH Key Exchange Library

Remote Attestation

Generally speaking, Remote Attestation is the concept of a HW entity or of a combination of HW and SW gaining the trust of a remote provider or producer of some sort. With Intel(R) SGX, Remote Attestation software includes the
app's enclave and the Intel-provided Quoting Enclave (QE) and Provisioning Enclave (PvE). The attestation HW is the Intel(R) SGX enabled CPU.

Remote Attestation alone is not enough for the remote party to be able to securely deliver their service (secrets or assets). Securely delivering services also requires a secure communication session. Remote Attestation is used during the establishment of such a session. This is analogous to how the familiar SSL handshake includes both authentication and session establishment.

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK includes sample code showing:

- How an application enclave can attest to a remote party.
- How an application enclave and the remote party can establish a secure session.

The SDK includes a remote session establishment or key exchange (KE) libraries that can be used to greatly simplify these processes.

You can find the sample code for remote attestation in the directory 
$(SGXSDKInstallPath)src\RemoteAttestation.

**NOTE:**
To run the sample code in the hardware mode, you need to access to Internet.

**NOTE:**
The Intel(R) Attestation Service has been activated. A sandbox version of Intel Attestation Service is supported to enable development in an ISV's application server for Intel(R) SGX attestation. Refer to the Intel(R) Attestation Service documentation for information on how to establish the communication between the ISV Application Server and Intel Attestation Server.

**NOTE:**
If the sample project is located in a system directory, administrator privilege is required to open it. You can copy the project folder to your directory if administrator permission cannot be granted.

Intel(R) SGX uses an anonymous signature scheme, Intel(R) Enhanced Privacy ID (Intel(R) EPID), for authentication (for example, attestation). The supplied key exchange libraries implement a Sigma-like protocol for session establishment. Sigma is a protocol that includes a Diffie-Hellman key exchange, but also addresses the weaknesses of DH. The protocol Intel(R) SGX uses differs from the Sigma protocol that's used in IKE v1 and v2 in that the Intel(R) SGX platform uses Intel(R) EPID to authenticate while the service provider uses PKI.
(In Sigma, both parties use PKI.) Finally, the KE libraries require the service provider to use an ECDSA, not an RSA, key pair in the authentication portion of the protocol and the libraries use ECDH for the actual key exchange.

**Remote Key Exchange (KE) Libraries**

The RemoteAttestation sample in the SDK uses the remote KE libraries as described above to create a remote attestation of an enclave, and uses that attestation during establishment of a secure session (a key exchange).

There are both untrusted and trusted KE libraries. The untrusted KE library is provided as a static library, `sgx_ukey_exchange[mt].lib`. The Intel(R) SGX application needs to link with this library and include the header file `sgx_ukey_exchange.h`, containing the prototypes for the APIs that the KE trusted library exposes.

**NOTE:**

If you are unable to use either of the two pre-built untrusted key exchange static libraries, the source code for a sample untrusted key exchange library is included in the isv_app subfolder of the Remote Attestation sample application that is shipped with this SDK.

The trusted KE library is also provided as a static library. As a trusted library, the process for using it is slightly different than that for the untrusted KE library. The main difference relates to the fact that the trusted KE library exposes ECALLs called by the untrusted KE library. This means that the library has a corresponding EDL file, `sgx_tkey_exchange.edl`, which has to be imported in the EDL file for the application enclave that uses the library. We can see this in code snippet below, showing the complete contents of `app_enclave.edl`, the EDL file for the app enclave in the sample code.

```
enclave {
    from "sgx_tkey_exchange.edl" import *;
    include "sgx_key_exchange.h"
    include "sgx_trts.h"
    trusted {
        public sgx_status_t enclave_init_ra( 
            int b_pse,
            [out] sgx_ra_context_t *p_context);
        public sgx_status_t enclave_ra_close( 
            sgx_ra_context_t context);
    }
};
```
It's worth noting that `sgx_key_exchange.h` contains types specific to remote key exchange and must be included as shown above as well as in the untrusted code of the application that uses the enclave. Finally, `sgx_tkey_exchange.h` is a header file that includes prototypes for the APIs that the trusted library exposes, but that are not ECALLs, i.e., APIs called by ISV code in the application enclave.

**Remote Attestation and Protected Session Establishment**

This topic describes the functionality of the remote attestation sample in detail.

---

**NOTE:**

In the sample code, the service provider is modeled as a DLL, `service_provider.dll`. The sample service provider does not depend on Intel® SGX headers, type definitions, libraries, and so on. This was done to demonstrate that the Intel SGX is not required in any way when building a remote attestation service provider.
Figure 21 Remote Attestation and Trust Channel Establishment Flow

An Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions (Intel(R) SGX) application would typically begin by requesting service (for example, media streaming) from a service provider (SP) and the SP would respond with a challenge. This is not shown in the figure. The figure begins with the app’s reaction to the challenge.
1. The flow starts with the app entering the enclave that will be the end-point of the KE, passing in b_pse, a flag indicating whether the app/enclave uses Platform Services.

2. If b_pse is true, then the isv enclave shall call trusted AE support library with `sgx_create_pse_session()` to establish a session with PSE.

3. Code in the enclave calls `sgx_ra_init()`, passing in the SP's ECDSA public key, g_sp_pub_key, and b_pse. The integrity of g_sp_pub_key is a public key is important so this value should just be built into isv_enclave.

4. Close PSE session by `sgx_close_pse_session()` if a session is established before. The requirement is that, if the app enclave uses Platform Services, the session with the PSE must already be established before the app enclave calls `sgx_ra_init()`.

5. `sgx_ra_init()` returns the KE context to the app enclave and the app enclave returns the context to the app.

6. The application calls `sgx_get_extended_epid_group_id()` and sends the value returned in `p_extended_epid_group_id` to the server in msg0.

7. The server checks whether the extended Intel(R) EPID group ID is supported. If the ID is not supported, the server aborts remote attestation.

**NOTE:**
Currently, the only valid extended Intel(R) EPID group ID is zero. The server should verify this value is zero. If the Intel(R) EPID group ID is not zero, the server aborts remote attestation.

8. The application calls `sgx_ra_get_msg1()`, passing in this KE's context. Figure 3 shows the app also passing in a pointer to the untrusted proxy corresponding to `sgx_ra_get_ga`, exposed by the TKE. This reflects the fact that the names of untrusted proxies are enclave-specific.

9. `sgx_ra_get_msg1()` builds an S1 message = (ga || GID) and returns it to the app.

10. The app sends S1 to the service provider (SP) by `ra_network_send_receive()`, it will call `sp_ra_proc_msg1_req()` to process S1 and generate S2.

11. Application eventually receives S2 = gb || SPID || 2-byte TYPE || 2-byte KDF-ID || SigSP(gb, ga) || CMAC_SMK(gb
12. The application calls `sgx_ra_proc_msg2()`, passing in S2 and the context.
13. The code in `sgx_ra_proc_msg2()` builds:

   $$S3 = \text{CMAC}_{\text{SMK}}(M) \| M$$

   where $M = \text{ga} \| \text{PS\_SECURITY\_PROPERTY\| QUOTE}$ and returns it.

   Platform Services Security Information is included only if the app/enclave uses Platform Services.
14. Application sends the msg3 to the SP by `ra_network_send_receive()`, and the SP verifies the msg3.
15. SP returns the verification result to the application.

At this point, a session has been established and keys exchanged. Whether the service provider thinks the session is secure and uses it depends on the security properties of the platform as indicated by the S3 message. If the platform's security properties meet the service provider's criteria, then the service provider can use the session keys to securely deliver a secret and the app enclave can consume the secret any time after it retrieves the session keys by calling `sgx_ra_get_keys()` on the trusted KE library. This is not shown in the figure, nor is the closing of the session. Closing the session requires entering the app enclave and calling `sgx_ra_close()` on the trusted KE library, among other app enclave-specific cleanup.

**Remote Attestation with a Custom Key Derivation Function (KDF)**

By default, the platform software uses the KDF described in the definition of the `sgx_ra_get_keys` API when the `sgx_ra_init` API is used to generate the remote attestation context. If the ISV needs to use a different KDF than the default KDF used by Intel(R) SGX PSW, the ISV can use the `sgx_ra_init_ex` API to provide a callback function to generate the remote attestation keys used in the SIGMA protocol (SMK) and returned by the API `sgx_ra_get_keys` (SK, MK, and VK). The decision to use a different KDF is a policy of the ISV, but it should be approved by the ISV's security process.

**Debugging a Remote Attestation Service Provider**

As an ISV writing the remote attestation service provider, you may want to debug the message flow. One way to do this would be to provide pre-generated messages that can be replayed and verified. However, note that `S1 message = (GID || ga)` includes the random component `ga` generated inside an enclave. Also, the remote attestation service provider generates a random public+private key pair as part of its `msg2` generation, but without...
any interaction with Intel(R) SGX. Finally, each of these has state or context that is associated with cryptographic operations and is used to ensure that certain calls being made are in the correct order and that the state is consistent. These characteristics help protect the remote attestation flow against attacks, but also make it more difficult to replay pre-generated messages.

To overcome these, the cryptographic library is modified and used (only) by the sample service provider. Any time that key generation, signing, or other operation requests a random number, the number 9 is returned. This means that the crypto functions from sample_libcrypto.lib are predictable and cryptographically weak. If we can replay msg1 send from the isv_app, the sample service_provider.dll will always generate the exact same msg2. We now have a sufficient system to replay messages sent by the isv_app and have it verify that the responses sent by the remote service are the expected ones.

To replay messages and exercise this verification flow, pass in 1 or 2 as a command-line argument when running the sample application isv_app. The isv_app will ignore errors generated by the built-in checks in the Intel SGX. Developers wishing to debug their remote attestation service provider should be able to temporarily modify their cryptographic subsystem to behave in a similar manner as the sample_libcrypto.lib and replay the pre-computed messages stored in sample_messages.h. The responses from their own remote attestation service provider should match the ones generated by ours, which are also stored in sample_messages.h.

**NOTE**

Do not use the sample cryptographic library provided in this sample in production code.

**Using a Different Extended Intel(R) EPID Group for Remote Attestation**

The Intel(R) SGX platform software can generate Quotes signed by keys belonging to a more than one extended Intel(R) EPID Group. Before remote attestation starts, the ISV Service provider (SP) needs to know which extended Intel(R) EPID Group the PSW supports. The ISV SP will use this information to request Quote generation and verification in the correct extended Intel(R) EPID Group. The API sgx_get_extended_epid_group_id returns the extended Intel(R) EPID Group ID. The ISV application should query the currently configured extended Intel(R) EPID Group ID from the platform software using this API and sending it to the ISV SP. The ISV SP then knows which extended Intel(R) EPID Group to use for remote attestation. If the ISV SP does
not support the provided extended Intel(R) EPID Group, it will terminate the remote attestation attempt.

Sealed Data
The Intel(R) SGX SDK provides APIs to encrypt and integrity-protect enclave secrets to store them outside the enclave, such as on disk. The Intel(R) SGX Platform SW provides Monotonic Counter and Trusted Time service to ISV enclaves. The Monotonic Counter can be used to implement replay-protected policy, and the Trusted Time can be used to enforce time based policy. Both of them are in a form of Sealed Data. The requirement of replay-protected data blob and time based policy data blob is quite subtle. The Intel(R) SGX SDK will provide reference code to help ISV to implement them correctly.

The sample code SealedData is shipped with the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK in $(SGXSDKInstallPath)src\SealedData folder. To compile, you only need to open the project with Microsoft* Visual Studio 2015.

**NOTE:**
To run this sample in the hardware mode, you need to access to Internet.

**NOTE:**
If the sample project is located in a system directory, administrator privilege is required to modify it. You can copy the project folder to your directory if administrator permission cannot be granted.

Replay Protected Policy
In Enterprise Rights Management (ERM) type usages, an offline activity log might need to be maintained and periodically audited by the enterprise, for example, depending on whether and/or how many times a secret document is viewed or printed offline. If the offline activity log is tampered with or deleted, the ERM application will disable the offline use capability. A functional secure document viewing ERM application is quite complex, involving credential verification, document key provisioning, secure document rendering, secure display and many other security processes.

The Replay Protected policy sample code will not implement a full secure document viewing functionality, instead, it will demonstrate:

- Initializing a replay protected policy, to create an offline activity log together with a secret, protected by a Monotonic Counter.
- Verifying and updating the replay protected policy, to verify and update the activity log before the secret can be used to perform a function.
- Deleting the replay protected policy, to delete the activity log and the associated Monotonic Counter after the secret is invalidated.

**Initializing a Policy**

1. The Enclave creates a new Monotonic Counter using `sgx_create_monotonic_counter`.
2. The Enclave fills the activity log with the sample usage secret and usage data, the Monotonic Counter_UUID and the Monotonic Counter_Value returned by `sgx_create_monotonic_counter`.
3. The Enclave seals the activity log into sealed data using `sgx_seal_data`.

**Verifying a Policy**

1. The Enclave verifies and decrypts the sealed data using `sgx_unseal_data`.
2. The Enclave retrieves the current Monotonic Counter value of the associated Monotonic Counter using `sgx_read_monotonic_counter`. If it fails, abort the operation.
3. The Enclave verifies the Monotonic Counter_Value returned by `sgx_read_monotonic_counter` is the same as the Monotonic Counter_Value in the activity log.
4. The Enclave releases the secret to perform functions.

**Updating a Policy**

1. The Enclave verifies activity log.
2. The Enclave checks that the secret and usage data inside the activity log has not been invalidated or expired, for example, by comparing the use count in the activity log against a predetermined threshold. If the secret is invalidated or expired, the function that requires the secret will not be rendered.
3. The Enclave Increases the Monotonic Counter value of the associated MC using `sgx_increment_monotonic_counter`. If it fails, abort the operation.
4. The Enclave verifies the Monotonic Counter value returned in `sgx_increment_monotonic_counter` is equal to the old value, previously returned by `sgx_read_monotonic_counter`, plus one.

5. The Enclave updates the activity log and the Monotonic Counter Value.

6. The Enclave seals the activity log into Sealed Data using `sgx_seal_data`.

7. The Enclave releases the secret to perform functions.

**Deleting a Policy**

1. The Enclave follows the process of updating the Replay-Protected Activity Log to set the use counter to the maximum number of uses allowed, before releasing the secret for the last time.

2. User connects to the network to upload the activity log and receives a new secret.

3. The Enclave deletes the activity log and the associated Monotonic Counter using `sgx_destroy_monotonic_counter`. If it is blocked by the attacker, the associated activity log does not allow releasing of the secret as the secret inside the activity log is invalidated or expired.

**Time Based Policy**

The sample code demonstrates a proper implementation of a Time-Based Policy in the form of an offline Digital Rights Management (DRM) Key that expires after a certain period of time. The sample code will not implement full DRM functionality. Instead, it demonstrates:

- Creating offline sealed data with the DRM key, a time stamp and the expiration policy.
- Verifying the DRM key has not expired before releasing the key to perform function.

**Initializing a Policy**

1. The Enclave retrieves the time reference and the time source nonce using `sgx_get_trusted_time`.

2. The Enclave fills the policy structure with the sample usage secret, the time policy, the time reference and the time source nonce returned by `sgx_get_trusted_time`.
3. The Enclave seals the policy structure into Sealed Data using `sgx_seal_data`.

Verifying a Policy

1. The Enclave verifies and decrypts the sealed data using `sgx_unseal_data`.
2. The Enclave retrieves the current time using `sgx_get_trusted_time`.
3. The Enclave verifies the time source nonce returned by `sgx_get_trusted_time` is the same as the time source nonce in the policy structure. If not, abort the operation.
4. Calculate time elapsed.
5. Verify the policy. If the time limit has expired, abort the operation.
6. The Enclave releases the secret to perform functions.
Library Functions and Type Reference
This topic includes the following sub-topics to describe library functions and type reference for Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK:

- Untrusted Library Functions
- Trusted Libraries
- Function Descriptions
- Types and Enumerations
- Error Codes

Untrusted Library Functions
The untrusted library functions can only be called from application code - outside the enclave.

Enclave Creation and Destruction
These functions are used to either create or destroy enclaves:

- `sgx_create_enclave`
- `sgx_destroy_enclave`

Enclave Enumeration
Use this function to enumerate all the processes that have created and are currently using one or more enclaves. You can also use this function to obtain information about all enclaves loaded on the platform.

- `sgx_enum_enclaves`

Quoting Functions
These functions allow application enclaves to ensure that they are running on an Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions environment.

**NOTE:**
To run these functions in the hardware mode, you need to access to Internet. Configure the system network proxy settings if needed.

**NOTE:**
In some rare condition, some Intel(R) SGX signed enclaves will not be loaded because of out of resource. In this case, `sgx_ra_get_msg1`, and `sgx_ra_proc_msg2` might return errors. To fix this problem, exit the applications with the loaded enclave to release the resource and retry.

- `sgx_init_quote`
- `sgx_calc_quote_size`
- `sgx_get_quote_size`
- `sgx_get_quote`
- `sgx_report_attestation_status`

Untrusted Key Exchange Functions
These functions allow exchanging of secrets between ISV's server and enclaves. They are used in concert with the trusted Key Exchange functions.

**NOTE:**
To run these functions in the hardware mode, you need to access to Internet. Configure the system network proxy settings if needed.

**NOTE:**
In some rare condition, some Intel(R) signed enclaves will not be loaded because of out of resource. In such case, `sgx_ra_get_msg1`, and `sgx_ra_proc_msg2` might return errors. To fix this problem, exit applications with the loaded enclave to release the resource and retry.

- `sgx_ra_get_msg1`
- `sgx_ra_proc_msg2`
- `sgx_get_extended_epid_group_id`

Untrusted Platform Service Function
This function helps ISVs determine what Intel(R) SGX Platform Services are supported by the platform.

**NOTE:**
To run this function in the hardware mode, you need to access to Internet. Configure the system network proxy settings if needed.
In some rare condition, some Intel(R) SGX signed enclaves will not be loaded because of out of resource. In such case, `sgx_ra_get_msg1`, and `sgx_ra_proc_msg2` might return errors. To fix this problem, exit applications with the loaded enclave to release the resource and retry.

- `sgx_get_ps_cap`

**Intel(R) SGX Enabling and Launch Control Functions**

The enabling and launch control function helps you to enable the Intel(R) SGX device and return appropriate status.

- `sgx_enable_device`
- `sgx_cap_enable_device`

This function provides an Enclave Signing Key White List Certificate Chain. An Enclave Signing Key White List Certificate Chain contains the signing key(s) of the Intel(R) SGX application enclave(s) allowed to be launched. If the system has not acquired an up-to-date Enclave Signing Key White List Certificate Chain, you can provide the chain to the system by setting `sgx_register_wl_cert_chain`. Use `sgx_get_whitelist_size` to get the size of current Enclave Signing Key White List Certificate Chain. Use `sgx_get_whitelist` to get the chain.

- `sgx_register_wl_cert_chain`
- `sgx_get_whitelist_size`
- `sgx_get_whitelist`

**Intel(R) SGX device capability Functions**

The Intel SGX device capability functions help you query the Intel SGX device status and the version of PSW installed.

- `sgx_is_capable`
- `sgx_cap_get_status`
- `sgx_cap_get_psw_version_string`
**Trusted Libraries**

The trusted libraries are static libraries that linked with the enclave binary. The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK ships with several trusted libraries that cover domains such as standard C/C++ libraries, synchronization, encryption and more.

These functions/objects can only be used from within the enclave.

Trusted libraries built for HW mode (for example, not for simulation) contain a string with the release number. The string version, which uses the library name as prefix, is defined when the SDK is built and consists of various parameters such as the product number, SVN revision number, build number, and so on. This mechanism ensures all trusted libraries shipped in a given SDK release will have the same version number and allows quick identification of the trusted libraries linked into an enclave.

For instance, `sgx_tstdc.lib` contains a string version like `SGX_TSTDC_VERSION_1.0.0.0`. Of course, the last digits vary depending on the SDK release.

---

**CAUTION:**

Do not link the enclave with any untrusted library including C/C++ standard libraries. This action will either fail the enclave signing process or cause a runtime failure due to the use of restricted instructions.

---

**Trusted Runtime System**

The Intel(R) SGX trusted runtime system (tRTS) is a key component of the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK. It provides the enclave entry point logic as well as other functions to be used by enclave developers.

- Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Helper Functions
- Custom Exception Handling
- Debug APIs inside Trusted Libraries
- Intrinsic Functions

**Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Helper Functions**

The tRTS provides the following helper functions for you to determine whether a given address is within or outside enclave memory.
The tRTS provides a wrapper to the RDRAND instruction to generate a true random number from hardware. The C/C++ standard library functions \texttt{rand} and \texttt{srand} functions are not supported within an enclave because they only provide pseudo random numbers. Instead, enclave developers should use the \texttt{sgx\_read\_rand} function to get true random numbers.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \texttt{sgx\_read\_rand}
\end{itemize}

\section*{Custom Exception Handling}

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides an API to allow you to register functions, or exception handlers, to handle a limited set of hardware exceptions. When one of the enclave supported hardware exceptions occurs within the enclave, the registered exception handlers will be called in a specific order until an exception handler reports that it has handled the exception. For example, issuing a CPUID instruction inside an Enclave will result in a #UD fault (Invalid Opcode Exception). ISV enclave code can call \texttt{sgx\_register\_exception\_handler} to register a function of type \texttt{sgx\_exception\_handler\_t} to respond to this exception. To check a list of enclave supported exceptions, see Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Programming Reference.

\begin{verbatim}
NOTE:
Custom exception handling is only supported in HW mode. Although the exception handlers can be registered in simulation mode, the exceptions cannot be caught and handled within the enclave.

NOTE:
OCALLs are not allowed in the exception handler.

NOTE:
Custom exception handing only saves general purpose registers in \texttt{sgx\_exception\_info\_t}. You should be careful when touching other registers in the exception handlers.
\end{verbatim}

The Custom Exception Handling APIs are listed below:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \texttt{sgx\_register\_exception\_handler}
  \item \texttt{sgx\_unregister\_exception\_handler}
\end{itemize}
Custom Exception Handler for CPUID Instruction

If an ISV requires using the CPUID information within an enclave, then the enclave code must make an OCALL to perform the CPUID instruction in the untrusted application. The Intel(R) SGX SDK provides two functions in the library `sgx_tstdc` to obtain CPUID information through an OCALL:

- `sgx_cpuid`
- `sgx_cpuid_ex`

In addition, the Intel SGX SDK also provides the following intrinsics which call the above functions to obtain CPUID data:

- `__cpuid`
- `__cpuidex`

Both the functions and intrinsics result in an OCALL to the uRTS library to obtain CPUID data. The results are returned from an untrusted component in the system. It is recommended that threat evaluation be performed to ensure that CPUID return values are not problematic. Ideally, sanity checking of the return values should be performed.

If an ISV's enclave uses a third party library which executes the CPUID instruction, then the ISV would need to provide a custom exception handler to handle the exception generated from issuing the CPUID instruction (unless the third party library registers its own exception handler for CPUID support). The ISV is responsible for analyzing the usage of the specific CPUID result provided by the untrusted domain to ensure it does not compromise the enclave security properties. Recommended implementation of the CPUID exception handler involves:

1. ISV analyzes the third party library CPUID usages, identifying required CPUID results.
2. ISV enclave code initialization routine populates a cache of the required CPUID results inside the enclave. This cache might be maintained by the RTS or by ISV code.
3. ISV enclave code initialization routine registers a custom exception handler.
4. The custom exception handler, when invoked, examines the exception information and faulting instruction. If the exception is caused by a CPUID instruction:
1. Retrieve the cached CPUID result and populate the CPUID instruction output registers.
2. Advance the RIP to bypass the CPUID instruction and complete the exception handling.

**Debug APIs inside Trusted Libraries**

You can use the following debug APIs inside enclave:

- IsDebuggerPresent
- DebugBreak
- OutputDebugString

**NOTE:**

OutputDebugString requires the Intel® SGX Debugger attached. Otherwise the function does nothing.

**Intrinsic Functions**

The majority of Microsoft® Visual C++ intrinsics can be called inside the enclave, and an enclave project can include Microsoft® standard `<intrin.h>` directly with few restrictions. For example, you should not use intrinsics that generate instructions unsupported inside an enclave. All unsupported intrinsic functions generally fall into following categories:

- I/O related functions.
- Instructions requiring ring 0 privileges or can change privilege level.
- OS or system related functions.
- Intrinsics which are considered unprotected and encryption alternatives.

1. There are few requirements for including Microsoft® standard `<intrin.h>`:
   1. Add `${VCInstallDir}include;${IncludePath}` to Include Directories.
   2. Set Ignore Standard Include Path to No.
   2. Use `/Oi` or `#pragma intrinsic(…)` to enable MSVC intrinsics.

The `<sgx_intrin.h>` also provides compile warnings for unsupported intrinsics.
Trusted Service Library
The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides a trusted library named sgx_tservice for secure data manipulation and protection. The sgx_tservice library provides the following trusted functionality and services:

- Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Instruction Wrapper Functions
- Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Sealing and Unsealing Functions
- Untrusted Platform Service Function
- Diffie–Hellman (DH) Session Establishment Functions

Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Instruction Wrapper Functions
The sgx_tservice library provides functions for getting specific keys and for creating and verifying an enclave report. The API functions are listed below:

- sgx_get_key
- sgx_create_report
- sgx_verify_report

Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Sealing and Unsealing Functions
The sgx_tservice library provides the following functions:

- Exposes APIs to create sealed data which is both confidentiality and integrity protected.
- Exposes an API to unseal sealed data inside the enclave.
- Provides APIs to authenticate and verify the input data with AES-GMAC.

See the following related topics for more information.

- sgx_seal_data
- sgx_seal_data_ex
- sgx_unseal_data
- sgx_mac_aadata
- sgx_mac_aadata_ex
- sgx_unmac_aadata

The library also provides APIs to help calculate the sealed data size, encrypt text length, and Message Authentication Code (MAC) text length.
• `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size`
• `sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len`
• `sgx_get_encrypt_txt_len`

**SealLibrary Introduction**

When an enclave is instantiated, it provides protections (confidentiality and integrity) to the data by keeping it within the boundary of the enclave. Enclave developers should identify enclave data and/or state that is considered secret and potentially needs preservation across the following enclave destruction events:

• Application is done with the enclave and closes it.
• Application itself is closed.
• The platform is hibernated or shutdown.

In general, the secrets provisioned within an enclave are lost when the enclave is closed. However if the secret data needs to be preserved during one of these events for future use within an enclave, it must be stored outside the enclave boundary before closing the enclave. In order to protect and preserve the data, a mechanism is in place which allows enclave software to retrieve a key unique to that enclave. This key can only be generated by that enclave on that particular platform. Enclave software uses that key to encrypt data to the platform or to decrypt data already on the platform. Refer to these encrypt and decrypt operations as sealing and unsealing respectively as the data is cryptographically sealed to the enclave and platform.

To provide strong protection against potential key-wear-out attacks, a unique seal key is generated for each data blob encrypted with the `sgx_seal_data` API call. A key ID for each encrypted data blob is stored in clear alongside the encrypted data blob. The key ID is used to re-generate the seal key to decrypt the data blob.

AES-GCM (AES – Advanced Encryption Standard) is utilized to encrypt and MAC-protect the payload. To protect against software-based side channel attacks, the crypto implementation of AES-GCM utilizes Intel® Advanced Encryption Standard New Instructions (Intel® AES-NI), which is immune to software-based side channel attacks. The Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) is a mode of operation of the AES algorithm. GCM assures authenticity of the confidential data (of up to about 64 GB per invocation) using a universal hash function. GCM can also provide authentication assurance for additional data (of
practically unlimited length per invocation) that is not encrypted. GCM can also provide authentication assurance for additional data (of practically unlimited length per invocation) that is not encrypted. If the GCM input contains only data that is not to be encrypted, the resulting specialization of GCM, called GMAC (Galois Message Authentication Code), is simply an authentication mode for the input data. The sgx_mac_aadata API call restricts the input to non-confidential data to provide data origin authentication only. The single output of this function is the authentication tag.

**Example Use Cases**

One example is that an application may start collecting secret state while executing that needs to be preserved and utilized on future invocations of that application. Another example is during application installation, a secret key may need to be preserved and verified upon starting the application.

For these cases the seal APIs can be utilized to seal the secret data (key or state) in the examples above, and then unseal the secret data when needed.

**Sealing**

1. Use **sgx_calc_sealed_data_size** to calculate the number of bytes to allocate for the **sgx_sealed_data_t** structure.
2. Allocate memory for the **sgx_sealed_data_t** structure.
3. Call **sgx_seal_data** to perform sealing operation.
4. Save the sealed data structure for future use.

**Unsealing**

1. Use **sgx_get_encrypt_txt_len** and **sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len** to determine the size of the buffers to allocate in terms of bytes.
2. Allocate memory for the decrypted text and additional text buffers.
3. Call **sgx_unseal_data** to perform the unsealing operation.

**Trusted Platform Service Functions**

The **sgx_tservice** library provides the following functions that allow an ISV to use platform services and get platform services security property.

**NOTE:**

To run these functions in the hardware mode, you need to access to Internet. Configure the system network proxy settings if needed.
• `sgx_create_pse_session`
• `sgx_close_pse_session`
• `sgx_get_ps_sec_prop`
• `sgx_get_ps_sec_prop_ex`
• `sgx_get_trusted_time`
• `sgx_create_monotonic_counter_ex`
• `sgx_create_monotonic_counter`
• `sgx_destroy_monotonic_counter`
• `sgx_increment_monotonic_counter`
• `sgx_read_monotonic_counter`

**Diffie–Hellman (DH) Session Establishment Functions**

These functions allow an ISV to establish secure session between two enclaves using the EC DH Key exchange protocol.

• `sgx_dh_init_session`
• `sgx_dh_responder_gen_msg1`
• `sgx_dh_initiator_proc_msg1`
• `sgx_dh_responder_proc_msg2`
• `sgx_dh_initiator_proc_msg3`

**C Standard Library**

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK includes a trusted version of the C standard library. The library is named `sgx_tstdc` (trusted standard C), and can only be used inside an enclave. Standard C headers are located under `$(SGXSDKInstallPath)include\tlibc`.

`sgx_tstdc` provides a subset of C11 functions that are ported from the OpenBSD* project. Unsupported functions are not allowed inside an enclave for the following reasons:

• The definition implies usage of a restricted CPU instruction.
• The definition is known to be unsafe or insecure.
• The definition implementation is too large to fit inside an enclave or relies heavily on information from the untrusted domain.
• The definition is compiler specific, and not part of the standard.
The definition is a part of the standard, but it is not supported by a specific compiler.

See Unsupported C Standard Functions for a list of unsupported C11 definitions within an enclave.

Locale Functions
A trusted version of locale functions is not provided primarily due to the size restriction. Those functions rely heavily on the localization data (normally 1MB to 2MB), which should be preloaded into the enclave in advance to ensure that it will not be modified from the untrusted domain. This practice would increase the footprint of an enclave, especially for those enclaves not depending on the locale functionality. Moreover, since localization data is not available, wide character functions inquiring enclave locale settings are not supported either.

Random Number Generation Functions
The random functions srand and rand are not supported in the Intel(R) SGX SDK C library. A true random function sgx_read_rand is provided in the tRTS library by using the RDRAND instruction. However, in the Intel(R) SGX simulation environment, this function still generates pseudo random numbers because RDRAND may not be available on the hardware platform.

String Functions
The functions strcpy and strcat are not supported in the Intel(R) SGX SDK C library. You are recommended to use strncpy and strncat instead.

Abort Function
The abort() function is supported within an enclave but has a different behavior. When a thread calls the abort function, it makes the enclave unusable by setting the enclave state to a specific value that allows the tRTS and application to detect and report this event. The aborting thread generates an exception and exits the enclave, while other enclave threads continue running normally until they exit the enclave. Once the enclave is in the unusable state, subsequent enclave calls and OCALL returns generate the same error indicating that the enclave is no longer usable. After all thread calls abort, the enclave is locked and cannot be recovered. You have to destroy, reload and reinitialize the enclave to use it again.
**Thread Synchronization Primitives**

Multiple untrusted threads may enter an enclave simultaneously as long as more than one thread context is defined by the application and created by the untrusted loader. Once multiple threads execute concurrently within an enclave, they will need some forms of synchronization mechanism if they intend to operate on any global data structure. In some cases, threads may use the atomic operations provided by the processor’s ISA. In the general case, however, they would use synchronization objects and mechanisms similar to those available outside the enclave.

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK already supports event, mutex and conditional variable synchronization mechanisms by means of the following API and data types defined in the **Types and Enumerations** section. Some functions included in the trusted Thread Synchronization library may make calls outside the enclave (OCALLs). If you use any of the APIs below, you must first import the needed OCALL functions from `sgx_tstdc.edl`. Otherwise, you will get a linker error when the enclave is being built; see **Calling Functions outside the Enclave** for additional details. The table below illustrates the primitives that the Intel(R) SGX Thread Synchronization library supports, as well as the OCALLs that each API function needs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function API</th>
<th>OCall Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mutex Synchronization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>sgx_thread_mutex_init</code></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>sgx_thread_mutex_destroy</code></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>sgx_thread_mutex_lock</code></td>
<td><code>sgx_thread_wait_untrusted_event_ocall</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>sgx_thread_mutex_trylock</code></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>sgx_thread_mutex_unlock</code></td>
<td><code>sgx_thread_set_untrusted_event_ocall</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition Variable Synchronization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>sgx_thread_cond_init</code></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>sgx_thread_cond_destroy</code></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>sgx_thread_cond_wait</code></td>
<td><code>sgx_thread_wait_untrusted_event_ocall</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event Synchronization</td>
<td>Function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>sgx_create_event</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>sgx_set_event</strong></td>
<td>sgx_thread_wait_untrusted_event_ocall</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sgx_thread_set_untrusted_event_ocall</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sgx_thread_set_multiple_untrusted_events_ocall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>sgx_reset_event</strong></td>
<td>sgx_thread_wait_untrusted_event_ocall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sgx_thread_set_untrusted_event_ocall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>sgx_destroy_event</strong></td>
<td>sgx_thread_wait_untrusted_event_ocall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sgx_thread_set_untrusted_event_ocall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>sgx_wait_for_single_object</strong></td>
<td>sgx_thread_wait_untrusted_event_ocall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sgx_thread_set_untrusted_event_ocall</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sgx_thread_wait_untrusted_event_ocall</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sgx_thread_setwait_untrusted_events_ocall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>sgx_wait_for_multiple_objects</strong></td>
<td>sgx_thread_wait_untrusted_event_ocall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sgx_thread_set_untrusted_event_ocall</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Thread Management | event_ocall  
|                  | sgx_thread_wait_untrusted_event_ocall  
|                  | sgx_thread_setwait_untrusted_events_ocall  
|                  | sgx_thread_self  
|                  | sgx_thread_equal  

Query CPUID inside Enclave

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides two functions for enclave developers to query a subset of CPUID information inside the enclave:

- `sgx_cpuid`
- `sgx_cpuidex`

Secure Functions

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides some secure functions. An enclave project can include `<mbusafecrt.h>` to use them.

See Supported C Secure Functions for a list of supported secure functions definitions within an enclave.

Non-Local Jumps

The C standard library provides a pair of functions, `setjmp` and `longjmp`, that can be used to perform non-local jumps. `setjmp` saves the current program state into a data structure. `longjmp` can later use this data structure to restore the execution context. This means that after `longjmp`, execution continues at the `setjmp` call site.

Since `setjmp/longjmp` may transfer execution from one function to a pre-determined location in another function, normal stack unwinding does not occur. As a result, you must use this functionality carefully, ensuring that an enclave only calls `setjmp` in a valid context. You should also perform extensive security validation to ascertain that the enclave never uses these functions in such a way it could result in undefined behavior. Typical use of `setjmp/longjmp` is the implementation of an exception mechanism (error handling). However, you must never use these functions in C++ programs. You should use the standard CEH instead. You are recommended to review the information provided at cert.org on how to use `setjmp/longjmp` securely.
C++ Language Support

The Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK provides a trusted library for C++ support inside the enclave. C++ developers would utilize advanced C++ features that require C++ runtime libraries.

The ISO/IEC 14882: C++ standard is chosen as the baseline for the Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK trusted library. Most of standard C++ features are fully supported inside the enclave, and including:

1. Dynamic memory management with new/delete;
2. Global initializers are supported (usually used in the construction of global objects);
3. Run-time Type Identification (RTTI);
4. C++ exception handling inside the enclave.

Currently, global destructors are not supported due to the reason that EPC memory will be recycled when destroying an enclave.

**NOTE**

C++ objects are not supported in enclave interface definitions. If an application needs to pass a C++ object across the enclave boundary, you are recommended to store the C++ object's data in a C struct and marshal the data across the enclave interface. Then you need to instantiate the C++ object inside the enclave with the marshaled C struct passed in to the constructor (or you may update existing instantiated objects with appropriate operators).

C++ Standard Library

The Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK includes a trusted version of the C++ standard library (including STL) that conforms to the C++11 standard. However, a different version of this library will be linked depending on the version of the Visual Studio* you use to develop enclaves. Visual Studio 2015 uses sgx_tcxx.lib by default, which has been ported from libc++ and supports most C++11 features. On the other hand, previous versions of Visual Studio use sgx_tstdcxx.lib. This library was ported from STLport but provides limited C++11 support. If you update an enclave project to Visual Studio 2015 and want access to all the supported C++11 features, you need to manually add the new C++ trusted library. If sgx_tstdcxx.lib is present, replace it with sgx_tcxx.lib. Otherwise, simply add sgx_tcxx.lib to the linker dependency list of the enclave project.
As for the C++ standard library, most functions will work just as its untrusted counterpart, but here is a high level summary of features that are not supported inside the enclave:

1. I/O related functions and classes, like `<iostream>`;
2. Functions depending on a locale library;
3. Any other functions that require system calls.

However, only C functions can be used as the language for trusted and untrusted interfaces. While you can use C++ to develop your enclaves, you should not pass C++ objects across the enclave boundary.

**Known Issue for C++ Exception**

There is a known issue for C++ exception handling inside the enclave. An exception object cannot be rethrown after it has been handled once (after a catch block), even though the object was not expected to be destroyed. The issue exists only in the 32-bit enclave.

Here is an example:

```cpp
void go2()
{
    try {
        throw 1;
    }
    catch (...) {
        try {
            throw;
        }
        catch (...) {
            throw; // exception object was destroyed unexpectedly
            // Crash!
        }
    }
}
```

**Cryptography Library**

The Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK includes a trusted cryptography library named `sgx_tcrypto`. It includes the cryptographic functions used by other trusted libraries included in the SDK, such as the `sgx_tservice` library. Thus, the functionality provided by this library is somewhat limited.

- `sgx_sha256_msg`
- `sgx_sha256_init`
- `sgx_sha256_update`
- sgx_sha256_get_hash
- sgx_sha256_close
- sgx_rijndael128GCM_encrypt
- sgx_rijndael128GCM_decrypt
- sgx_rijndael128_cmac_msg
- sgx_cmac128_init
- sgx_cmac128_update
- sgx_cmac128_final
- sgx_cmac128_close
- sgx_aes_ctr_encrypt
- sgx_aes_ctr_decrypt
- sgx_ecc256_open_context
- sgx_ecc256_close_context
- sgx_ecc256_create_key_pair
- sgx_ecc256_compute_shared_dhkey
- sgx_ecc256_check_point
- sgx_ecdsa_sign
- sgx_ecdsa_verify

If you need additional cryptographic functionality, you can use the Cryptography for Intel® Integrated Performance Primitives (Intel® IPP) library. The Cryptography for Intel® IPP library version 9.0 Update 4 is linked into sgx_tcrypto.lib and its API is directly accessible. The Intel IPP Cryptographic header files are located in $(SGXSDKInstallPath)include\ipp. The Intel® IPP Cryptographic library is included in the SDK under the Community Licensing.

**NOTE**
See more information on cryptography in Intel® Integrated Performance Primitives Developer Reference.

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**Trusted Key Exchange Functions**
These functions allow an ISV to exchange secrets between its server and its enclaves. They are used in concert with untrusted Key Exchange functions.
- Intel® Protected File System Library -

Intel® Protected File System Library provides protected files API for Intel® SGX enclaves. It supports a basic subset of the regular C file API and enables you to create files and work with them as you would normally do from a regular application.

With this API, the files are encrypted and saved on the untrusted disk during a write operation, and they are verified for confidentiality and integrity during a read operation.

To encrypt a file, you should provide a file encryption key. This key is a 128 bits key, and is used as a key derivation key, to generate multiple encryption keys. According to “NIST Special Publication 800-108 - Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions”: “The key that is input to a key derivation function is called a key derivation key. To comply with this Recommendation, a key derivation key shall be a cryptographic key (see Section 3.1). The key derivation key used as an input to one of the key derivation functions specified in this Recommendation can be generated by an approved cryptographic random bit generator (e.g., by a deterministic random bit generator of the type specified in [5]), or by an approved automated key-establishment process (e.g., as defined in [1] and [2])”. For more details, please refer to NIST SP 800-108 document.

Another option is to use automatic keys derived from the enclave sealing key (see disadvantages of this approach in the topic Using the Protected FS Automatic Keys API).

- sgx_fopen
- sgx_fopen_auto_key
- sgx_fclose
- sgx_fread
- sgx_fwrite
- sgx_fflush

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Intel® Protected File System Library provides protected files API for Intel® SGX enclaves. It supports a basic subset of the regular C file API and enables you to create files and work with them as you would normally do from a regular application.

With this API, the files are encrypted and saved on the untrusted disk during a write operation, and they are verified for confidentiality and integrity during a read operation.

To encrypt a file, you should provide a file encryption key. This key is a 128 bits key, and is used as a key derivation key, to generate multiple encryption keys. According to “NIST Special Publication 800-108 - Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions”: “The key that is input to a key derivation function is called a key derivation key. To comply with this Recommendation, a key derivation key shall be a cryptographic key (see Section 3.1). The key derivation key used as an input to one of the key derivation functions specified in this Recommendation can be generated by an approved cryptographic random bit generator (e.g., by a deterministic random bit generator of the type specified in [5]), or by an approved automated key-establishment process (e.g., as defined in [1] and [2])”. For more details, please refer to NIST SP 800-108 document.

Another option is to use automatic keys derived from the enclave sealing key (see disadvantages of this approach in the topic Using the Protected FS Automatic Keys API).

- sgx_fopen
- sgx_fopen_auto_key
- sgx_fclose
- sgx_fread
- sgx_fwrite
- sgx_fflush
- sgx_ftell
- sgx_fseek
- sgx_feof
- sgx_ferror
- sgx_clearerr
- sgx_remove
- sgx_fexport_auto_key
- sgx_fimport_auto_key
- sgx_fclear_cache

Protected FS Usage Limitation

Since the Protected Files have meta-data embedded in them, only one file handle can be opened for writing at a time, or many file handles for reading. OS protection mechanism is used for protecting against accidentally opening more than one 'write' file handle. If this protection is bypassed, the file will get corrupted. An open file handle can be used by many threads inside the same enclave, the APIs include internal locks for handling this and the operations will be executed by one.

Protected FS Error Codes

The Protected File System (FS) API tries to preserve the original C file API errors. A local errno (enclave internal) is also set for APIs that require this according to the original C file API documentation.

When the Protected FS API is accessing the OS file system, if an error is returned, that error will be provided back to the caller of the Protected FS API. In addition, when possible, it returns an EXXX error code for internal errors (for example, the EACCES error code is returned when trying to write a file that was opened as read-only, or ENOMEM is returned when an internal attempt to allocate memory fails). Several special error codes were added, like SGX_ERROR_FILE_NAME_MISMATCH, for the cases when the current file name does not match the internal file name. You can find these error codes and their explanations in sgx_error.h.

Protected FS Application Layout

The following figure demonstrates how the Protected File System (FS) works inside an Intel® SGX application:
To use the Intel SGX Protected File System libraries:

1. The enclave must be linked with `sgx_tprotected_fs.lib`
2. The application must be linked with `sgx_uprotected_fs.lib`
3. The enclave's EDL file must 'import' all the functions from `sgx_tprotected_fs.edl`
4. The source files should 'include' `sgx_tprotected_fs.h`

Protected FS S3/S4 Important Note

To enhance the performance of the Protected File System, cache is used to save the user's data inside the enclave, and only when the cache is full it is flushed to disk.
In case of S3/S4 transitions, data in the cache will be lost (the entire enclave is lost). Therefore, all file handles must be flushed or closed before entering S3/S4. If no action is taken, the file integrity is not harmed, only the latest written data that was not flushed will be lost.

**Using the Protected FS Automatic Keys API**

Automatic keys are derived from the enclave sealing key (with MRSIGNER), so the files are bound to all the enclaves signed by the same signer on this particular machine. To transfer a file from one machine to another, you should follow the key export and import procedure below. There are several cases when using automatic keys is not recommended.

- Disaster recovery – trying to open files created on one machine on a different machine will fail (unless you follow the procedure described below). Therefore, automatic disaster recovery may not work properly.
- VM migrations – currently, Intel® SGX does not support automatic enclave keys transfer in VM migration. Therefore, enclaves running on servers that use VM migrations cannot use the auto key API.

**File Transfer with the Automatic Keys API**

For files that were created with `sgx_fopen_auto_key`, to transfer a file from one enclave to another, or to another enclave on a different machine, follow this procedure:

1. Close all open handles to the file.
2. Call the `sgx_fexport_auto_key` API. This API returns the last encryption key that was used to encrypt the meta-data node of the file.
3. Transfer the file to the destination enclave, and provide the key in a safe method to that enclave.
4. Call the `sgx_fimport_auto_key` API. This API will re-encrypt the meta-data node with a new encryption key, derived from the local enclave seal key.
5. Open the file with `sgx_fopen_auto_key` as usual.

**Protected FS Security Non-Objectives**

In order to mitigate file swapping attacks (with two valid files), file names are checked during a file open operation (verifies that the current name is equal to the file name the file was created with). However, if two files are created with the same file name, there is no way to protect against such a swapping attack.
Since the files are saved in the regular FS, there is no protection against malicious file deletion or modification – this will only be detected when trying to read or write the modified section from the file (decryption will fail).

There are several things that are not protected when using the Protected FS API, and anyone who can access the OS can see them:

1. File name
2. File size (up to 4KB granularity)
3. File modification date
4. Key type (user or auto)
5. Usage patterns
6. Read/Write offsets

If any of those items might expose sensitive information, and help a potential attacker, the enclave developer should add defense mechanisms on their own to protect against this. For example, an implementation of a “secure browser” should not save the 'cookies' with the names of their related websites, because an attacker can learn from that the user's browsing history.

**Function Descriptions**

This topic describes various functions including their syntax, parameters, return values, and requirements.

---

**NOTE**

When an API function lists an EDL in its requirements, users need to explicitly import such library EDL file in their enclave's EDL.

---

**sgx_create_enclave**

Loads the enclave using its file name and initializes it using a launch token.

*sgx_create_enclave* is a **macro for the sgx_create_enclavea** (ANSI) or **sgx_create_enclavew** (Unicode) function.

The compiler will use the Unicode version if UNICODE is defined in the project.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_create_enclave(
    const char *file_name,
    const int debug,
    sgx_launch_token_t *launch_token,
    int *launch_token_updated,
```
Parameters

**file_name [in]**

Name or full path to the enclave image. This parameter is identical to the `lpFileName` parameter in `CreateFile()`. If the project is using Unicode character set, `file_name` should be an Unicode string. If the project is using Multi-Byte character set, `file_name` should be an ANSI string.

**debug [in]**

The valid value is 0 or 1.

0 indicates to create the enclave in non-debug mode. An enclave created in non-debug mode cannot be debugged.

1 indicates to create the enclave in debug mode. The code/data memory inside an enclave created in debug mode is accessible by the debugger or other software outside of the enclave and thus is not under the same memory access protections as an enclave created in non-debug mode.

Enclaves should only be created in debug mode for debug purposes. A helper macro `SGX_DEBUG_FLAG` is provided to create an enclave in debug mode. In release builds, the value of `SGX_DEBUG_FLAG` is 0. In debug and pre-release builds, the value of `SGX_DEBUG_FLAG` is 1 by default.

**launch_token [in/out]**

A pointer to an `sgx_launch_token_t` object used to initialize the enclave to be created. Must not be NULL. The caller can provide an all-0 buffer as the `sgx_launch_token_t` object, in which case, the function will attempt to create a valid `sgx_launch_token_t` object and store it in the buffer. The caller should store the `sgx_launch_token_t` object and re-use it in future calls to create the same enclave. Certain platform configuration changes can invalidate a previously stored `sgx_launch_token_t` object. If the token provided is not valid, the function will attempt to update it to a valid one.

**launch_token_updated [out]**

The output is 0 or 1. 0 indicates the launch token has not been updated. 1 indicates the launch token has been updated.

**enclave_id [out]**
A pointer to an `sgx_enclave_id_t` that receives the enclave ID or handle. Must not be NULL.

**misc_attr [out, optional]**

A pointer to an `sgx_misc_attribute_t` structure that receives the misc select and attributes of the enclave. This pointer may be NULL if the information is not needed.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

The enclave was loaded and initialized successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_ENCLAVE**

The enclave file is corrupted.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

The 'enclave_id', 'updated' or 'token' parameter is NULL.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**

Not enough memory available to complete `sgx_create_enclave()`.

**SGX_ERROR_ENCLAVE_FILE_ACCESS**

The enclave file can't be opened. It may be caused by enclave file not being found or no privilege to access the enclave file.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_METADATA**

The metadata embedded within the enclave image is corrupt or missing.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_VERSION**

The enclave metadata version (created by the signing tool) and the untrusted library version (uRTS) do not match.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE**

The signature for the enclave is not valid.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC**

The protected memory has run out. For example, a user is creating too many enclaves, the enclave requires too much memory, or we cannot load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_NO_DEVICE**
The Intel SGX device is not valid. This may be caused by the Intel SGX driver not being installed or the Intel SGX driver being disabled.

**SGX_ERROR_MEMORY_MAP_CONFLICT**

During enclave creation, there is a race condition for mapping memory between the loader and another thread. The loader may fail to map virtual address. If this error code is encountered, create the enclave again.

**SGX_ERROR_DEVICE_BUSY**

The Intel SGX driver or low level system is busy when creating the enclave. If this error code is encountered, we suggest creating the enclave again.

**SGX_ERROR_MODE_INCOMPATIBLE**

The target enclave mode is incompatible with the mode of the current RTS. For example, a 64-bit application tries to load a 32-bit enclave or a simulation uRTS tries to load a hardware enclave.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE**

sgx_create_enclave() needs the AE service to get a launch token. If the service is not available, the enclave may not be launched.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT**

The request to the AE service timed out.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_INVALID_PRIVILEGE**

The request requires some special attributes for the enclave, but is not privileged.

**SGX_ERROR_NDEBUG_ENCLAVE**

The enclave is signed as a product enclave and cannot be created as a debuggable enclave.

**SGX_ERROR_UNDEFINED_SYMBOL**

The enclave contains an import table.

The signing tool should typically report this type of error when the enclave is built.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_MISC**

The MiscSelct/MiscMask settings are not correct.

**SGX_ERROR_HYPERV_ENABLED**
Incompatible versions of Windows® 10 OS and Hyper-V® are detected. In this case, you need to disable Hyper-V on the target machine.

**SGX_ERROR_IPLDR_ENCRYPTED**

sgx_create_enclave was called, but the enclave is encrypted.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

An unexpected error is detected.

**Description**

The sgx_create_enclave function will load and initialize the enclave using the enclave file name and a launch token. If the launch token is incorrect, it will get a new one and save it back to the input parameter “token”, and the parameter “updated” will indicate that the launch token was updated.

If both enclave and launch token are valid, the function will return a value of SGX_SUCCESS. The enclave ID (handle) is returned via the enclave_id parameter.

The library sgx_urts.lib provides this function to load an enclave with Intel(R) SGX hardware, and it cannot be used to load an enclave linked with the simulation library. On the other hand, the simulation library sgx_urts_sim.lib exposes an identical interface which can only load a simulation enclave. Running in simulation mode does not require Intel(R) SGX hardware/driver. However, it does not provide hardware protection.

The randomization of the load address of the enclave is dependent on the operating system. The address of the heap and stack is not randomized and is at a constant offset from the enclave base address. Different versions of Windows OS may randomize or not randomize the base address. A compromised loader or operating system (both of which are outside the TCB) can remove the randomization entirely. The enclave writer should not rely on the randomization of the base address of the enclave.

Do not call the sgx_create_enclave function as part of initialization of a DLL. For instance, sgx_create_enclave hangs when it is called from the global object constructor of a C++ class in a DLL.

**Requirements**

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<td>Library</td>
<td>sgx_urts.lib or sgx_urts_sim.lib (simulation)</td>
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</table>
sgx_destroy_enclave

The `sgx_destroy_enclave` function destroys an enclave and frees its associated resources.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_destroy_enclave(
    const sgx_enclave_id_t enclave_id
);
```

Parameters

**enclave_id [in]**
An enclave ID or handle that was generated by `sgx_create_enclave`.

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**
The enclave was unloaded successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_ENCLAVE_ID**
The enclave ID (handle) is not valid. The enclave has not been loaded or the enclave has already been destroyed.

Description

The `sgx_destroy_enclave` function destroys an enclave and releases its associated resources and invalidates the enclave ID or handle.

The function will block until no other threads are executing inside the enclave.

It is highly recommended that the `sgx_destroy_enclave` function be called after the application has finished using the enclave to avoid possible deadlocks.

The library `sgx_urts.lib` exposes this function to destroy a previously created enclave in hardware mode, while `sgx_urts_sim.lib` provides a simulative counterpart.

See more details in *Loading and Unloading an Enclave*.

Requirements

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</table>
sgx_enum_enclaves
Enumerates the process IDs that have loaded enclaves, as well as their corresponding enclave IDs and enclave size.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_enum_enclaves(
    EnclaveEnumArrayType* pEnclaveEnum,
    DWORD cb,
    DWORD* pBytesNeeded;
);
```

Parameters

**pEnclaveEnum [out]**
Pointer to an array of structures containing process ID, enclave ID and enclave size.

**cb [in]**
Size allocated for the array of structures of type `EnclaveEnumArrayType`.

**pBytesNeeded [out]**
The number of bytes required to store the complete array of structures of type `EnclaveEnumArrayType`.

Return value

**SGX_ERROR_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED**
This API has been deprecated and is not longer supported.

Description

The `sgx_enum_enclaves` function has been deprecated and is not longer supported.

Requirements

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</table>
**sgx_init_quote**

sgx_init_quote returns information needed by an Intel(R) SGX application to get a quote of one of its enclaves.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_init_quote(
    sgx_target_info_t *p_target_info,
    sgx_epid_group_id_t *p_gid
);
```

**Parameters**

- **p_target_info [out]**
  Allows an enclave for which the quote is being created, to create report that only QE can verify.

- **p_gid [out]**
  ID of platform's current Intel(R) EPID group.

**Return value**

- **SGX_SUCCESS**
  All of the outputs are generated successfully.

- **SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
  Any of the pointers are invalid.

- **SGX_ERROR_AE_INVALID_EPIDBLOB**
  The Intel(R) EPID blob is corrupted.

- **SGX_ERROR_BUSY**
  The requested service is temporarily not available.

- **SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
  Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

- **SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE**
  The AE service did not respond.

- **SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT**
  A request to the AE service timed out.
SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE
Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC
There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UPDATE_NEEDED
Intel(R) SGX needs to be updated.

SGX_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_PLATFORM
Intel(R) EPID Provisioning failed because the platform was not recognized by the back-end server.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
An unexpected error was detected.

Description
Calling sgx_init_quote is the first thing an Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions application does in the process of getting a quote of an enclave. The content of p_target_info changes when the QE changes. The content of p_gid changes when the platform SVN changes.

It's suggested that the caller should wait (typically several seconds to tens of seconds) and retry this API if SGX_ERROR_BUSY is returned.

Requirements

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</table>

sgx_calc_quote_size
sgx_calc_quote_size returns the required buffer size for the quote.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_calc_quote_size(
    const uint8_t *p_sig_rl,
    uint32_t sig_rl_size,
    uint32_t *p_quote_size
);
```
Parameters

**p_sig_rl [in]**
Optional revoke list of signatures, can be NULL.

**sig_rl_size [in]**
Size of p_sig_rl, in bytes. If p_sig_rl is NULL, then sig_rl_size will be 0.

**p_quote_size [out]**
Indicate the size of quote buffer.

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**
All the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
The p_quote_size pointer is invalid or the other input parameters are corrupted.

Description

You cannot allocate a chunk of memory at compile time because the size of the quote is not a fixed value. Instead, before trying to call `sgx_calc_quote`, call `sgx_calc_quote_size` first to calculate the buffer size and then allocate enough memory for the quote.

Requirements

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</table>

**sgx_get_quote_size**

`sgx_get_quote_size` is deprecated. Use the `sgx_calc_quote_size` function instead.

`sgx_get_quote_size` returns the required buffer size for the quote.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_get_quote_size(
    const uint8_t *p_sig_rl,
    uint32_t *p_quote_size
)```

---

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Parameters

\texttt{p\_sig\_rl [in]}
Optional revoke list of signatures, can be NULL.

\texttt{p\_quote\_size [out]}
Indicate the size of quote buffer.

Return value

\texttt{SGX\_SUCCESS}
All the outputs are generated successfully.

\texttt{SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER}
The \texttt{p\_quote\_size} pointer is invalid or the other input parameters are corrupted.

Description

You cannot allocate a chunk of memory at compile time because the size of the quote is not a fixed value. Instead, before trying to call \texttt{sgx\_get\_quote}, call \texttt{sgx\_get\_quote\_size} first to get the buffer size and then allocate enough memory for the quote.

Requirements

\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
Header & \texttt{sgx\_uae\_service.h} \\
Library & \texttt{sgx\_uae\_service.lib} or \texttt{sgx\_uae\_service_sim.lib} (simulation) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\texttt{sgx\_get\_quote}
\texttt{sgx\_get\_quote} generates a linkable or un-linkable QUOTE.

Syntax

\begin{verbatim}
sgx\_status\_t sgx\_get\_quote(
    const sgx\_report\_t *p\_report,
    sgx\_quote\_sign\_type\_t quote\_type,
    const sgx\_spid\_t *p\_spid,
    const sgx\_quote\_nonce\_t *p\_nonce,
    const uint8\_t *p\_sig\_rl,
    uint32\_t sig\_rl\_size,
    sgx\_report\_t *p\_qe\_report,
)
\end{verbatim}
```c
sgx_quote_t *p_quote,
uint32_t quote_size
);
```

**Parameters**

**p_report [in]**
Report of enclave for which quote is being calculated.

**quote_type [in]**

- `SGX_UNLINKABLE_SIGNATURE` for unlinkable quote
- `SGX_LINKABLE_SIGNATURE` for linkable quote.

**p_spid [in]**
ID of service provider.

**p_nonce [in]**
Optional nonce, if `p_qe_report` is not NULL, then nonce should not be NULL as well.

**p_sig_rl [in]**
Optional revoke list of signatures, can be NULL.

**sig_rl_size [in]**
Size of `p_sig_rl`, in bytes. If the `p_sig_rl` is NULL, then `sig_rl_size` shall be 0.

**p_qe_report [out]**
Optional output. If not NULL, report of QE target to the calling enclave will be copied to this buffer, and in this case, nonce should not be NULL as well.

**p_quote [out]**
The major output of `get_quote`, the quote itself, linkable or unlinkable depending on `quote_type` input. `quote` cannot be NULL.

**quote_size [in]**
Indicates the size of the quote buffer. To get the size, user shall call `sgx_calc_quote_size` first.

**Return value**

`SGX_SUCCESS`
All the outputs are generated successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER
Any of the pointers are invalid.

SGX_ERROR_AE_INVALID_EPIDBLOB
The Intel(R) EPID blob is corrupted.

SGX_ERROR_EPID_MEMBER_REVOKED
The Intel(R) EPID group membership has been revoked. The platform is not trusted. Updating the platform and retrying will not remedy the revocation.

SGX_ERROR_BUSY
The requested service is temporarily not available.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE
The AE service did not respond.

SGX_ERRORSERVICE_TIMEOUT
A request to AE service timed out.

SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE
Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC
There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UPDATE_NEEDED
Intel(R) SGX needs to be updated.

SGX_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_PLATFORM
Intel(R) EPID Provisioning failed because the platform was not recognized by the back-end server.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
An unexpected error was detected.

Description
Both Intel(R) EPI D Member and Verifier need to know the Group Public Key and the Intel(R) EPI D Parameters used. These values not being returned by either \texttt{sgx\_init\_quote()} or \texttt{sgx\_get\_quote()} reflects the reliance on the Attestation Service for Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions. With the Attestation Service in place, simply sending the GID to the Attestation Service (through the Intel(R) SGX application and PS) is sufficient for the Attestation Service to know which public key and parameters to use.

The purpose of \texttt{p\_qe\_report} is for the ISV enclave to confirm the QUOTE it received is not modified by the untrusted SW stack, and not a replay. The implementation in QE is to generate a REPORT targeting the ISV enclave (target info from \texttt{p\_report}), with the lower 32Bytes in \texttt{report\_data} = SHA256(p\_nonce||p\_quote). The ISV enclave can verify the \texttt{p\_qe\_report} and \texttt{report\_data} to confirm the QUOTE has not be modified and is not a replay. It is optional.

It's suggested that the caller should wait (typically several seconds to tens of seconds) and retry this API if \texttt{SGX\_ERROR\_BUSY} is returned.

**Requirements**

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**\texttt{sgx\_ra\_get\_msg1}**

\texttt{sgx\_ra\_get\_msg1} is used to get the remote attestation and key exchange protocol message 1 to send to a service provider. The application enclave should use \texttt{sgx\_ra\_init} or \texttt{sgx\_ra\_init\_ex} function to create the remote attestation and key exchange process context, and return to the untrusted code, before the untrusted code can invoke this function.

**Syntax**

\begin{verbatim}
sgx\_status\_t sgx\_ra\_get\_msg1(
    sgx\_ra\_context\_t context,
    sgx\_enclave\_id\_t eid,
    sgx\_ecall\_get\_ga\_trusted\_t p\_get\_ga,
    sgx\_ra\_msg1\_t \*p\_msg1
);
\end{verbatim}

**Parameters**

context [in]
Context returned by the \texttt{sgx\_ra\_init} or \texttt{sgx\_ra\_init\_ex} function inside the application enclave.

\texttt{eid [in]}

ID of the application enclave which is going to be attested.

\texttt{p\_get\_ga [in]}

Function pointer of the ECALL proxy \texttt{sgx\_ra\_get\_ga} generated by \texttt{sgx\_edger8r}. The application enclave should link with \texttt{sgx\_tkey\_exchange} library and import \texttt{sgx\_tkey\_exchange.edl} in the enclave EDL file to expose the ECALL proxy for \texttt{sgx\_ra\_get\_ga}.

\texttt{p\_msg1 [out]}

Message 1 used by the remote attestation and key exchange protocol.

Return value

\texttt{SGX\_SUCCESS}

All the outputs are generated successfully.

\texttt{SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER}

Any of the pointers are invalid.

\texttt{SGX\_ERROR\_AE\_INVALID\_EPIDBLOB}

The Intel(R) EPID blob is corrupted.

\texttt{SGX\_ERROR\_EPIDBLOB\_MEMBER\_REVOKED}

The Intel(R) EPID group membership has been revoked. The platform is not trusted. Updating the platform and retrying will not remedy the revocation.

\texttt{SGX\_ERROR\_BUSY}

The requested service is temporarily not available.

\texttt{SGX\_ERROR\_UPDATE\_NEEDED}

Intel(R) SGX needs to be updated.

\texttt{SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY}

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

\texttt{SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_EPC}

There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.
SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE
The AE service did not respond.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT
A request to AE service timed out.

SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE
Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_STATE
The API is invoked in incorrect order or state.

SGX_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_PLATFORM
Intel(R) EPID Provisioning failed because the platform was not recognized by the back-end server.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
An unexpected error was detected.

Description
The application also passes in a pointer to the untrusted proxy corresponding to sgx_ra_get_ga, which is exposed by the trusted key exchange library. This reflects the fact that the names of untrusted proxies are enclave-specific.

It's suggested that the caller should wait (typically several seconds to tens of seconds) and retry this API if SGX_ERROR_BUSY is returned.

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_ukey_exchange.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Library</td>
<td>sgx_ukey_exchange.lib or sgx_ukey_exchangemt.lib</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

sgx_ra_proc_msg2

sgx_ra_proc_msg2 is used to process the remote attestation and key exchange protocol message 2 from the service provider and generate message 3 to send to the service provider. If the service provider accepts message 3, negotiated session keys between the application enclave and the service provider are ready for use. The application enclave can use sgx_ra_get_keys function to retrieve the negotiated keys and can use sgx_ra_close function to release the context of the remote attestation and key exchange process. If processing message 2 results in an error, the application
should notify the service provider of the error or the service provider needs a
time-out mechanism to terminate the remote attestation transaction when it
does not receive message 3.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_ra_proc_msg2(
    sgx_ra_context_t context,
    sgx_enclave_id_t eid,
    sgx_ecall_proc_msg2_trusted_t p_proc_msg2,
    sgx_ecall_get_msg3_trusted_t p_get_msg3,
    const sgx_ra_msg2_t *p_msg2,
    uint32_t msg2_size,
    sgx_ra_msg3_t **pp_msg3,
    uint32_t *p_msg3_size
);
```

Parameters

costex [in]
Context returned by `sgx_ra_init`.

eid [in]
ID of the application enclave which is going to be attested.

`p_proc_msg2` [in]
Function pointer of the ECALL proxy `sgx_ra_proc_msg2_trusted_t` generated by `sgx_edger8r`. The application enclave should link with `sgx_tkey_exchange` library and import the `sgx_tkey_exchange.edl` in the EDL file of the application enclave to expose the ECALL proxy for `sgx_ra_proc_msg2`.

`p_get_msg3` [in]
Function pointer of the ECALL proxy `sgx_ra_get_msg3_trusted_t` generated by `sgx_edger8r`. The application enclave should link with `sgx_tkey_exchange` library and import the `sgx_tkey_exchange.edl` in the EDL file of the application enclave to expose the ECALL proxy for `sgx_ra_get_msg3`.

`p_msg2` [in]
`sgx_ra_msg2_t` message 2 from the service provider received by application.

`msg2_size` [in]
The length of `p_msg2` (in bytes).
**pp_msg3 [out]**

sgx_ra_msg3_t message 3 to be sent to the service provider. The message buffer is allocated by the sgx_ukey_exchange library. The caller should free the buffer after use.

**p_msg3_size [out]**

The length of pp_msg3 (in bytes).

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

Any of the pointers are invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_AE_INVALID_EPIDBLOB**

The Intel(R) EPID blob is corrupted.

**SGX_ERROR_EPID_MEMBER_REVOKED**

The Intel(R) EPID group membership has been revoked. The platform is not trusted. Updating the platform and retrying will not remedy the revocation.

**SGX_ERROR_BUSY**

The requested service is temporarily not available.

**SGX_ERROR_UPDATE_NEEDED**

Intel(R) SGX needs to be updated.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC**

There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE**

The AE service did not respond.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT**

A request to AE service timed out.
SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE
Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_STATE
The API is invoked in incorrect order or state.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
The signature is invalid.

SGX_ERROR_MAC_MISMATCH
Indicates verification error for reports, sealed data, etc.

SGX_ERROR_KDF_MISMATCH
Indicates key derivation function does not match.

SGX_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_PLATFORM
Intel(R) EPID Provisioning failed because the platform was not recognized by the back-end server.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
An unexpected error was detected.

Description
The sgx_ra_proc_msg2 processes the incoming message 2 and returns message 3. Message 3 is allocated by the library, so the caller should free it after use.

It's suggested that the caller should wait (typically several seconds to tens of seconds) and retry this API if SGX_ERROR_BUSY is returned.

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Library</td>
<td>sgx_ukey_exchange.lib or sgx_ukey_exchangemt.lib</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

sgx_report_attestation_status
sgx_report_attestation_status reports information from the Intel Attestation Server during a remote attestation to help to decide whether a TCB update is required. It is recommended to always call sgx_report_attestation_status after a remote attestation transaction when it results in a Platform Info Blob (PIB).
The `attestation_status` indicates whether the ISV server decided to trust the enclave or not.

- The value `pass: 0` indicates that the ISV server trusts the enclave. If the ISV server trusts the enclave and platform services, `sgx_report_attestation_status` will not take actions to correct the TCB that will cause negative user experience such as long latencies or requesting a TCB update.
- The value `fail: != 0` indicates that the ISV server does not trust the enclave. If the ISV server does not trust the enclave or platform services, `sgx_report_attestation_status` will take all actions to correct the TCB which may incur long latencies and/or request the application to update one of the Intel SGX's TCB components. It is the ISV's responsibility to provide the TCB component updates to the client platform.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_report_attestation_status (  
    const sgx_platform_info_t* p_platform_info  
    int attestation_status,  
    sgx_update_info_bit_t* p_update_info  
);
```

**Parameters**

- `p_platform_info [in]`
  Pointer to opaque structure received from Intel Attestation Server.
- `attestation_status [in]`
  The value indicates whether remote attestation succeeds or fails. If attestation succeeds, the value is 0. If it fails, the value will be others.
- `p_update_info [out]`
  Pointer to the buffer that receives the update information only when the return value of `sgx_report_attestation_status` is `SGX_ERROR_UPDATE_NEEDED`.

**Return value**

- `SGX_SUCCESS`
  All the outputs are generated successfully.
SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER
Any of the pointers are invalid.

SGX_ERROR_AE_INVALID_EPIDBLOB
The Intel(R) EPID blob is corrupted.

SGX_ERROR_UPDATE_NEEDED
Intel(R) SGX needs to be updated.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE
The AE service did not respond.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT
A request to AE service timed out.

SGX_ERROR_BUSY
This service is temporarily unavailable.

SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE
Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC
There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_PLATFORM
Intel(R) EPID Provisioning failed because the platform was not recognized by the back-end server.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
An unexpected error was detected.

Description
The application calls `sgx_report_attestation_status` after remote attestation to help to recover the TCB.

Requirements
sgx_get_extended_epid_group_id

The function `sgx_get_extended_epid_group_id` reports which extended Intel(R) EPID Group the client uses by default. The key used to sign a Quote will be a member of the extended Intel(R) EPID Group reported in this API.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_get_extended_epid_group_id(
    uint32_t *p_extended_epid_group_id
);
```

**Parameters**

`p_extended_epid_group_id [out]`

The extended Intel(R) EPID Group ID.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

The `p_extended_epid_group_id` pointer is invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE**

The AE service did not respond.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT**

A request to AE service timed out.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

An unexpected error was detected.

**Description**
The application uses this value to tell the ISV Service Provider which extended Intel(R) EPID Group to use during remote attestation.

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
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<tr>
<td>Library</td>
<td>sgx_uae_service.lib or sgx_uae_service_sim.lib (simulation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**sgx_get_ps_cap**

sgx_get_ps_cap returns the platform service capability of the platform.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_get_ps_cap(
    sgx_ps_cap_t* p_sgx_ps_cap
);
```

**Parameters**

**p_sgx_ps_cap [out]**

A pointer to sgx_ps_cap_t structure indicates the platform service capability of the platform.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

The ps_cap pointer is invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE**

The AE service did not respond.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT**

A request to the AE service timed out.

**SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE**

Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

An unexpected error is detected.
**Description**

Before using Platform Services provided by the trusted Architecture Enclave support library, you need to call `sgx_get_ps_cap` first to get the capability of the platform.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
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<td><code>sgx_uae_service.lib</code> or <code>sgx_uae_service_sim.lib</code> (simulation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

`sgx_register_wl_cert_chain`

`sgx_register_wl_cert_chain` helps you to provide an Enclave Signing Key White List Certificate Chain. An Enclave Signing Key White List Certificate Chain contains the signing key(s) of the Intel(R) SGX application enclave(s). If the system has not acquired an up-to-date Enclave Signing Key White List Certificate Chain, you can provide the chain to the system by setting `sgx_register_wl_cert_chain`.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_register_wl_cert_chain(
    const TCHAR *CertChainPath
);
```

**Parameters**

CertChainPath [in]

The full path of Enclave White List Cert Chain file.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

The White List is invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE**

The AE service did not respond.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT**
The request to the AE service timed out.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

An unexpected error is detected.

**Description**

If you have an update-to-date Enclave Signing Key White List Certificate Chain, you need to call `sgx_register_wl_cert_chain` once first to launch enclaves.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_status.h</th>
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<td>Library</td>
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</table>

**sgx_enable_device**

`sgxEnableDevice` helps ISV applications to enable the Intel(R) SGX device and return appropriate status. If a reboot is required, ISV applications can decide whether to notify users of the restart requirement or not.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgxEnableDevice(
    sgx_device_status_t *sgx_device_status
);
```

**Parameters**

**sgx_device_status [out]**

The status of Intel SGX device.

**SGX_ENABLED**

The platform is enabled for Intel SGX.

**SGX_DISABLED_REBOOT_REQUIRED**

This platform is disabled for Intel SGX. It is configured to be enabled after the next reboot. The Intel SGX device is currently disabled and a reboot is required to enable it.

**SGX_DISABLED_MANUAL_ENABLE**
The platform is disabled for Intel SGX but can be enabled manually through the BIOS menu. The Software Control Interface is not available to enable Intel SGX on this platform.

**SGX_DISABLED_LEGACY_OS**

The operating system does not support UEFI enabling of the Intel SGX device. If UEFI is supported by the operating system in general, but support for enabling the Intel SGX device does not exist, this function will return the more general **SGX_DISABLED**.

**SGX_DISABLED**

This platform is disabled for Intel SGX. More details about the ability to enable Intel® SGX are unavailable. There may be cases where Intel SGX can be manually enabled in the BIOS.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

The `sgx_device_status` pointer is invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE**

The AE service did not respond.

**SGX_ERROR_HYPERV_ENABLED**

The detected version of Windows* 10 is incompatible with Hyper-V*. In this case, you need to disable Hyper-V* on the target machine.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

An unexpected error is detected.

**Description**

ISV applications can call `sgx_enable_device` to enable Intel SGX device dynamically.

A platform update may have occurred disabling Intel® SGX, and execution of this API will re-enable Intel® SGX but only after a reboot. If Intel® SGX is not currently enabled on the platform, the ISV application determines the next course of action:
a. Continue to run in non-SGX mode
b. Shut down the application and inform the user that a reboot is required before this application can run.

NOTE: In the case SGX_DISABLED is returned, manual BIOS configuration by the user may be required. The ISV needs to determine the recommended course of action to the user.

**Requirements**

<table>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>sgx_uae_service.dll</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:**
It's recommended to use `sgx_cap_enable_device` for an application installer and `sgx_enable_device` for an Intel SGX application.

**sgx_is_capable**

`s gx_is_capable` helps ISV applications to check if the client platform is enabled for Intel(R) SGX. The client application must be run with the administrator privileges to get the status successfully.

**Syntax**

```
sgx_status_t sgx_is_capable(
    int *sgx_capable
);
```

**Parameters**

**sgx_capable [out]**

The capable status of Intel SGX device.

1

The platform is enabled for Intel SGX or the Software Control Interface is available to configure the Intel SGX device.

0

Intel SGX device is not available or may require manual configuration.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**
All the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

The `sgx_capable` pointer is invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_NO_PRIVILEGE**

The application does not have the required privilege to read EFI variables. Run the application with administrator privilege to query the Intel SGX device status.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

An unexpected error is detected.

**Description**

ISV applications can call `sgx_is_capable` to detect if Intel SGX device is available. This API is intended to detect cases where software can configure the Intel SGX device. If 0 is returned, `sgx_cap_get_status` can be used to determine if there are manual configuration changes that can be made to enable the Intel SGX device.

**Requirements**

<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td><code>sgx_capable.dll</code></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE:

Administrative privileges are required to use this API.

`sgx_cap_enable_device`

`sgx_cap_enable_device` helps ISV applications to enable the Intel(R) SGX device and return the appropriate status. If a reboot is required, an ISV application can decide whether to notify users of the restart requirement or not.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_cap_enable_device(
    sgx_device_status_t *sgx_device_status
);
```

**Parameters**

- `sgx_device_status [out]`
The Intel® SGX status of the Intel SGX device.

**SGX_ENABLED**
The platform is enabled for Intel SGX.

**SGX_DISABLED_REBOOT_REQUIRED**
This platform is disabled for Intel SGX. It is configured to be enabled after the next reboot.

**SGX_DISABLED_MANUAL_ENABLE**
The platform is disabled for Intel SGX but can be enabled manually through the BIOS menu. The Software Control Interface is not available to enable Intel SGX on this platform.

**SGX_DISABLED_HYPERV_ENABLED**
The detected version of Windows* 10 is incompatible with Hyper-V*. Intel SGX cannot be enabled on the target machine unless Hyper-V* is disabled.

**SGX_DISABLED_LEGACY_OS**
The operating system does not support UEFI enabling of the Intel SGX device. If UEFI is supported by the operating system in general, but support for enabling the Intel SGX device does not exist, this function will return the more general **SGX_DISABLED**.

**SGX_DISABLED_UNSUPPORTED_CPU**
Intel SGX is not supported by this processor.

**SGX_DISABLED**
This platform is disabled for Intel SGX. More details about the ability to enable Intel® SGX are unavailable. There may be cases where Intel SGX can be manually enabled in the BIOS.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**
All the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
The sgx_device_status pointer is invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_NO_PRIVILEGE**
The application does not have the required privileges to read an EFI variable. Run the application with the administrator privileges to enable the Intel SGX device status.

**SGX_ERROR_HYPERV_ENABLED**

The detected version of Windows* 10 is incompatible with Hyper-V*. In this case, you need to disable Hyper-V* on the target machine.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

An unexpected error is detected.

**Description**

ISV application can call `sgx_cap_enable_device` to enable the Intel SGX device dynamically.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Library</td>
<td>sgx_capable.dll</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:**

Administrative privileges are required to use this API.

APIs that begin with `sgx_cap` are utility functions that operate independently of the Intel SGX PSW. They do not require the PSW to be installed on the system. When the PSW is installed, they have the same behavior.

**sgx_cap_get_status**

`sgx_cap_get_status` helps ISV applications check the status of Intel® SGX on the client platform. The client application must be run with the administrator privileges to get the status successfully.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_cap_get_status(  
    sgx_device_status_t *sgx_device_status  
);  
```

**Parameters**

**sgx_device_status [out]**

Intel SGX status of the Intel SGX device.
**SGX_ENABLED**
The platform is enabled for Intel SGX.

**SGX_DISABLED_REBOOT_REQUIRED**
This platform is disabled for Intel SGX. It is configured to be enabled after the next reboot.

**SGX_DISABLED_SCI_AVAILABLE**
The platform is disabled for Intel SGX but can be enabled using the Software Control Interface.

**SGX_DISABLED_MANUAL_ENABLE**
The platform is disabled for Intel SGX but can be enabled manually through the BIOS menu. The Software Control Interface is not available to enable Intel® SGX on this platform.

**SGX_DISABLED_HYPERV_ENABLED**
The detected version of Windows® 10 is incompatible with Hyper-V®. Intel SGX cannot be enabled on the target machine, unless Hyper-V® is disabled.

**SGX_DISABLED_LEGACY_OS**
The operating system does not support UEFI enabling of the Intel SGX device. If UEFI is supported by the operating system in general, but support for enabling the Intel SGX device does not exist, this function returns the more general **SGX_DISABLED**.

**SGX_DISABLED_UNSUPPORTED_CPU**
Intel SGX is not supported by this processor.

**SGXDISABLED**
This platform is disabled for Intel SGX. More details about the ability to enable Intel® SGX are unavailable. There may be cases when Intel SGX can be enabled manually in the BIOS.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**
All the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
The `sgx_device_status` pointer is invalid.
**SGX_ERROR_NO_PRIVILEGE**

The application does not have the required privileges to read EFI variables. Run the application with the administrator privileges to query the Intel SGX device status.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

An unexpected error is detected.

**Description**

ISV applications can call `sgx_cap_get_status` to detect if Intel SGX is enabled or can be enabled on a device, using the software interface to enable it or taking manual configuration steps.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_capable.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:**

Administrator privileges are required to use this API.

APIs that begin with `sgx_cap` are utility functions that operate independently of the Intel SGX PSW. They do not require the PSW to be installed on the system. When the PSW is installed, they have the same behavior.

**sgx_cap_get_psw_version_string**

`sgx_cap_get_psw_version_string` helps ISV applications determine the version of the Intel® SGX Platform Software (PSW) installed on the device. A buffer is specified along with the buffer length (in characters). If the buffer is not large enough to hold the PSW version string or is NULL, the buffer length needed to store the version string is returned in the size parameter.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_cap_get_psw_version_stringw(
    LPWSTR *version_string,
    DWORD *version_string_len
);
```

or

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_cap_get_psw_version_stringa(
    LPSTR *version_string,
    DWORD *version_string_len
);
```
Parameters

version_string [out]
Version of the PSW installed on the system, in the string format.

version_string_size [in out]
When version_string is not NULL, version_string_length is interpreted as the length of version_string. If version_string_len is too small to hold the string, or if a NULL pointer is passed in for version_string, version_string_len returns the length required.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS
All the outputs are generated successfully. A NULL terminated version string is returned in the version_string parameter.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER
The version_string_len pointer is invalid.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY
There is no sufficient space in the version_string parameter. The size of the buffer needed is returned in the version_string_len parameter.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE
The Intel SGX PSW is not installed. As a result, the version string is not available.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
An unexpected error is detected.

Description

ISV applications can call sgx_cap_get_psw_version_string to determine the version of the Intel SGX Platform Software installed on the device.

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
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</table>

 NOTE:
APIs that begin with `sgx_cap` are utility functions that operate independently of the Intel SGX PSW. They do not require the PSW to be installed on the system. When the PSW is installed, they have the same behavior.

```
sgx_get_whitelist_size
```

`sgx_get_whitelist_size` returns the required buffer size for the white-list.

**Syntax**

```
sgx_status_t sgx_get_whitelist_size(
    uint32_t *p_whitelist_size
);
```

**Parameters**

`p_whitelist_size [out]`

Indicate the size of white-list buffer.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

The `p_whitelist_size` pointer is invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_BUSY**

The requested service is temporarily not available.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE**

The AE service did not respond.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT**

A request to AE service timed out.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

The white-list is invalid.
Description

You cannot allocate a chunk of memory at compile time because the size of the quote is not a fixed value. Instead, before trying to call `sgx_get_whitelist`, call `sgx_get_whitelist_size` first to get the buffer size and then allocate enough memory for the quote.

Requirements

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</table>

`sgx_get_whitelist`

`sgx_get_whitelist` returns the white-list used by `aesm_service`.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_get_whitelist(
    uint8_t *p_whitelist,
    uint32_t whitelist_size
);
```

Parameters

**p_whitelist [out]**

The white-list.

**whitelist_size [in]**

Indicate the size of white-list buffer. To get the size, call `sgx_get_whitelist_size` first.

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

The `p_whitelist` pointer is invalid or `p_whitelist_size` is not correct.

**SGX_ERROR_BUSY**

The requested service is temporarily not available.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE**
The AE service did not respond.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT**
A request to AE service timed out.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
The white-list is invalid.

**Description**
You can get current white-list used by `aesm_service`.

**Requirements**

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**sgx_is_within_enclave**
The `sgx_is_within_enclave` function checks that the buffer located at the pointer `addr` with its length of `size` is an address that is strictly within the calling enclave address space.

**Syntax**

```c
int sgx_is_within_enclave(
    const void *addr,
    size_t size
);
```

**Parameters**

- `addr [in]`
The start address of the buffer.

- `size [in]`
The size of the buffer.

**Return value**

1
The buffer is strictly within the enclave address space.
0
The whole buffer or part of the buffer is not within the enclave, or the buffer is wrapped around.

Description
sgx_is_within_enclave simply compares the start and end address of the buffer with the calling enclave address space. It does not check the property of the address. Given a function pointer, you sometimes need to confirm whether such a function is within the enclave. In this case, it is recommended to use sgx_is_within_enclave with a size of 1.

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sgx_is_outside_enclave
The sgx_is_outside_enclave function checks that the buffer located at the pointer addr with its length of size is an address that is strictly outside the calling enclave address space.

Syntax

```c
int sgx_is_outside_enclave (  
    const void *addr,  
    size_t size  
);```

Parameters
addr [in]
The start address of the buffer.
size [in]
The size of the buffer.

Return value
1
The buffer is strictly outside the enclave address space.
0

The whole buffer or part of the buffer is not outside the enclave, or the buffer is wrapped around.

**Description**

`sgx_is_outside_enclave` simply compares the start and end address of the buffer with the calling enclave address space. It does not check the property of the address.

**Requirements**

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**sgx_read_rand**

The `sgx_read_rand` function is used to generate a random number inside the enclave.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_read_rand(
    unsigned char *rand,
    size_t length_in_bytes
);
```

**Parameters**

`rand [out]`

A pointer to the buffer that receives the random number. The pointer cannot be NULL. The rand buffer can be either within or outside the enclave, but it is not allowed to be across the enclave boundary or wrapped around.

`length_in_bytes [in]`

The length of the buffer (in bytes).

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

Indicates success.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

Invalid input parameters detected.
**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

Indicates an unexpected error occurs during the valid random number generation process.

**Description**

The `sgx_read_rand` function is provided to replace the C standard pseudo-random sequence generation functions inside the enclave, since these standard functions are not supported in the enclave, such as `rand`, `srand`, etc. For HW mode, the function generates a real-random sequence; while for simulation mode, the function generates a pseudo-random sequence.

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**sgx_register_exception_handler**

`sgx_register_exception_handler` allows developers to register an exception handler, and specify whether to prepend (when `is_first_handler` is equal to 1) or append the handler to the handler chain.

**Syntax**

```c
void* sgx_register_exception_handler(
    int is_first_handler,
    sgx_exception_handler_t exception_handler
);
```

**Parameters**

- **is_first_handler [in]**
  Specify the order in which the handler should be called. If the parameter is nonzero, the handler is the first handler to be called. If the parameter is zero, the handler is the last handler to be called.

- **exception_handler [in]**
  The exception handler to be called

**Return value**

Non-zero
Indicates the exception handler is registered successfully. The return value is an open handle to the custom exception handler.

**NULL**

The exception handler was not registered.

**Description**

The Intel(R) SGX SDK supports the registration of custom exception handler functions. You can write your own code to handle a limited set of hardware exceptions. For example, a CPUID instruction inside an enclave will effectively result in a #UD fault (Invalid Opcode Exception). ISV enclave code can have an exception handler to prevent the enclave from being trapped into an exception condition. See Custom Exception Handling for more details.

Calling `sgx_register_exception_handler` allows you to register an exception handler, and specify whether to prepend (when `is_first_handler` is nonzero) or append the handler to the handler chain.

After calling `sgx_register_exception_handler` to prepend an exception handler, a subsequent call to this function may add another exception handler at the beginning of the handler chain. Therefore the order in which exception handlers are called does not only depend on the value of the `is_first_handler` parameter, but more importantly depends on the order in which exception handlers are registered.

**NOTE:**

Custom exception handling is only supported in hardware mode. Although the exception handlers can be registered in simulation mode, the exceptions cannot be caught and handled within the enclave.

**Requirements**

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</table>

`sgx_unregister_exception_handler`

`sgx_unregister_exception_handler` is used to unregister a custom exception handler.

**Syntax**

```c
int sgx_unregister_exception_handler(
    void* handler
);
```
Parameters

**handler [in]**

A handle to the custom exception handler previously registered using the `sgx_register_exception_handler` function.

Return value

**Non-zero**

The custom exception handler is unregistered successfully.

**0**

The exception handler was not unregistered (not a valid pointer, handler not found).

Description

The Intel(R) SGX SDK supports the registration of custom exception handler functions. An enclave developer can write their own code to handle a limited set of hardware exceptions. See Custom Exception Handling for more details.

Calling `sgx_unregister_exception_handler` allows developers to unregister an exception handler that was registered earlier.

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**IsDebuggerPresent**

Determines whether the calling process is being debugged by Intel(R) SGX debugger.

**Syntax**

```c
bool IsDebuggerPresent(
    void
);
```

Parameters

None.

Return value
True
If the current process is running in the context of Intel(R) SGX debugger.

False
If the current process is not running in the context of Intel(R) SGX debugger.

Requirements

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OutputDebugString
Sends a string to the Intel(R) SGX debugger for display.

Syntax

```c
void OutputDebugStringA(W)(
    char*(wchar_t) output_string
);
```

Parameters

`lpOutputString [in, optional]`
The null-terminated string to be displayed.

Return value
This function does not return a value.

Requirements

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</table>

DebugBreak
Causes a breakpoint exception to occur in the current process. This allows the calling thread to signal Intel(R) SGX debugger to handle the exception.

**NOTE:**
If an enclave calls this function after the Intel(R) SGX debugger detaches from the enclave, the application will crash.

Syntax

```c
void DebugBreak()
```

Parameters

None

Return value

This function does not return a value.

Requirements

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**sgx_spin_lock**

The `sgx_spin_lock` function acquires a spin lock within the enclave.

Syntax

```c
uint32_t sgx_spin_lock(
    sgx_spinlock_t * lock
);
```

Parameters

**lock [in]**

The trusted spin lock object to be acquired.

Return value

0

This function always returns zero after the lock is acquired.

Description
sgx_spin_lock modifies the value of the spin lock by using compiler atomic operations. If the lock is not available to be acquired, the thread will always wait on the lock until it can be acquired successfully.

Requirements

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sgx_spin_unlock

The sgx_spin_unlock function releases a spin lock within the enclave.

Syntax

```c
uint32_t sgx_spin_unlock(
    sgx_spinlock_t * lock
);
```

Parameters

lock [in]

The trusted spin lock object to be released.

Return value

0

This function always returns zero after the lock is released.

Description

sgx_spin_unlock resets the value of the spin lock, regardless of its current state. This function simply assigns a value of zero to the lock, which indicates the lock is released.

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sgx_thread_mutex_init

The sgx_thread_mutex_init function initializes a trusted mutex object within the enclave.

Syntax
```c
int sgx_thread_mutex_init(
    sgx_thread_mutex_t * mutex,
    const sgx_thread_mutexattr_t * unused
);
```

**Parameters**

**mutex [in]**
The trusted mutex object to be initialized.

**unused [in]**
Unused parameter reserved for future user defined mutex attributes. [NOT USED]

**Return value**

0
The mutex is initialized successfully.

EINVAL
The trusted mutex object is invalid. It is either NULL or located outside of enclave memory.

**Description**

When a thread creates a mutex within an enclave, `sgx_thread_mutex_init` simply initializes the various fields of the mutex object to indicate that the mutex is available. `sgx_thread_mutex_init` creates a non-recursive mutex. The results of using a mutex in a lock or unlock operation before it has been fully initialized (for example, the function call to `sgx_thread_mutex_init` returns) are undefined. To avoid race conditions in the initialization of a trusted mutex, it is recommended statically initializing the mutex with the macro `SGX_THREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER`, `SGX_THREAD_NON_RECURSIVE_MUTEX_INITIALIZER`, or `SGX_THREAD_RECURSIVE_MUTEX_INITIALIZER` instead.

**Requirements**

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</table>
sgx_thread_mutex_destroy

The `sgx_thread_mutex_destroy` function destroys a trusted mutex object within an enclave.

Syntax

```c
int sgx_thread_mutex_destroy(
    sgx_thread_mutex_t *mutex
);
```

Parameters

**mutex [in]**

The trusted mutex object to be destroyed.

Return value

0

The mutex is destroyed successfully.

EINVAL

The trusted mutex object is invalid. It is either NULL or located outside of enclave memory.

EBUSY

The mutex is locked by another thread or has pending threads to acquire the mutex.

Description

`sgx_thread_mutex_destroy` resets the mutex, which brings it to its initial status. In this process, certain fields are checked to prevent releasing a mutex that is still owned by a thread or on which threads are still waiting.

**NOTE:**

Locking or unlocking a mutex after it has been destroyed results in undefined behavior. After a mutex is destroyed, it must be re-created before it can be used again.

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</table>
sgx_thread_mutex_lock
The `sgx_thread_mutex_lock` function locks a trusted mutex object within an enclave.

Syntax

```c
int sgx_thread_mutex_lock(
    sgx_thread_mutex_t *mutex
);
```

Parameters

**mutex [in]**
The trusted mutex object to be locked.

Return value

* 0
  The mutex is locked successfully.

**EINVAL**
The trusted mutex object is invalid.

Description

To acquire a mutex, a thread first needs to acquire the corresponding spin lock. After the spin lock is acquired, the thread checks whether the mutex is available. If the queue is empty or the thread is at the head of the queue the thread will now become the owner of the mutex. To confirm its ownership, the thread updates the refcount and owner fields. If the mutex is not available, the thread searches the queue. If the thread is already in the queue, but not at the head, it means that the thread has previously tried to lock the mutex, but it did not succeed and had to wait outside the enclave and it has been awakened unexpectedly. When this happens, the thread makes an OCALL and simply goes back to sleep. If the thread is trying to lock the mutex for the first time, it will update the waiting queue and make an OCALL to get suspended. Note that threads release the spin lock after acquiring the mutex or before leaving the enclave.

---

**NOTE**

---

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A thread should not exit an enclave returning from a root ECALL after acquiring the ownership of a mutex. Do not split the critical section protected by a mutex across root ECALLs.

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**sgx_thread_mutex_trylock**

The `sgx_thread_mutex_trylock` function tries to lock a trusted mutex object within an enclave.

**Syntax**

```c
int sgx_thread_mutex_trylock(
   sgx_thread_mutex_t * mutex
);
```

**Parameters**

- `mutex [in]`
  
The trusted mutex object to be try-locked.

**Return value**

- **0**
  
The mutex is locked successfully.

- **EINVAL**
  
The trusted mutex object is invalid.

- **EBUSY**
  
The mutex is locked by another thread or has pending threads to acquire the mutex.

**Description**

A thread may check the status of the mutex, which implies acquiring the spin lock and verifying that the mutex is available and that the queue is empty or the thread is at the head of the queue. When this happens, the thread acquires the mutex, releases the spin lock and returns 0. Otherwise, the
thread releases the spin lock and returns EINVAL/EBUSY. The thread is not suspended in this case.

**NOTE**

A thread should not exit an enclave returning from a root ECALL after acquiring the ownership of a mutex. Do not split the critical section protected by a mutex across root ECALLs.

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**sgx_thread_mutex_unlock**

The `sgx_thread_mutex_unlock` function unlocks a trusted mutex object within an enclave.

**Syntax**

```c
int sgx_thread_mutex_unlock(
    sgx_thread_mutex_t * mutex
);
```

**Parameters**

`mutex [in]`

The trusted mutex object to be unlocked.

**Return value**

0

The mutex is unlocked successfully.

EINVAL

The trusted mutex object is invalid or it is not locked by any thread.

EPERM

The mutex is locked by another thread.

**Description**

Before a thread releases a mutex, it has to verify it is the owner of the mutex. If that is the case, the thread decreases the refcount by 1 and then may either
continue normal execution or wakeup the first thread in the queue. Note that to ensure the state of the mutex remains consistent, the thread that is awakened by the thread releasing the mutex will then try to acquire the mutex almost as in the initial call to the \texttt{sgx_thread_mutex_lock} routine.

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\texttt{sgx_thread_cond_init}

The \texttt{sgx_thread_cond_init} function initializes a trusted condition variable within the enclave.

**Syntax**

\begin{verbatim}
int sgx_thread_cond_init(
    sgx_thread_cond_t * cond,
    const sgx_thread_condattr_t * unused
);
\end{verbatim}

**Parameters**

\texttt{cond [in]}

The trusted condition variable.

\texttt{attr [in]}

Unused parameter reserved for future user defined condition variable attributes. [NOT USED]

**Return value**

0

The condition variable is initialized successfully.

EINVAL

The trusted condition variable is invalid. It is either NULL or located outside enclave memory.

**Description:**

When a thread creates a condition variable within an enclave, it simply initializes the various fields of the object to indicate that the condition variable is
available. The results of using a condition variable in a wait, signal or broadcast
operation before it has been fully initialized (for example, the function call to
sgx_thread_cond_init returns) are undefined. To avoid race conditions
in the initialization of a condition variable, it is recommended statically ini-
tializing the condition variable with the macro SGX_THREAD_COND
INITIALIZER.

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sgx_thread_cond_destroy
The sgx_thread_cond_destroy function destroys a trusted condition vari-
able within an enclave.

Syntax

int sgx_thread_cond_destroy(
   sgx_thread_cond_t * cond
);

Parameters

cond [in]
The trusted condition variable to be destroyed.

Return value

0
The condition variable is destroyed successfully.

EINVAL
The trusted condition variable is invalid. It is either NULL or located outside
enclave memory.

EBUSY
The condition variable has pending threads waiting on it.

Description
The procedure first confirms that there are no threads waiting on the con-
dition variable before it is destroyed. The destroy operation acquires the spin
lock at the beginning of the operation to prevent other threads from signaling to or waiting on the condition variable.

**NOTE**
Acquiring or releasing a condition variable after it has been destroyed results in undefined behavior. After a condition variable is destroyed, it must be re-created before it can be used again.

**Requirements**

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**sgx_thread_cond_wait**

The `sgx_thread_cond_wait` function waits on a condition variable within an enclave.

**Syntax**

```c
int sgx_thread_cond_wait(
    sgx_thread_cond_t * cond,
    sgx_thread_mutex_t * mutex
);
```

**Parameters**

- **cond [in]**
The trusted condition variable to be waited on.

- **mutex [in]**
The trusted mutex object that will be unlocked when the thread is blocked in the condition variable.

**Return value**

- **0**
The thread waiting on the condition variable is signaled by other thread (without errors).

- **EINVAL**
The trusted condition variable or mutex object is invalid or the mutex is not locked.
**EPERM**

The trusted mutex is locked by another thread.

**Description:**

A condition variable is always used in conjunction with a mutex. To wait on a condition variable, a thread first needs to acquire the condition variable spin lock. After the spin lock is acquired, the thread updates the condition variable waiting queue. To avoid the lost wake-up signal problem, the condition variable spin lock is released after the mutex. This order ensures the function atomically releases the mutex and causes the calling thread to block on the condition variable, with respect to other threads accessing the mutex and the condition variable. After releasing the condition variable spin lock, the thread makes an OCALL to get suspended. When the thread is awakened, it acquires the condition variable spin lock. The thread then searches the condition variable queue. If the thread is in the queue, it means that the thread was already waiting on the condition variable outside the enclave, and it has been awakened unexpectedly. When this happens, the thread releases the condition variable spin lock, makes an OCALL and simply goes back to sleep. Otherwise, another thread has signaled or broadcasted the condition variable and this thread may proceed. Before returning, the thread releases the condition variable spin lock and acquires the mutex, ensuring that upon returning from the function call the thread still owns the mutex.

**NOTE**

Threads check whether they are in the queue to make the Intel SGX condition variable robust against attacks to the untrusted event.

A thread may have to do up to two OCALLs throughout the `sgx_thread_cond_wait` function call.

**Requirements**

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</table>

**sgx_thread_cond_signal**

The `sgx_thread_cond_signal` function wakes a pending thread waiting on the condition variable.

**Syntax**

```c
int sgx_thread_cond_signal(
```
Parameters

cond [in]
The trusted condition variable to be signaled.

Return value

0
One pending thread is signaled.

EINVAL
The trusted condition variable is invalid.

Description
To signal a condition variable, a thread starts acquiring the condition variable spin-lock. Then it inspects the status of the condition variable queue. If the queue is empty it means that there are not any threads waiting on the condition variable. When that happens, the thread releases the condition variable and returns. However, if the queue is not empty, the thread removes the first thread waiting in the queue. The thread then makes an OCALL to wake up the thread that is suspended outside the enclave, but first the thread releases the condition variable spin-lock. Upon returning from the OCALL, the thread continues normal execution.

Requirements

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sgx_thread_cond_broadcast

The `sgx_thread_cond_broadcast` function wakes all pending threads waiting on the condition variable.

Syntax

```c
int sgx_thread_cond_broadcast(
    sgx_thread_cond_t * cond
);
```
Parameters
cond [in]
The trusted condition variable to be broadcasted.

Return value
0
All pending threads have been broadcasted.
EINVAL
The trusted condition variable is invalid.
ENOMEM
Internal memory allocation failed.

Description
Broadcast and signal operations on a condition variable are analogous. The only difference is that during a broadcast operation, the thread removes all the threads waiting on the condition variable queue and wakes up all the threads suspended outside the enclave in a single OCALL.

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sgx_thread_self
The sgx_thread_self function returns the unique thread identification.

Syntax
sgx_thread_t sgx_thread_self(
    void
);

Return value
The return value cannot be NULL and is always valid as long as it is invoked by a thread inside the enclave.

Description
The function is a simple wrap of `get_thread_data()` provided in the tRTS, which provides a trusted thread unique identifier.

**NOTE:**
This identifier does not change throughout the life of an enclave.

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**sgx_thread_equal**

The `sgx_thread_equal` function compares two thread identifiers.

**Syntax**

```c
int sgx_thread_equal(sgx_thread_t
                     sgx_thread_t t1,
                     sgx_thread_t t2);
```

**Return value**

A nonzero value if the two thread IDs are equal, 0 otherwise.

**Description**

The function compares two thread identifiers provided by `sgx_thread_self` to determine if the IDs refer to the same trusted thread.

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**sgx_create_event**

The `sgx_create_event` function initializes an unnamed event within the enclave.

**Syntax**

```c
int sgx_create_event(
                     sgx_thread_sync_object_handle_t* handle,
                     int is_manual_reset,
                     int is_signaled_init_state
);```
Parameters

handle [out]
Pointer to handle of the trusted thread synchronization object (event).

is_manual_reset [in]
If this parameter is 1, the event can only be reset manually.
If this parameter is 0, the event will be reset automatically.

is_signaled_init_state [in]
By default, the initial state of the event is not set. However, when this parameter is 1, the event will be signaled upon initialization.
When this parameter is 0, the event will be non-signaled upon initialization.

Return value

0
The unnamed event is initialized successfully.

EINVAL
The pointer to the trusted event is invalid.

ENOMEM
There is not enough memory to allocate an event.

Description

When a thread creates an event within an enclave, `sgx_create_event` simply initializes various fields of the event object to indicate that the event is available. By default, `sgx_create_event` creates a non-signaled event that is automatically reset by `sgx_wait_for_single_object` and `sgx_wait_for_multiple_objects`. The results of using an event in any operation before it has been fully initialized are undefined.

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</table>
sgx_set_event
The sgx_set_event function sets the event object to the signaled state.

Syntax
int sgx_set_event(
    sgx_thread_sync_object_handle_t handle
);

Parameters
handle [in]
Handle of the trusted thread synchronization object (event).

Return value
0
The event object state was signaled successfully.
EINVAL
The pointer to the trusted event is invalid.

Description
sgx_set_event explicitly signals the state of an event object. The state of an auto-reset event object remains signaled until a thread waiting on this event is released. The state of a manually-reset event object remains signaled until you explicitly reset it calling sgx_reset_event. All threads waiting on a manually-reset event will be released.

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sgx_reset_event
The sgx_reset_event function sets the event object to the non-signaled state.

Syntax
int sgx_reset_event(
    sgx_thread_sync_object_handle_t handle
);
**Parameters**

**handle [in]**

Handle of the trusted thread synchronization object (event).

**Return value**

0

The event object state is reset successfully.

**EINVAL**

The pointer to the trusted event is invalid.

**Description**

`sgx_reset_event` changes the state of an event object to non-signaled. Use this function to reset events configured not to be automatically reset.

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**sgx_wait_for_single_object**

The `sgx_wait_for_single_object` function waits until the specified object is in the signaled state or the timeout interval elapses.

**Syntax**

```c
int sgx_wait_for_single_object(
    sgx_thread_sync_object_handle_t handle,
    uint32_t timeout
);
```

**Parameters**

**handle [in]**

Handle of the trusted thread synchronization object (event).

**timeout [in]**

Timeout interval. Only 0 and `WAIT_FUNC_TIMEOUT_INFINITY` are supported. With `WAIT_FUNC_TIMEOUT_INFINITY` a thread waits until the
object is signaled. If timeout is zero, the function does not enter a wait state if the object is not signaled. Instead it returns immediately.

Return value
0
The object was signaled successfully.

SGX_THREAD_ERROR_WAIT_TIMEOUT
A timeout interval of 0 was specified and the object was not in the signaled state.

SGX_THREAD_ERROR_WAIT_FAILED
The function failed to wait.

Description
sgx_wait_for_single_object allows a thread to wait until an object is signaled (timeout \texttt{WAIT\_FUNC\_TIMEOUT\_INFINITE}) or to check whether an object has been signaled (timeout zero) without waiting if not.

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\texttt{sgx_wait_for_multiple_objects}

The \texttt{sgx_wait_for_multiple_objects} function waits until one or all of the specified objects are in the signaled state or the timeout interval elapses.

Syntax

\begin{verbatim}
int sgx_wait_for_multiple_objects(
    uint32_t count,
    sgx_thread_sync_object_handle_t * handles,
    int wait_all,
    uint32_t timeout
);
\end{verbatim}

Parameters
count [in]
Number of objects in the handle array. The current implementation limits the number of objects to \texttt{MAX\_WAIT\_HANDLE\_NUM}.
handles [in]
Array of handles of the trusted thread synchronization object (event).

wait_all [in]
If this parameter is 1, sgx_wait_for_multiple_objects returns only after all the objects in the handle array are signaled. When this parameter is 0, the function returns when the state of any object is signaled. In this case, the return value indicates the object whose state caused the function to return.

timeout [in]
Timeout interval. Only 0 and WAIT_FUNC_TIMEOUT_INFINITE are supported. With WAIT_FUNC_TIMEOUT_INFINITE, a thread waits until the event object is signaled. If timeout is zero, the function does not enter a wait state if the event object is not signaled. Instead it returns immediately.

Return value
0
If the function succeeds.

SGX_THREAD_ERROR_WAIT_TIMEOUT
A timeout interval of 0 was specified and no object was in the signaled state.

SGX_THREAD_ERROR_WAIT_FAILED
The function failed to wait.

Description
sgx_wait_for_multiple_objects allows a thread to wait until an object is signaled (timeout WAIT_FUNC_TIMEOUT_INFINITE) or to check whether if an event object has been signaled (timeout zero). Handles could refer to different object types: event and mutex.

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sgx_destroy_event
The sgx_destroy_event function destroys the event object and releases all its resources.

Syntax
int sgx_destroy_event(
    sgx_thread_sync_object_handle_t handle
);

Parameters

handle [in]
Handle of the trusted thread synchronization object (event).

Return value

0
The event object was destroy successfully.

Non zero
The function failed. See the returned error code for additional information.

Description

sgx_destroy_event destroys an event object and releases all the resources associated with the event. This function signals all threads waiting on the event before it is closed.

NOTE:
The sgx_destroy_event returns different values if the event object to be destroyed is being waited by sgx_wait_single_object or sgx_wait_multiple_objects:

- The sgx_destroy_event returns EBUSY if the event is being waited by sgx_wait_single_object.
- The sgx_destroy_event returns 0 if the event is being waited by sgx_wait_multiple_objects.

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sgx_cpuid

The sgx_cpuid function performs the equivalent of a cpuid() function call or intrinsic which executes the CPUID instruction to query the host processor for the information about supported features.
**NOTE:**
This function performs an OCALL to execute the CPUID instruction.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_cpuid(
    int cpuinfo[4],
    int leaf
);
```

**Parameters**

**cpuinfo [in, out]**

The information returned in an array of four integers. This array must be located within the enclave.

**leaf [in]**

The leaf specified for retrieved CPU info.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

Indicates success.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

Indicates the parameter cpuinfo is invalid, which would be NULL or outside the enclave.

**Description**

This function provides the equivalent of the cpuid() function or intrinsic. The function executes the CPUID instruction for the given leaf (input). The CPUID instruction provides processor feature and type information that is returned in cpuinfo, an array of 4 integers to specify the values of EAX, EBX, ECX and EDX registers. `sgx_cpuid` performs an OCALL by invoking oc_cpuidex to get the info from untrusted side because the CPUID instruction is an illegal instruction in the enclave domain.

For additional details, see Intel(R) 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual for the description on the CPUID instruction and its individual leafs. (Leaf corresponds to EAX in the PRM description.)

**NOTE**
1. As the CPUID instruction is executed by an OCALL, the results should not be trusted. Code should verify the results and perform a threat evaluation to determine the impact on trusted code if the results were spoofed.

2. The implementation of this function performs an OCALL and therefore, this function will not have the same serializing or fencing behavior of executing a CPUID instruction in an untrusted domain code flow.

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sgx_cpuidex

The sgx_cpuidex function performs the equivalent of a cpuid_ex() function call or intrinsic which executes the CPUID instruction to query the host processor for the information about supported features.

**NOTE:**
This function performs an OCALL to execute the CPUID instruction.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_cpuidex(
    int cpuinfo[4],
    int leaf,
    int subleaf
);
```

Parameters

cpuinfo [in, out]

The information returned in an array of four integers. The array must be located within the enclave.

leaf[in]

The leaf specified for retrieved CPU info.

subleaf[in]

The sub-leaf specified for retrieved CPU info.

Return value
**SGX_SUCCESS**

Indicates success.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

Indicates the parameter cpuinfo is invalid, which would be NULL or outside the enclave.

**Description**

This function provides the equivalent of the `cpuid()` function or intrinsic. The function executes the CPUID instruction for the given leaf (input). The CPUID instruction provides processor feature and type information returned in cpuinfo, an array of 4 integers to specify the values of EAX, EBX, ECX and EDX registers. `sgx_cpuid` performs an OCALL by invoking oc_cpuidex to get the info from untrusted side because the CPUID instruction is an illegal instruction in the enclave domain.


**NOTE**

1. As the CPUID instruction is executed by an OCALL, the results should not be trusted. Code should verify the results and perform a threat evaluation to determine the impact on trusted code if the results were spoofed.
2. The implementation of this function performs an OCALL and therefore, this function will not have the same serializing or fencing behavior of executing a CPUID instruction in an untrusted domain code flow.

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**sgx_get_key**

The `sgx_get_key` function generates a 128-bit secret key using the input information. This function is a wrapper for the Intel SGX EGETKEY instruction.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_get_key(  
```
```c
const sgx_key_request_t *key_request,
sgx_key_128bit_t *key
);
```

**Parameters**

**key_request [in]**

A pointer to a `sgx_key_request_t` object used for selecting the appropriate key and any additional parameters required in the derivation of that key. The pointer cannot be NULL and must be located within the enclave. See details on the `sgx_key_request_t` to understand initializing this structure before calling this function.

**key [out]**

A pointer to the buffer that receives the cryptographic key output. The pointer cannot be NULL and must be located within enclave memory.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

Indicates success.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

Indicates an error if the parameters do not meet any of the following conditions:

- `key_request` buffer must be non-NULL and located within the enclave.
- `key` buffer must be non-NULL and located within the enclave.
- `key_request` and `key_request->key_policy` should not have any reserved bits set.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**

Indicates an error that the enclave is out of memory.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_ATTRIBUTE**

Indicates the `key_request` requests a key for a `KEYNAME` which the enclave is not authorized.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_CPUSVN**

Indicates `key_request->cpu_svn` is beyond platform CPUSVN value

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_ISVSVN**
Indicates `key_request->isv_svn` is greater than the enclave's ISVSVN

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_KEYNAME**

Indicates `key_request->key_name` is an unsupported value

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

Indicates an unexpected error occurs during the key generation process.

**Description**

The `sgx_get_key` function generates a 128-bit secret key from the processor specific key hierarchy with the `key_request` information. If the function fails with an error code, the key buffer will be filled with random numbers. The `key_request` structure needs to be initialized properly to obtain the requested key type. See `sgx_key_request_t` for structure details.

---

**NOTE:**

It is not recommended to use this API to obtain the sealing key. Use the `sgx_seal_data`, `sgx_seal_data_ex`, and `sgx_unseal_data` API instead. The sealing key can change after the platform firmware is updated. The sealing data API generates a data blob (`sgx_sealed_data_t`), which contains all the necessary information to unseal the blob even after updating the platform firmware. Without this information, unsealing may fail.

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**sgx_create_report**

The `sgx_create_report` function tries to use the information of the target enclave and other information to create a cryptographic report of the enclave. This function is a wrapper for the Intel SGX `EREPORT` instruction.

**Syntax**

```
sgx_status_t sgx_create_report(
    const sgx_target_info_t *target_info,
    const sgx_report_data_t *report_data,
    sgx_report_t *report
);
```
Parameters

target_info [in]
A pointer to the sgx_target_info_t object that contains the information of the target enclave, which will be able to cryptographically verify the report calling sgx_verify_report.

- If the pointer value is NULL, sgx_create_report retrieves information about the calling enclave, but the generated report cannot be verified by any enclave.
- If the pointer value is not NULL the target_info buffer must be within the enclave.

See sgx_target_info_t for structure details.

report_data [in]
A pointer to the sgx_report_data_t object which contains a set of data used for communication between the enclaves. This pointer is allowed to be NULL. If it is not NULL, the report_data buffer must be within the enclave. See sgx_report_data_t for structure details.

report [out]
A pointer to the buffer that receives the cryptographic report of the enclave. The pointer cannot be NULL and the report buffer must be within the enclave. See sgx_report_t for structure details.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS
Indicates success.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER
An error is reported if any of the parameters are non-NULL pointers but the memory is not within the enclave or the reserved fields of the data structure are not set to zero.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY
Indicates that the enclave is out of memory.

Description

Use the function sgx_create_report to create a cryptographic report that describes the contents of the calling enclave. The report can be used by other
enclaves to verify that the enclave is running on the same platform. When an enclave calls `sgx_verify_report` to verify a report, it will succeed only if the report was generated using the `target_info` for said enclave. This function is a wrapper for the Intel SGX `EREPOR T` instruction.

Before the source enclave calls `sgx_create_report` to generate a report, it needs to populate `target_info` with information about the target enclave that will verify the report. The target enclave may obtain this information calling `sgx_create_report` with a NULL pointer for `target_info` and pass it to the source enclave at the beginning of the inter-enclave attestation process.

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`sgx_verify_report`

The `sgx_verify_report` function provides software verification for the report which is expected to be generated by the `sgx_create_report` function.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_verify_report(
    const sgx_report_t * report
);
```

**Parameters**

*report*[in]

A pointer to an `sgx_report_t` object that contains the cryptographic report to be verified. The pointer cannot be NULL and the report buffer must be within the enclave.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

Verification success: The input report was generated using a `target_info` that matches the one for the enclave making this call.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

The report object is invalid.
SGX_ERROR_MAC_MISMATCH
Indicates report verification error.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
Indicates an unexpected error occurs during the report verification process.

Description
The `sgx_verify_report` function performs a cryptographic CMAC function of the input `sgx_report_data_t` object in the report using the report key. Then the function compares the input report MAC value with the calculated MAC value to determine whether the report is valid or not.

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sgx_calc_sealed_data_size
The `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size` function is a helper function for the seal library which should be used to determine how much memory to allocate for the `sgx_sealed_data_t` structure.

Syntax

```c
uint32_t sgx_calc_sealed_data_size(
    const uint32_t add_mac_txt_size,
    const uint32_t txt_encrypt_size
);
```

Parameters

**add_mac_txt_size [in]**
Length of the optional additional data stream in bytes. The additional data will not be encrypted, but will be part of the MAC calculation.

**txt_encrypt_size [in]**
Length of the data stream to be encrypted in bytes. This data will also be part of the MAC calculation.

Return value
If the function succeeds, the return value is the minimum number of bytes that need to be allocated for the `sgx_sealed_data_t` structure. If the function fails, the return value is `0xFFFFFFFF`. It is recommended that you check the return value before use it to allocate memory.

**Description**

The function calculates the number of bytes to allocate for the `sgx_sealed_data_t` structure. The calculation includes the fixed portions of the structure as well as the two input data streams: encrypted text and optional additional MAC text.

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**sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len**

The `sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len` function is a helper function for the seal library which should be used to determine how much memory to allocate for the `additional_MAC_text` buffer output from the `sgx_unseal_data` function.

**Syntax**

```c
uint32_t sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len(
    const sgx_sealed_data_t *p_sealed_data
);
```

**Parameters**

**p_sealed_data [in]**

Pointer to the sealed data structure which was populated by the `sgx_seal_data` function.

**Return value**

If the function succeeds, the number of bytes in the optional additional MAC data buffer is returned. If this function fails, the return value is `0xFFFFFFFF`. It is recommended that you check the return value before use it to allocate memory.

**Description**
The function calculates the minimum number of bytes to allocate for the output MAC data buffer returned by the \texttt{sgx\_unseal\_data} function.

\section*{Requirements}

\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
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  Library & \texttt{sgx\_tservice.lib} or \texttt{sgx\_tservice\_sim.lib} (simulation) \\
  \hline
\end{tabular}

\texttt{sgx\_get\_encrypt\_txt\_len}

The \texttt{sgx\_get\_encrypt\_txt\_len} function is a helper function for the seal library which should be used to calculate the minimum number of bytes to allocate for decrypted data returned by the \texttt{sgx\_unseal\_data} function.

\section*{Syntax}

\begin{verbatim}
uint32_t sgx_get_encrypt_txt_len(
    const sgx_sealed_data_t *p_sealed_data
);
\end{verbatim}

\section*{Parameters}

\texttt{p\_sealed\_data [in]}

Pointer to the sealed data structure which was populated during by the \texttt{sgx\_seal\_data} function.

\section*{Return value}

If the function succeeds, the number of bytes in the encrypted data buffer is returned. Otherwise, the return value is \texttt{0xFFFFFFFF}. It is recommended that you check the return value before use it to allocate memory.

\section*{Description}

The function calculates the minimum number of bytes to allocate for decrypted data returned by the \texttt{sgx\_unseal\_data} function.

\section*{Requirements}

\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
  \hline
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\end{tabular}
sgx_seal_data
This function is used to AES-GCM encrypt the input data. Two input data sets are provided: one is the data to be encrypted; the second is optional additional data that will not be encrypted but will be part of the GCM MAC calculation which also covers the data to be encrypted.

Syntax

sgx_status_t sgx_seal_data(
    const uint32_t additional_MACtext_length,
    const uint8_t * p_additional_MACtext,
    const uint32_t text2encrypt_length,
    const uint8_t * p_text2encrypt,
    const uint32_t sealed_data_size,
    sgx_sealed_data_t * p_sealed_data
);

Parameters

additional_MACtext_length [in]
Length of the additional Message Authentication Code (MAC) data in bytes. The additional data is optional and thus the length can be zero if no data is provided.

p_additional_MACtext [in]
Pointer to the additional Message Authentication Code (MAC) data. This additional data is optional and no data is necessary (NULL pointer can be passed, but additional_MACtext_length must be zero in this case).

NOTE:
This data will not be encrypted. This data can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.

text2encrypt_length [in]
Length of the data stream to be encrypted in bytes. Must be non-zero.

p_text2encrypt [in]
Pointer to the data stream to be encrypted. Must not be NULL. Must be within the enclave.

sealed_data_size [in]
Number of bytes allocated for the sgx_sealed_data_t structure. The calling code should utilize helper function sgx_calc_sealed_data_size to determine the required buffer size.

**p_sealed_data [out]**

Pointer to the buffer to store the sealed data.

---

**NOTE:**
The calling code must allocate the memory for this buffer and should utilize helper function sgx_calc_sealed_data_size to determine the required buffer size. The sealed data must be within the enclave.

---

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

Indicates success.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

Indicates an error if the parameters do not meet any of the following conditions:

- If additional_MACtext_length is non-zero, p_additional_MACtext cannot be NULL.
- p_additional_MACtext buffer can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.
- p_text2encrypt must be non-zero.
- p_text2encrypt buffer must be within the enclave.
- sealed_data_size must be equal to the required buffer size, which is calculated by the function sgx_calc_sealed_data_size.
- p_sealed_data buffer must be within the enclave.
- Input buffers cannot cross an enclave boundary.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**

The enclave is out of memory.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

Indicates a crypto library failure or the RDRAND instruction fails to generate a random number.

**Description**
The `sgx_seal_data` function retrieves a key unique to the enclave and uses that key to encrypt the input data buffer. This function can be utilized to preserve secret data after the enclave is destroyed. The sealed data blob can be unsealed on future instantiations of the enclave.

The additional data buffer will not be encrypted but will be part of the MAC calculation that covers the encrypted data as well. This data may include information about the application, version, data, etc which can be utilized to identify the sealed data blob since it will remain plain text.

Use `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size` to calculate the number of bytes to allocate for the `sgx_sealed_data_t` structure. The input sealed data buffer and `text2encrypt` buffers must be allocated within the enclave.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_tseal.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Library</td>
<td><code>sgx_tservice.lib</code> or <code>sgx_tservice_sim.lib</code> (simulation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**sgx_seal_data_ex**

This function is used to AES-GCM encrypt the input data. Two input data sets are provided: one is the data to be encrypted; the second is optional additional data that will not be encrypted but will be part of the GCM MAC calculation which also covers the data to be encrypted. This is the expert mode version of function `sgx_seal_data`.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_seal_data_ex(
    const uint16_t key_policy,
    const sgx_attributes_t attribute_mask,
    const sgx_misc_select_t misc_mask,
    const uint32_t additional_MACtext_length,
    const uint8_t * p_additional_MACtext,
    const uint32_t text2encrypt_length,
    const uint8_t * p_text2encrypt,
    const uint32_t sealed_data_size,
    sgx_sealed_data_t * p_sealed_data
);
```

**Parameters**

`key_policy` [in]
Specifies the policy to use in the key derivation. Function `sgx_seal_data` uses the MRSIGNER policy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key policy name</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KEYPOLICY_MRENCLAVE</td>
<td>0x00 01</td>
<td>Derive key using the enclave's ENCLAVE measurement register</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEYPOLICY_MRSIGNER</td>
<td>0x00 02</td>
<td>Derive key using the enclave's SIGNER measurement register</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**attribute_mask [in]**

Identifies which platform/enclave attributes to use in the key derivation. See the definition of `sgx_attributes_t` to determine which attributes will be checked. Function `sgx_seal_data` uses `flags=0xFF0000000000000B, xfrm=0`.

**misc_mask [in]**

Identifies the mask bits for the Misc feature to enforce. Function `sgx_seal_data` uses `0xF0000000`. The misc mask bits for the enclave. Reserved for future function extension.

**additional_MACtext_length [in]**

Length of the additional data to be MAC'ed in bytes. The additional data is optional and thus the length can be zero if no data is provided.

**p_additional_MACtext [in]**

Pointer to the additional data to be MAC'ed of variable length. This additional data is optional and no data is necessary (NULL pointer can be passed, but `additional_MACtext_length` must be zero in this case).

---

**NOTE:**

This data will not be encrypted. This data can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.

**text2encrypt_length [in]**

Length of the data stream to be encrypted in bytes. Must be non-zero.

**p_text2encrypt [in]**

Pointer to the data stream to be encrypted of variable length. Must not be NULL. Must be within the enclave.

**sealed_data_size [in]**
Number of bytes allocated for `sealed_data_t` structure. The calling code should utilize helper function `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size` to determine the required buffer size.

**p_sealed_data [out]**

Pointer to the buffer that is populated by this function.

---

**NOTE:**
The calling code must allocate the memory for this buffer and should utilize helper function `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size` to determine the required buffer size. The sealed data must be within the enclave.

---

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

Indicates success.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

Indicates an error if the parameters do not meet any of the following conditions:

- If `additional_MACtext_length` is non-zero, `p_additional_MACtext` cannot be NULL.
- `p_additional_MACtext` buffer can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.
- `p_text2encrypt` must be non-zero.
- `p_text2encrypt` buffer must be within the enclave.
- `sealed_data_size` must be equal to the required buffer size, which is calculated by the function `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size`.
- `p_sealed_data` buffer must be within the enclave.
- Input buffers cannot cross an enclave boundary.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**

The enclave is out of memory.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

Indicates crypto library failure or the RDRAND instruction fails to generate a random number.

**Description**
The `sgx_seal_data_ex` is an extended version of `sgx_seal_data`. It provides parameters for you to identify how to derive the sealing key (key policy and attributes mask). Typical callers of the seal library should be able to use `sgx_seal_data` and the default values provided for `key_policy` (MR_SIGNER) and an attribute mask which includes the RESERVED, INITED and DEBUG bits. Users of this function should have a clear understanding of the impact on using a policy and/or `attribute_mask` that is different from that in `sgx_seal_data`.

**Requirement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**sgx_unseal_data**

This function is used to AES-GCM decrypt the input sealed data structure. Two output data sets result: one is the decrypted data; the second is the optional additional data that was part of the GCM MAC calculation but was not encrypted. This function provides the converse of `sgx_seal_data` and `sgx_seal_data_ex`.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_unseal_data(
    const sgx_sealed_data_t * p_sealed_data,
    uint8_t * p_additional_MACtext,
    uint32_t * p_additional_MACtext_length,
    uint8_t * p_decrypted_text,
    uint32_t * p_decrypted_text_length
);
```

**Parameters**

**p_sealed_data [in]**

Pointer to the sealed data buffer to be AES-GCM decrypted. Must be within the enclave.

**p_additional_MACtext [out]**

Pointer to the additional data part of the MAC calculation. This additional data is optional and no data is necessary. The calling code should call helper function `sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len` to determine the required buffer size to
allocate. (NULL pointer can be passed, if additional_MACtext_length is zero).

**p_additional_MACtext_length [in, out]**

Pointer to the length of the additional MAC data buffer in bytes. The calling code should call helper function sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len to determine the minimum required buffer size. The sgx_unseal_data function returns the actual length of decrypted addition data stream.

**p_decrypted_text [out]**

Pointer to the decrypted data buffer which needs to be allocated by the calling code. Use sgx_get_encrypt_txt_len to calculate the minimum number of bytes to allocate for the p_decrypted_text buffer. Must be within the enclave.

**p_decrypted_text_length [in, out]**

Pointer to the length of the decrypted data buffer in byte. The buffer length of p_decrypted_text must be specified in p_decrypted_text_length as input. The sgx_unseal_data function returns the actual length of decrypted addition data stream. Use sgx_get_encrypt_txt_len to calculate the number of bytes to allocate for the p_decrypted_text buffer. Must be within the enclave.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

Indicates success.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

Indicates an error if the parameters do not meet any of the following conditions:

- If additional_mac_text_length is non-zero, p_additional_MACtext cannot be NULL.
- p_additional_mac_text buffer can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot across the enclave boundary.
- p_decrypted_text and p_decrypted_text_length must be within the enclave.
- p_decrypted_text and p_addtitional_MACtext buffer must be big enough to receive the decrypted data.
- p_sealed_data buffer must be within the enclave.
  - Input buffers cannot cross an enclave boundary.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_CPUSVN**
The CPUSVN in the sealed data blob is beyond the CPUSVN value of the platform.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_ISVSVN**
The ISVSVN in the sealed data blob is greater than the ISVSVN value of the enclave.

**SGX_ERROR_MAC_MISMATCH**
The tag verification failed during unsealing. The error may be caused by a platform update, software update, or sealed data blob corruption. This error is also reported if other corruption of the sealed data structure is detected.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
The enclave is out of memory.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
Indicates a cryptography library failure.

**Description**
The `sgx_unseal_data` function AES-GCM decrypts the sealed data so that the enclave data can be restored. This function can be utilized to restore secret data that was preserved after an earlier instantiation of this enclave saved this data.

The calling code needs to allocate the additional data buffer and the decrypted data buffer. To determine the minimum memory to allocate for these buffers, helper functions `sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len` and `sgx_get_encrypt_txt_len` are provided. The decrypted text buffer must be allocated within the enclave.

**Requirements**

<table>
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</thead>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**sgx_mac_aadata**

This function is used to authenticate the input data with AES-GMAC.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_mac_aadata(
    const uint32_t additional_MACtext_length,
    const uint8_t * p_additional_MACtext,
    const uint32_t sealed_data_size,
    sgx_sealed_data_t * p_sealed_data
);
```

**Parameters**

**additional_MACtext_length [in]**

Length of the plain text to provide authentication for in bytes.

**p_additional_MACtext [in]**

Pointer to the plain text to provide authentication for.

**NOTE:**

This data is not encrypted. This data can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.

**sealed_data_size [in]**

Number of bytes allocated for the `sealed_data_t` structure. The calling code should utilize the helper function `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size` to determine the required buffer size.

**p_sealed_data [out]**

Pointer to the buffer to store the `sealed_data_t` structure.

**NOTE:**

The calling code must allocate the memory for this buffer and should utilize the helper function `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size` with 0 as the `txt_encrypt_size` to determine the required buffer size. The `sealed_data_t` structure must be within the enclave.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

Indicates success.
SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER
Indicates an error if the parameters do not meet any of the following conditions:

- `p_additional_mactext` buffer can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.
- `sealed_data_size` must be equal to the required buffer size, which is calculated by the function `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size`.
- `p_sealed_data` buffer must be within the enclave.
- Input buffers cannot cross an enclave boundary.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY
The enclave is out of memory.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
Indicates a crypto library failure, or the RDRAND instruction fails to generate a random number.

Description
The `sgx_mac_aadata` function retrieves a key unique to the enclave and uses that key to generate the authentication tag based on the input data buffer. This function can be utilized to provide authentication assurance for additional data (of practically unlimited length per invocation) that is not encrypted. The data origin authentication can be demonstrated on future instantiations of the enclave using the MAC stored into the data blob.

Use `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size` to calculate the number of bytes to allocate for the `sgx_sealed_data_t` structure. The input sealed data buffer must be allocated within the enclave.

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

`sgx_mac_aadata_ex`
This function is used to authenticate the input data with AES-GMAC. This is the expert mode version of the function `sgx_mac_aadata`.

Syntax
sgx_status_t sgx_mac_aadata_ex(
    const uint16_t key_policy,
    const sgx_attributes_t attribute_mask,
    const sgx_misc_select_t misc_mask,
    const uint32_t additional_MACtext_length,
    const uint8_t * p_additional_MACtext,
    const uint32_t sealed_data_size,
    sgx_sealed_data_t * p_sealed_data
);

Parameters

key_policy [in]
Specifies the policy to use in the key derivation. Function sgx_mac_aadata uses the MRSIGNER policy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key policy name</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KEYPOLICY_MRENCLAVE</td>
<td>0x00</td>
<td>Derive key using the enclave's ENCLAVE measurement register</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEYPOLICY_MRSIGNER</td>
<td>0x00</td>
<td>Derive key using the enclave's SIGNER measurement register</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

attribute_mask [in]
Identifies which platform/enclave attributes to use in the key derivation. See the definition of sgx_attributes_t to determine which attributes will be checked. Function sgx_mac_aadata uses flag-s=0xfffffffffffffff3, xfrm=0.

misc_mask [in]
The MISC_SELECT mask bits for the enclave. Reserved for future function extension.

additional_MACtext_length [in]
Length of the plain text data stream to be MAC'ed in bytes.

p_additional_MACtext [in]
Pointer to the plain text data stream to be MAC'ed of variable length.

NOTE:
This data is not encrypted. This data can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.
sealed_data_size [in]
Number of bytes allocated for the sealed_data_t structure. The calling
code should utilize the helper function sgx_calc_sealed_data_size to
determine the required buffer size.

p_sealed_data [out]
Pointer to the buffer that is populated by this function.

NOTE:
The calling code must allocate the memory for this buffer and should utilize
the helper function sgx_calc_sealed_data_size with 0 as the txt_encrypt_size to determine the required buffer size. The sealed_data_t structure must be within the enclave.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS
Indicates success.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER
Indicates an error if the parameters do not meet any of the following con-
ditions:

- p_additional_mactext buffer can be within or outside the enclave,
  but cannot cross the enclave boundary.
- sealed_data_size must be equal to the required buffer size, which
  is calculated by the function sgx_calc_sealed_data_size.
- p_sealed_data buffer must be within the enclave.
- Input buffers cannot cross an enclave boundary.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY
The enclave is out of memory.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
Indicates crypto library failure or the RDRAND instruction fails to generate a
random number.

Description
The sgx_mac_aadata_ex is an extended version of sgx_mac_aadata. It
provides parameters for you to identify how to derive the sealing key (key
policy and attributes_mask). Typical callers of the seal library should be able to use sgx_mac_aadata and the default values provided for key_policy (MR_SIGNER) and an attribute mask which includes the RESERVED, INITED and DEBUG bits. Before you use this function, you should have a clear understanding of the impact of using a policy and/or attribute_mask that is different from that in sgx_mac_aadata.

**Requirement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Library</td>
<td>sgx_tservice.lib or sgx_tservice_sim.lib (simulation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**sgx_unmac_aadata**

This function is used to verify the authenticity of the input sealed data structure using AES-GMAC. This function verifies the MAC generated with sgx_mac_aadata or sgx_mac_aadata_ex.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_unmac_aadata(
    const sgx_sealed_data_t * p_sealed_data,
    uint8_t * p_additional_MACtext,
    uint32_t * p_additional_MACtext_length,
);
```

**Parameters**

- **p_sealed_data [in]**
  Pointer to the sealed data structure to be authenticated with AES-GMAC. Must be within the enclave.

- **p_addtional_MACtext [out]**
  Pointer to the plain text data stream that was AES-GMAC protected. You should call the helper function sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len to determine the required buffer size to allocate.

- **p_additional_MACtext_length [in, out]**
  Pointer to the length of the plain text data stream in bytes. Upon successful tag matching, sgx_unmac_data sets this parameter with the actual length of the plaintext stored in p_additional_MACtext.
Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**

The authentication tag in the `sealed_data_t` structure matches the expected value.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

This parameter indicates an error if the parameters do not meet any of the following conditions:

- `p_additional_MACtext` buffers can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.
- `p_additional_MACtext` buffers must be big enough to receive the plain text data.
- `p_sealed_data` buffers must be within the enclave.
- Input buffers cannot cross an enclave boundary.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_CPUSVN**

The CPUSVN in the data blob is beyond the CPUSVN value of the platform.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_ISVSVN**

The ISVSVN in the data blob is greater than the ISVSVN value of the enclave.

**SGX_ERROR_MAC_MISMATCH**

The tag verification fails. The error may be caused by a platform update, software update, or corruption of the `sealed_data_t` structure.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**

The enclave is out of memory.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

Indicates a cryptography library failure.

Description

The `sgx_unmac_aadata` function verifies the tag with AES-GMAC. Use this function to demonstrate the authenticity of data that was preserved by an earlier instantiation of this enclave.

You need to allocate additional data buffer. To determine the minimum memory to allocate for additional data buffers, use the helper function `sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len`. 
Requirements

<table>
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</thead>
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<tr>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**sgx_sha256_msg**

The `sgx_sha256_msg` function performs a standard SHA256 hash over the input data buffer.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_sha256_msg(
    const uint8_t *p_src,
    uint32_t src_len,
    sgx_sha256_hash_t *p_hash
);
```

**Parameters**

**p_src [in]**

A pointer to the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported, but the pointer must be non-NULL.

**src_len [in]**

Specifies the length on the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported.

**p_hash [out]**

A pointer to the output 256bit hash resulting from the SHA256 calculation. This pointer must be non-NULL and the caller allocates memory for this buffer.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

The SHA256 hash function is performed successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

Input pointers are invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
The SHA256 hash calculation failed.

**Description**
The `sgx_sha256_msg` function performs a standard SHA256 hash over the input data buffer. Only a 256-bit version of the SHA hash is supported. (Other sizes, for example 512, are not supported in this minimal cryptography library).

The function should be used if the complete input data stream is available. Otherwise, the Init, Update... Update, Final procedure should be used to compute a SHA256 bit hash over multiple input data sets.

A zero-length input data buffer is supported but the pointer must be non-NULL.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Library</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**sgx_sha256_init**

`sgx_sha256_init` returns an allocated and initialized SHA algorithm context state. This should be part of the Init, Update ... Update, Final process when the SHA hash is to be performed over multiple datasets. If a complete dataset is available, the recommend call is `sgx_sha256_msg` to perform the hash in a single call.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_sha256_init(
    sgx_sha_state_handle_t* p_sha_handle
);
```

**Parameters**

`p_sha_handle [out]`
This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative SHA256 hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over data sets.

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**
The SHA256 state is allocated and initialized properly.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
The pointer `p_sha_handle` is invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
The SHA256 state is not initialized properly due to an internal cryptography library failure.

Description

Calling `sgx_sha256_init` is the first set in performing a SHA256 hash over multiple datasets. The caller does not allocate memory for the SHA256 state that this function returns. The state is specific to the implementation of the cryptography library; thus the allocation is performed by the library itself. If the hash over the desired datasets is completed or any error occurs during the hash calculation process, `sgx_sha256_close` should be called to free the state allocated by this algorithm.

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Library</td>
<td>sgx_tcrypto.lib</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**sgx_sha256_update**

`sgx_sha256_update` performs a SHA256 hash over the input dataset provided. This function supports an iterative calculation of the hash over mul-
tiple datasets where the sha_handle contains the intermediate results of the hash calculation over previous datasets.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_sha256_update(
    const uint8_t *p_src,
    uint32_t src_len,
    sgx_sha_state_handle_t sha_handle
);
```

**Parameters**

- **p_src [in]**
  A pointer to the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported, but the pointer must be non-NULL.

- **src_len [in]**
  Specifies the length on the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported.

- **sha_handle [in]**
  This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative SHA256 hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over multiple data sets.

**Return value**

- **SGX_SUCCESS**
  All the outputs are generated successfully.

- **SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
  The input parameter(s) are NULL.

- **SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
  An internal cryptography library failure occurred while performing the SHA256 hash calculation.
This function should be used as part of a SHA256 calculation over multiple datasets. If a SHA256 hash is needed over a single data set, function `sgx_sha256_msg` should be used instead. Prior to calling this function on the first dataset, the `sgx_sha256_init` function must be called first to allocate and initialize the SHA256 state structure which will hold intermediate hash results over earlier datasets. The function `sgx_sha256_get_hash` should be used to obtain the hash after the final dataset has been processed by this function.

### Requirements

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</tbody>
</table>

### `sgx_sha256_get_hash`

`sgx_sha256_get_hash` obtains the SHA256 hash after the final dataset has been processed (by calls to `sgx_sha256_update`).

#### Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_sha256_get_hash(
    sgx_sha_state_handle_t sha_handle,
    sgx_sha256_hash_t* p_hash
);
```

#### Parameters

**sha_handle [in]**

This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative SHA256 hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over multiple datasets.

**p_hash [out]**

This is a pointer to the 256-bit hash that has been calculated. The memory for the hash should be allocated by the calling code.

#### Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**

The hash is obtained successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
The pointers are NULL.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

The SHA256 state passed in is likely problematic causing an internal cryptography library failure.

**Description**

This function returns the hash after performing the SHA256 calculation over one or more datasets using the `sgx_sha256_update` function. Memory for the hash should be allocated by the calling function. The handle to SHA256 state used in the `sgx_sha256_update` calls must be passed in as input.

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`sgx_sha256_close`

`sgx_sha256_close` cleans up and deallocates the SHA256 state that was allocated in function `sgx_sha256_init`.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_sha256_close(
    sgx_sha_state_handle_t sha_handle
);
```

**Parameters**

`sha_handle [in]`

This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative SHA256 hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over data sets.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

The SHA256 state was deallocated successfully.
**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

The input handle is NULL.

**Description**

Calling `sgx_sha256_close` is the last step after performing a SHA256 hash over multiple datasets. The caller uses this function to deallocate memory used to store the SHA256 calculation state.

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**sgx_rijndael128GCM_encrypt**

`sgx_rijndael128GCM_encrypt` performs a Rijndael AES-GCM encryption operation. Only a 128bit key size is supported by this Intel(R) SGX SDK cryptography library.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_rijndael128GCM_encrypt(
    const sgx_aes_gcm_128bit_key_t *p_key,
    const uint8_t *p_src,
    uint32_t src_len,
    uint8_t *p_dst,
    const uint8_t *p_iv,
    uint32_t iv_len,
    const uint8_t *p_aad,
    uint32_t aad_len,
    sgx_aes_gcm_128bit_tag_t *p_out_mac
);
```

**Parameters**

- **p_key [in]**
  
  A pointer to key to be used in the AES-GCM encryption operation. The size must be 128 bits.

- **p_src [in]**
  
  A pointer to the input data stream to be encrypted. Buffer could be NULL if there is AAD text.
src_len [in]
Specifies the length on the input data stream to be encrypted. This could be zero but p_src and p_dst should be NULL and aad_len must be greater than zero.

p_dst [out]
A pointer to the output encrypted data buffer. This buffer should be allocated by the calling code.

p_iv [in]
A pointer to the initialization vector to be used in the AES-GCM calculation. NIST AES-GCM recommended IV size is 96 bits (12 bytes).

iv_len [in]
Specifies the length on input initialization vector. The length should be 12 as recommended by NIST.

p_aad [in]
A pointer to an optional additional authentication data buffer which is used in the GCM MAC calculation. The data in this buffer will not be encrypted. The field is optional and could be NULL.

aad_len [in]
Specifies the length of the additional authentication data buffer. This buffer is optional and thus the size can be zero.

p_out_mac [out]
This is the output GCM MAC performed over the input data buffer (data to be encrypted) as well as the additional authentication data (this is optional data). The calling code should allocate this buffer.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS
All the outputs are generated successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER
If key, MAC, or IV pointer is NULL.
If AAD size is > 0 and the AAD pointer is NULL.
If source size is > 0 and the source pointer or destination pointer are NULL.
If both source pointer and AAD pointer are NULL.
If IV Length is not equal to 12 (bytes).

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
An internal cryptography library failure occurred.

**Description**
The Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) is a mode of operation of the AES algorithm. GCM [NIST SP 800-38D] uses a variation of the counter mode of operation for encryption. GCM assures authenticity of the confidential data (of up to about 64 GB per invocation) using a universal hash function defined over a binary finite field (the Galois field).

GCM can also provide authentication assurance for additional data (of practically unlimited length per invocation) that is not encrypted. GCM provides stronger authentication assurance than a (non-cryptographic) checksum or error detecting code. In particular, GCM can detect both accidental modifications of the data and intentional, unauthorized modifications.

It is recommended that the source and destination data buffers are allocated within the enclave. The AAD buffer could be allocated within or outside enclave memory. The use of AAD data buffer could be information identifying the encrypted data since it will remain in clear text.

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**sgx_rijndael128GCM_decrypt**

*sgx_rijndael128GCM_decrypt* performs a Rijndael AES-GCM decryption operation. Only a 128bit key size is supported by this Intel(R) SGX SDK cryptography library.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_rijndael128GCM_decrypt(  
    const sgx_aes_gcm_128bit_key_t *p_key,  
    const uint8_t *p_src,  
    uint32_t src_len,
```
uint8_t *p_dst,
const uint8_t *p_iv,
uint32_t iv_len,
const uint8_t *p_aad,
uint32_t aad_len,
const sgx_aes_gcm_128bit_tag_t *p_in_mac
);

Parameters

p_key [in]
A pointer to key to be used in the AES-GCM decryption operation. The size must be 128 bits.

p_src [in]
A pointer to the input data stream to be decrypted. Buffer could be NULL if there is AAD text.

src_len [in]
Specifies the length on the input data stream to be decrypted. This could be zero but p_src and p_dst should be NULL and aad_len must be greater than zero.

p_dst [out]
A pointer to the output decrypted data buffer. This buffer should be allocated by the calling code.

p_iv [in]
A pointer to the initialization vector to be used in the AES-GCM calculation. NIST AES-GCM recommended IV size is 96 bits (12 bytes).

iv_len [in]
Specifies the length on input initialization vector. The length should be 12 as recommended by NIST.

p_aad [in]
A pointer to an optional additional authentication data buffer which is provided for the GCM MAC calculation when encrypting. The data in this buffer was not encrypted. The field is optional and could be NULL.

aad_len [in]
Specifies the length of the additional authentication data buffer. This buffer is optional and thus the size can be zero.

\textbf{p\_in\_mac [in]}

This is the GCM MAC that was performed over the input data buffer (data to be encrypted) as well as the additional authentication data (this is optional data) during the encryption process (call to \texttt{sgx\_rijndael128GCM\_encrypt}).

\textbf{Return value}

\textbf{SGX\_SUCCESS}

All the outputs are generated successfully.

\textbf{SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER}

If key, MAC, or IV pointer is NULL.
If AAD size is > 0 and the AAD pointer is NULL.
If source size is > 0 and the source pointer or destination pointer are NULL.
If both source pointer and AAD pointer are NULL.
If IV Length is not equal to 12 (bytes).

\textbf{SGX\_ERROR\_MAC\_MISMATCH}

The input MAC does not match the MAC calculated.

\textbf{SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY}

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

\textbf{SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED}

An internal cryptography library failure occurred.

\textbf{Description}

The Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) is a mode of operation of the AES algorithm. GCM [NIST SP 800-38D] uses a variation of the counter mode of operation for encryption. GCM assures authenticity of the confidential data (of up to about 64 GB per invocation) using a universal hash function defined over a binary finite field (the Galois field).
GCM can also provide authentication assurance for additional data (of practically unlimited length per invocation) that is not encrypted. GCM provides stronger authentication assurance than a (non-cryptographic) checksum or error detecting code. In particular, GCM can detect both accidental modifications of the data and intentional, unauthorized modifications.

It is recommended that the destination data buffer is allocated within the enclave. The AAD buffer could be allocated within or outside enclave memory.

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**sgx_rijndael128_cmac_msg**

The `sgx_rijndael128_cmac_msg` function performs a standard 128bit CMAC hash over the input data buffer.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_rijndael128_cmac_msg(  
    const sgx_cmac_128bit_key_t *p_key,  
    const uint8_t *p_src,  
    uint32_t src_len,  
    sgx_cmac_128bit_tag_t *p_mac  
);
```

**Parameters**

**p_key [in]**

A pointer to key to be used in the CMAC hash operation. The size must be 128 bits.

**p_src [in]**

A pointer to the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported, but the pointer must be non-NULL.

**src_len [in]**

Specifies the length on the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported.

**p_mac [out]**
A pointer to the output 128-bit hash resulting from the CMAC calculation. This pointer must be non-NULL and the caller allocates memory for this buffer.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**
The CMAC hash function is performed successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
The key, source or MAC pointer is NULL.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
An unexpected internal cryptography library.

**Description**
The `sgx_rijndael128_cmac_msg` function performs a standard CMAC hash over the input data buffer. Only a 128-bit version of the CMAC hash is supported.

The function should be used if the complete input data stream is available. Otherwise, the `Init`, `Update... Update`, `Final` procedure should be used to compute a CMAC hash over multiple input data sets.

A zero-length input data buffer is supported, but the pointer must be non-NULL.

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**sgx_cmac128_init**

`sgx_cmac128_init` returns an allocated and initialized CMAC algorithm context state. This should be part of the `Init`, `Update... Update`, `Final` process when the CMAC hash is to be performed over multiple datasets. If a complete
dataset is available, the recommended call is `sgx_rijndael128_cmac_msg` to perform the hash in a single call.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_cmac128_init(
    const sgx_cmac_128bit_key_t *p_key,
    sgx_cmac_state_handle_t* p_cmac_handle
);
```

**Parameters**

**p_key [in]**

A pointer to key to be used in the CMAC hash operation. The size must be 128 bits.

**p_cmac_handle [out]**

This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative CMAC 128-bit hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over data sets.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

The CMAC hash state is successfully allocated and initialized.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

The key or handle pointer is NULL.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

An internal cryptography library failure occurred.

**Description**

Calling `sgx_cmac128_init` is the first set in performing a CMAC 128-bit hash over multiple datasets. The caller does not allocate memory for the CMAC state that this function returns. The state is specific to the
implementation of the cryptography library and thus the allocation is performed by the library itself. If the hash over the desired datasets is completed or any error occurs during the hash calculation process, sgx_cmac128_close should be called to free the state allocated by this algorithm.

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sgx_cmac128_update

sgx_cmac128_update performs a CMAC 128-bit hash over the input dataset provided. This function supports an iterative calculation of the hash over multiple datasets where the cmac_handle contains the intermediate results of the hash calculation over previous datasets.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_cmac128_update(
    const uint8_t *p_src,
    uint32_t src_len,
    sgx_cmac_state_handle_t cmac_handle
);
```

Parameters

p_src [in]
A pointer to the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported, but the pointer must be non-NULL.

src_len [in]
Specifies the length on the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported.

cmac_handle [in]
This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative CMAC hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over multiple data sets.

Return value
**SGX_SUCCESS**
All the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
The source pointer or cmac handle is NULL.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
An internal cryptography library failure occurred while performing the CMAC hash calculation.

---

**NOTE:**
If an unexpected error occurs, then the CMAC state is not freed (CMAC handle). In this case, call `sgx_cmac128_close` to free the CMAC state to avoid memory leak.

---

**Description**
This function should be used as part of a CMAC 128-bit hash calculation over multiple datasets. If a CMAC hash is needed over a single data set, function `sgx_rijndael128_cmac128_msg` should be used instead. Prior to calling this function on the first dataset, the `sgx_cmac128_init` function must be called first to allocate and initialize the CMAC state structure which will hold intermediate hash results over earlier datasets. The function `sgx_cmac128_final` should be used to obtain the hash after the final dataset has been processed by this function.

---

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**sgx_cmac128_final**
`sgx_cmac128_final` obtains the CMAC 128-bit hash after the final dataset has been processed (by calls to `sgx_cmac128_update`).

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_cmac128_final(
```
sgx_cmac_state_handle_t cmac_handle,
sgx_cmac_128bit_tag_t* p_hash
);

Parameters

**cmac_handle [in]**

This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative CMAC hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over multiple data sets.

**p_hash [out]**

This is a pointer to the 128-bit hash that has been calculated. The memory for the hash should be allocated by the calling code.

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**

The hash is obtained successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

The hash pointer or CMAC handle is NULL.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

The CMAC state passed in is likely problematic causing an internal cryptography library failure.

**NOTE:**

If an unexpected error occurs, then the CMAC state is freed (CMAC handle). In this case, please call sgx_cmac128_close to free the CMAC state to avoid memory leak.

Description

This function returns the hash after performing the CMAC 128-bit hash calculation over one or more datasets using the sgx_cmac128_update function. Memory for the hash should be allocated by the calling code. The handle to CMAC state used in the sgx_cmac128_update calls must be passed in as input.
sgx_cmac128_close cleans up and deallocates the CMAC algorithm context state that was allocated in function sgx_cmac128_init.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_cmac128_close(
    sgx_cmac_state_handle_t cmac_handle
);
```

**Parameters**

**cmac_handle [in]**

This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative CMAC hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over multiple data sets.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

The CMAC state was deallocated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALIDParameter**

The CMAC handle is NULL.

**Description**

Calling `sgx_cmac128_close` is the last step after performing a CMAC hash over multiple datasets. The caller uses this function to deallocate memory used for storing the CMAC algorithm context state.

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sgx_aes_ctr_encrypt

sgx_aes_ctr_encrypt performs a Rijndael AES-CTR encryption operation (counter mode). Only a 128bit key size is supported by this Intel(R) SGX SDK cryptography library.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_aes_ctr_encrypt(
    const sgx_aes_ctr_128bit_key_t *p_key,
    const uint8_t *p_src,
    const uint32_t src_len,
    uint8_t *p_ctr,
    const uint32_t ctr_inc_bits,
    uint8_t *p_dst,
);
```

Parameters

**p_key** [in]
A pointer to key to be used in the AES-CTR encryption operation. The size must be 128 bits.

**p_src** [in]
A pointer to the input data stream to be encrypted.

**src_len** [in]
Specifies the length on the input data stream to be encrypted.

**p_ctr** [in]
A pointer to the initialization vector to be used in the AES-CTR calculation.

**ctr_inc_bits** [in]
Specifies the number of bits in the counter to be incremented.

**p_dst** [out]
A pointer to the output encrypted data buffer. This buffer should be allocated by the calling code.

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
If key, source, destination, or counter pointer is NULL.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

An internal cryptography library failure occurred.

**Description**

This function encrypts the input data stream of a variable length according to the CTR mode as specified in [NIST SP 800-38A]. The counter can be thought of as an IV which increments on successive encryption or decryption calls. For a given dataset or data stream, the incremented counter block should be used on successive calls of the encryption process for that given stream. However, for new or different datasets/stems, the same counter should not be reused, instead initialize the counter for the new data set.

It is recommended that the source, destination and counter data buffers are allocated within the enclave.

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**sgx_aes_ctr_decrypt**

*sgx_aes_ctr_decrypt* performs a Rijndael AES-CTR decryption operation (counter mode). Only a 128bit key size is supported by this Intel(R) SGX SDK cryptography library.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_aes_ctr_decrypt(
    const sgx_aes_gcm_128bit_key_t *p_key,
    const uint8_t *p_src,
    const uint32_t src_len,
    uint8_t *p_ctr,
    const uint32_t ctr_inc_bits,
    uint8_t *p_dst)
);```

Parameters

\texttt{p\_key [in]}

A pointer to key to be used in the AES-CTR decryption operation. The size \textit{must} be 128 bits.

\texttt{p\_src [in]}

A pointer to the input data stream to be decrypted.

\texttt{src\_len [in]}

Specifies the length of the input data stream to be decrypted.

\texttt{p\_ctr [in]}

A pointer to the initialization vector to be used in the AES-CTR calculation.

\texttt{ctr\_inc\_bits [in]}

Specifies the number of bits in the counter to be incremented.

\texttt{p\_dst [out]}

A pointer to the output decrypted data buffer. This buffer should be allocated by the calling code.

Return value

\texttt{SGX\_SUCCESS}

All the outputs are generated successfully.

\texttt{SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER}

If key, source, destination, or counter pointer is NULL.

\texttt{SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY}

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

\texttt{SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED}

An internal cryptography library failure occurred.

Description

This function decrypts the input data stream of a variable length according to the CTR mode as specified in [NIST SP 800-38A]. The counter can be thought of as an IV which increments on successive encryption or decryption calls. For
a given dataset or data stream, the incremented counter block should be used on successive calls of the decryption process for that given stream. However, for new or different datasets/streams, the same counter should not be reused, instead initialize the counter for the new data set.

It is recommended that the source, destination and counter data buffers are allocated within the enclave.

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**sgx_ecc256_open_context**

*sgx_ecc256_open_context* returns an allocated and initialized context for the elliptic curve cryptosystem over a prime finite field, GF(p). This context must be created prior to calling *sgx_ecc256_create_key_pair* or *sgx_ecc256_compute_shared_dhkey*. When the calling code has completed its set of ECC operations, *sgx_ecc256_close_context* should be called to cleanup and deallocate the ECC context.

**NOTE:**

Only a field element size of 256 bits is supported.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_ecc256_open_context(
    sgx_ecc_state_handle_t *p_ecc_handle
);
```

**Parameters**

**p_ecc_handle [out]**

This is a handle to the ECC GF(p) context state allocated and initialized used to perform elliptic curve cryptosystem standard functions. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of calculations performed using this context.

**NOTE:**

The ECC set of APIs only support a 256-bit GF(p) cryptography system.

**Return value**
SGX_SUCCESS
The ECC256 GF(p) state is allocated and initialized properly.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER
The ECC context handle is NULL.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
The ECC context state was not initialized properly due to an internal cryptography library failure.

Description
sgx_ecc256_open_context is utilized to allocate and initialize a 256-bit GF(p) cryptographic system. The caller does not allocate memory for the ECC state that this function returns. The state is specific to the implementation of the cryptography library and thus the allocation is performed by the library itself. If the ECC cryptographic function using this cryptographic system is completed or any error occurs, sgx_sha256_close_context should be called to free the state allocated by this algorithm.

Public key cryptography successfully allows to solving problems of information safety by enabling trusted communication over insecure channels. Although elliptic curves are well studied as a branch of mathematics, an interest to the cryptographic schemes based on elliptic curves is constantly rising due to the advantages that the elliptic curve algorithms provide in the wireless communications: shorter processing time and key length.

Elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECCs) implement a different way of creating public keys. As elliptic curve calculation is based on the addition of the rational points in the (x,y) plane and it is difficult to solve a discrete logarithm from these points, a higher level of safety is achieved through the cryptographic schemes that use the elliptic curves. The cryptographic systems that encrypt messages by using the properties of elliptic curves are hard to attack due to the extreme complexity of deciphering the private key.

Using of elliptic curves allows shorter public key length and encourages cryptographers to create cryptosystems with the same or higher encryption strength as the RSA or DSA cryptosystems. Because of the relatively short key length, ECCs do encryption and decryption faster on the hardware that requires less computation processing volumes.
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sgx_ecc256_close_context

sgx_ecc256_close_context cleans up and deallocates the ECC 256 GF (p) state that was allocated in function sgx_ecc256_open_context.

NOTE:
Only a field element size of 256 bits is supported.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_ecc256_close_context(
    sgx_ecc_state_handle_t ecc_handle
);
```

Parameters

ecc_handle [in]

This is a handle to the ECC GF(p) context state allocated and initialized used to perform elliptic curve cryptosystem standard functions. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of calculations performed using this context.

NOTE:
The ECC set of APIs only support a 256-bit GF(p) cryptography system.

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**
The ECC 256 GF(p) state was deallocated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
The input handle is NULL.

Description
sgx_ecc256_close_context is used by calling code to deallocate memory used for storing the ECC 256 GF(p) state used in ECC cryptographic calculations.

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</table>

sgx_ecc256_create_key_pair

sgx_ecc256_create_key_pair generates a private/public key pair on the ECC curve for the given cryptographic system. The calling code is responsible for allocating memory for the public and private keys. sgx_ecc256_open_context must be called to allocate and initialize the ECC context prior to making this call.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_ecc256_create_key_pair(
    sgx_ec256_private_t *p_private,
    sgx_ec256_public_t *p_public,
    sgx_ecc_state_handle_t ecc_handle
);
```

Parameters

p_private [out]

A pointer to the private key which is a number that lies in the range of \([1, n-1]\) where \(n\) is the order of the elliptic curve base point.

\[NOTE:\]
Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

p_public [out]

A pointer to the public key which is an elliptic curve point such that:

public key = private key \(* G\), where \(G\) is the base point of the elliptic curve.

\[NOTE:\]
Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

ecc_handle [in]
This is a handle to the ECC GF(p) context state allocated and initialized used to perform elliptic curve cryptosystem standard functions. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of calculations performed using this context.

**NOTE:**
The ECC set of APIs only support a 256-bit GF(p) cryptography system.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**
The public/private key pair was successfully generated.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
The ECC context handle, private key or public key is invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
The key creation process failed due to an internal cryptography library failure.

**Description**

This function populates private/public key pair. The calling code allocates memory for the private and public key pointers to be populated. The function generates a private key \( p_{\text{private}} \) and computes a public key \( p_{\text{public}} \) of the elliptic cryptosystem over a finite field GF(p).

The private key \( p_{\text{private}} \) is a number that lies in the range of \([1, n-1]\) where \( n \) is the order of the elliptic curve base point.

The public key \( p_{\text{public}} \) is an elliptic curve point such that \( p_{\text{public}} = p_{\text{private}} * G \), where \( G \) is the base point of the elliptic curve.

The context of the point \( p_{\text{public}} \) as an elliptic curve point must be created by using the function \( \text{sgx}_\text{ecc256}_\text{open}_\text{context} \).

**Requirements**

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sgx_ecc256_compute_shared_dhkey

sgx_ecc256_compute_shared_dhkey generates a secret key shared between two participants of the cryptosystem. The calling code should allocate memory for the shared key to be generated by this function.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_ecc256_compute_shared_dhkey(
    sgx_ec256_private_t *p_private_b,
    sgx_ec256_public_t *p_public_ga,
    sgx_ec256_dh_shared_t *p_shared_key,
    sgx_ecc_state_handle_t ecc_handle
);
```

Parameters

**p_private_b [in]**
A pointer to the local private key.

**NOTE:**
Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

**p_public_ga [in]**
A pointer to the remote public key.

**NOTE:**
Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

**p_shared_key [out]**
A pointer to the secret key generated by this function which is a common point on the elliptic curve.

**NOTE:**
Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

**ecc_handle [in]**
This is a handle to the ECC GF(p) context state allocated and initialized used to perform elliptic curve cryptosystem standard functions. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of calculations performed using this context.

**NOTE:**
The ECC set of APIs only support a 256-bit GF(p) cryptography system.
Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**
The public/private key pair was successfully generated.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
The ECC context handle, private key, public key, or shared key pointer is NULL.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
The key creation process failed due to an internal cryptography library failure.

Description

This function computes the Diffie-Hellman shared key based on the enclave's own (local) private key and remote enclave's public Ga Key. The calling code allocates memory for shared key to be populated by this function.

The function computes a secret number sharedKey, which is a secret key shared between two participants of the cryptosystem.

In cryptography, metasyntactic names such as Alice as Bob are normally used as examples and in discussions and stand for participant A and participant B.

Both participants (Alice and Bob) use the cryptosystem for receiving a common secret point on the elliptic curve called a secret key (sharedKey). To receive a secret key, participants apply the Diffie-Hellman key-agreement scheme involving public key exchange. The value of the secret key entirely depends on participants.

According to the scheme, Alice and Bob perform the following operations:

1. Alice calculates her own public key pubKeyA by using her private key
   
   \[ \text{pubKeyA} = \text{privKeyA} \times G, \text{where } G \text{ is the base point of the elliptic curve.} \]

2. Alice passes the public key to Bob.

3. Bob calculates his own public key pubKeyB by using his private key
   
   \[ \text{pubKeyB} = \text{privKeyB} \times G, \text{where } G \text{ is a base point of the elliptic curve.} \]

4. Bob passes the public key to Alice.
5. Alice gets Bob's public key and calculates the secret point shareKeyA. When calculating, she uses her own private key and Bob's public key and applies the following formula:

\[ \text{shareKeyA} = \text{privKeyA} \times \text{pubKeyB} = \text{privKeyA} \times \text{privKeyB} \times G. \]

6. Bob gets Alice's public key and calculates the secret point shareKeyB. When calculating, he uses his own private key and Alice's public key and applies the following formula:

\[ \text{shareKeyB} = \text{privKeyB} \times \text{pubKeyA} = \text{privKeyB} \times \text{privKeyA} \times G. \]

As the following equation is true \( \text{privKeyA} \times \text{privKeyB} \times G = \text{privKeyB} \times \text{privKeyA} \times G \), the result of both calculations is the same, that is, the equation \( \text{shareKeyA} = \text{shareKeyB} \) is true. The secret point serves as a secret key.

Shared secret shareKey is an x-coordinate of the secret point on the elliptic curve. The elliptic curve domain parameters must be hitherto defined by the function: \( \text{sgx_ecc256_open_context} \).

### Requirements

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**sgx_ecc256_check_point**

\( \text{sgx_ecc256_check_point} \) checks whether the input point is a valid point on the ECC curve for the given cryptographic system. \( \text{sgx_ecc256_open_context} \) must be called to allocate and initialize the ECC context prior to making this call.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_ecc256_check_point(
    const sgx_ec256_public_t *p_point,
    const sgx_ecc_state_handle_t ecc_handle,
    int *p_valid
);
```

**Parameters**
p_point [in]
A pointer to the point to perform validity check on.

**NOTE:**
Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

ecc_handle [in]
This is a handle to the ECC GF(p) context state allocated and initialized used to perform elliptic curve cryptosystem standard functions. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of calculations performed using this context.

**NOTE:**
The ECC set of APIs only support a 256-bit GF(p) cryptography system.

p_valid [out]
A pointer to the validation result.

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**
The validation process is performed successfully. Check p_valid to get the validation result.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
If the input ecc handle, p_point or p_valid is NULL.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
An internal cryptography library failure occurred.

Description

`sgx_ecc256_check_point` validates whether the input point is a valid point on the ECC curve for the given cryptographic system.

The typical validation result is one of the two values:

1 - The input point is valid
0 – The input point is not valid

Requirements
sgx_ecdsa_sign

sgx_ecdsa_sign computes a digital signature with a given private key over an input dataset.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_ecdsa_sign(
    const uint8_t *p_data,
    uint32_t data_size,
    sgx_ec256_private_t *p_private,
    sgx_ec256_signature_t *p_signature,
    sgx_ecc_state_handle_t ecc_handle
);
```

Parameters

**p_data [in]**
A pointer to the data to calculate the signature over.

**data_size [in]**
The size of the data to be signed.

**p_private [in]**
A pointer to the private key.

---

**NOTE:**
Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

**p_signature [out]**
A pointer to the signature generated by this function.

---

**NOTE:**
Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

**ecc_handle [in]**
This is a handle to the ECC GF(p) context state allocated and initialized used to perform elliptic curve cryptosystem standard functions. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of calculations performed using this context.
**NOTE:**
The ECC set of APIs only support a 256-bit GF(p) cryptography system.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**
The digital signature is successfully generated.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
The ECC context handle, private key, data, or signature pointer is NULL. Or the data size is 0.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
The signature generation process failed due to an internal cryptography library failure.

**Description**
This function computes a digital signature over the input dataset based on the input private key.

A message digest is a fixed size number derived from the original message with an applied hash function over the binary code of the message. (SHA256 in this case)

The signer's private key and the message digest are used to create a signature.

A digital signature over a message consists of a pair of large numbers, 256-bits each, which the given function computes.

The scheme used for computing a digital signature is of the ECDSA scheme, an elliptic curve of the DSA scheme.

The keys can be generated and set up by the function: `sgx_ecc256_create_key_pair`.

The elliptic curve domain parameters must be created by function: `sgx_ecc256_open_context`.

**Requirements**
sgx_ecdsa_verify

sgx_ecdsa_verify verifies the input digital signature with a given public key over an input dataset.

Syntax

sgx_status_t sgx_ecdsa_verify(
    const uint8_t *p_data,
    uint32_t data_size,
    const sgx_ec256_public_t *p_public,
    sgx_ec256_signature_t *p_signature,
    uint8_t *p_result,
    sgx_ecc_state_handle_t ecc_handle
);

Parameters

p_data [in]
A pointer to the signed dataset to verify.

data_size [in]
The size of the dataset to have its signature verified.

p_public [in]
A pointer to the public key to be used in the calculation of the signature.

NOTE:
Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

p_signature [in]
A pointer to the signature to be verified.

NOTE:
Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

p_result [out]
A pointer to the result of the verification check populated by this function.

ecc_handle [in]
This is a handle to the ECC GF(p) context state allocated and initialized used to perform elliptic curve cryptosystem standard functions. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of calculations performed using this context.

**NOTE:**
The ECC set of APIs only support a 256-bit GF(p) cryptography system.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**
The digital signature verification was performed successfully. Check p_result to get the verification result.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
The ECC context handle, public key, data, result or signature pointer is NULL or the data size is 0.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
The verification process failed due to an internal cryptography library failure.

**Description**
This function verifies the signature for the given data set based on the input public key.

A digital signature over a message consists of a pair of large numbers, 256-bits each, which could be created by function: `sgx_ecdsa_sign`. The scheme used for computing a digital signature is of the ECDSA scheme, an elliptic curve of the DSA scheme.

The typical result of the digital signature verification is one of the two values:

- **SGX_EC_VALID** - Digital signature is valid
- **SGX_EC_INVALID_SIGNATURE** - Digital signature is not valid

The elliptic curve domain parameters must be created by function: `sgx_ec256_open_context`.

**Requirements**
**sgx_create_pse_session**

*sgx_create_pse_session* creates a session with the PSE.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_create_pse_session(
    void
);
```

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

Session is created successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE**

The AE service did not respond or the requested service is not supported.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT**

A request to the AE service timed out.

**SGX_ERROR_BUSY**

The requested service is temporarily not available.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE**

Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC**

There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UPDATE_NEEDED**

Intel(R) SGX needs to be updated.

**SGX_ERROR_KDF_MISMATCH**

Indicates the key derivation function does not match.
SGX_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_PLATFORM
Intel(R) EPID Provisioning failed because the platform was not recognized by
the back-end server.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
Indicates an unexpected error occurred.

Description
An Intel(R) SGX enclave first calls sgx_create_pse_session() in the pro-
cess to request platform service.

It's suggested that the caller should wait (typically several seconds to tens of
seconds) and retry this API if SGX_ERROR_BUSY is returned.

Requirements

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sgx_close_pse_session
sgx_close_pse_session closes a session created by sgx_create_pse_session.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_close_pse_session(
    void
);
```

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS
Session is closed successfully.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE
The AE service did not respond or the requested service is not supported.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT
A request to the AE service timed out.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
Indicates an unexpected error occurs.

Description
An Intel(R) SGX enclave calls `sgx_close_pse_session()` when there is no need to request platform service.

Requirements

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`sgx_get_ps_sec_prop` gets a data structure describing the security property of the platform service.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_get_ps_sec_prop ( 
    sgx_ps_sec_prop_desc_t* security_property
);
```

Parameters

`security_property [out]`
A pointer to the buffer that receives the security property descriptor of the platform service. The pointer cannot be NULL.

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**
Security property is returned successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
Any of the pointers is invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSION_INVALID**
Session is not created or has been closed by architectural enclave service.

Description
Gets a data structure that describes the security property of the platform service.
The caller should call `sgx_create_pse_session` to establish a session with the platform service enclave before calling this API.

**Requirements**

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**sgx_get_ps_sec_prop_ex**

`sgx_get_ps_sec_prop_ex` gets a data structure describing the security property of the platform service with extended platform service information.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_get_ps_sec_prop_ex(
    sgx_ps_sec_prop_desc_ex_t* security_property
);
```

**Parameters**

- `security_property [out]`
  A pointer to the buffer that receives the security property descriptor of the platform service and platform service information. The pointer cannot be NULL.

**Return value**

- **SGX_SUCCESS**
  Security property is returned successfully.

- **SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
  Any of the pointers is invalid.

- **SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSIONINVALID**
  Session is not created or has been closed by architectural enclave service.

**Description**

Gets a data structure that describes the security property of the platform service.
The caller should call `sgx_create_pse_session` to establish a session with the platform service enclave before calling this API.

**Requirements**

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`sgx_get_trusted_time`

`sgx_get_trusted_time` gets trusted time from the AE service.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_get_trusted_time(
    sgx_time_t* current_time,
    sgx_time_source_nonce_t* time_source_nonce
);
```

**Parameters**

- **current_time [out]**
  
  Trusted Time Stamp in seconds relative to a reference point. The reference point does not change as long as the `time_source_nonce` has not changed. The pointer cannot be NULL.

- **time_source_nonce [out]**
  
  A pointer to the buffer that receives the nonce which indicates time source. The pointer cannot be NULL.

**Return value**

- **SGX_SUCCESS**
  
  Trusted time is obtained successfully.

- **SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
  
  Any of the pointers is invalid.

- **SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSION_INVALID**
  
  Session is not created or has been closed by architectural enclave service.

- **SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE**
The AE service did not respond or the requested service is not supported.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT**

A request to the AE service timed out.

**SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE**

Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC**

There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

Indicates an unexpected error occurs.

**Description**

`current_time` contains time in seconds and `time_source_nonce` contains nonce associate with the time. The caller should compare `time_source_nonce` against the value returned from the previous call of this API if it needs to calculate the time passed between two readings of the Trusted Timer. If the `time_source_nonce` of the two readings do not match, the difference between the two readings does not necessarily reflect time passed.

The caller should call `sgx_create_pse_session` to establish a session with the platform service enclave before calling this API.

**Requirements**

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`sgx_create_monotonic_counter_ex`

`sgx_create_monotonic_counter_ex` creates a monotonic counter.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_create_monotonic_counter_ex(
    uint16_t owner_policy,
    const sgx_attributes_t * owner_attribute_mask,
```
sgx_mc_uuid_t * counter_uuid,
uint32_t * counter_value
);

Parameters

owner_policy [in]
The owner policy of the monotonic counter.

- 0x1 means enclaves with same signing key can access the monotonic counter
- 0x2 means enclave with same measurement can access the monotonic counter
- 0x3 means enclave with same measurement as well as signing key can access the monotonic counter.
- Owner policy values of 0x0 or any bits set beyond bits 0 and 1 will cause SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

owner_attribute_mask [in]
Mask of owner attribute, in the format of sgx_attributes_t.

counter_uuid [out]
A pointer to the buffer that receives the monotonic counter ID. The pointer cannot be NULL.

counter_value [out]
A pointer to the buffer that receives the monotonic counter value. The pointer cannot be NULL.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS
Monotonic counter is created successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER
Any of the parameters is invalid.

SGX_ERROR_BUSY
The requested service is temporarily not available.

SGX_ERROR_MC_OVER_QUOTA
The enclave has reached the quota of Monotonic Counters it can maintain.

**SGX_ERROR_MC_USED_UP**
Monotonic counters are used out.

**SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSION_INVALID**
Session is not created or has been closed by the architectural enclave service.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE**
The AE service did not respond or the requested service is not supported.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT**
A request to the AE service timed out.

**SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE**
Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC**
There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
Indicates an unexpected error occurs.

**Description**

Call `sgx_create_monotonic_counter_ex` to create a monotonic counter with the given `owner_policy` and `owner_attribute_mask`.

The caller should call `sgx_create_pse_session` to establish a session with the platform service enclave before calling this API.

Creating a monotonic counter (MC) involves writing to the non-volatile memory available in the platform. Repeated write operations could cause the memory to wear out during the normal lifecycle of the platform. Intel(R) SGX prevents this by limiting the rate at which MC operations can be performed. If you exceed the limit, the MC operation may return `SGX_ERROR_BUSY` for several minutes.

Intel(R) SGX limits the number of monotonic counters (MC) an enclave can create. To avoid exhausting the available quota, an Intel SGX application should
record the MC UUID that \texttt{sgx\_create\_monotonic\_counter\_ex} returns and destroy a MC when it is not needed any more. If an enclave reaches its quota and previously created MC UUIDs have not been recorded, you may restore the MC service after uninstalling the Intel(R) SGX PSW and installing it again. This procedure deletes all MCs created by any enclave in that system.

**NOTE**
One application is not able to access the monotonic counter created by another application in simulation mode. This also affects two different applications using the same enclave.

**Requirements**

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\texttt{sgx\_create\_monotonic\_counter}

\texttt{sgx\_create\_monotonic\_counter} creates a monotonic counter with default owner policy and default user attribute mask.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx\_status\_t sgx\_create\_monotonic\_counter(
    sgx\_mc\_uuid\_t \* counter\_uuid,
    uint32\_t \* counter\_value
);```

**Parameters**

- **counter\_uuid [out]**
  A pointer to the buffer that receives the monotonic counter ID. The pointer cannot be NULL.

- **counter\_value [out]**
  A pointer to the buffer that receives the monotonic counter value. The pointer cannot be NULL.

**Return value**

- **SGX\_SUCCESS**
  Monotonic counter is created successfully.
SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER
Any of the pointers is invalid.

SGX_ERROR_BUSY
The requested service is temporarily not available.

SGX_ERROR_MC_OVER_QUOTA
The enclave has reached the quota of Monotonic Counters it can maintain.

SGX_ERROR_MC_USED_UP
Monotonic counters are used out.

SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSION_INVALID
Session is not created or has been closed by architectural enclave service.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE
The AE service did not respond or the requested service is not supported.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT
A request to the AE service timed out.

SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE
Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC
There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
Indicates an unexpected error occurs.

Description
Call sgx_create_monotonic_counter to create a monotonic counter with the default owner policy 0x1, which means enclaves with same signing key can access the monotonic counter and default owner_attribute_mask 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFCB.
The caller should call \texttt{sgx\_create\_pse\_session} to establish a session with the platform service enclave before calling this API.

Creating a monotonic counter (MC) involves writing to the non-volatile memory available in the platform. Repeated write operations could cause the memory to wear out during the normal lifecycle of the platform. Intel\textregistered\ SGX prevents this by limiting the rate at which MC operations can be performed. If you exceed the limit, the MC operation may return \texttt{SGX\_ERROR\_BUSY} for several minutes.

Intel\textregistered\ SGX limits the number of MCs an enclave can create. To avoid exhausting the available quota, an Intel SGX application should record the MC UUID that \texttt{sgx\_create\_monotonic\_counter} returns and destroy a MC when it is not needed any more. If an enclave reaches its quota and previously created MC UUIDs have not been recorded, you may restore the MC service after uninstalling the Intel\textregistered\ SGX PSW and installing it again. This procedure deletes all MCs created by any enclave in that system.

\textbf{NOTE}

One application is not able to access the monotonic counter created by another application in simulation mode. This also affects two different applications using the same enclave.

\textbf{Requirements}

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\texttt{sgx\_destroy\_monotonic\_counter}

\texttt{sgx\_destroy\_monotonic\_counter} destroys a monotonic counter created by \texttt{sgx\_create\_monotonic\_counter} or \texttt{sgx\_create\_monotonic\_counter\_ex}.

\textbf{Syntax}

\begin{verbatim}
sgx\_status\_t sgx\_destroy\_monotonic\_counter(
    const sgx\_mc\_uuid\_t * counter\_uuid
);
\end{verbatim}

\textbf{Parameters}

\texttt{counter\_uuid [in]}

The monotonic counter ID to be destroyed.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**
Monotonic counter is destroyed successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
Any of the pointers is invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_BUSY**
The requested service is temporarily not available.

**SGX_ERROR_MC_NOT_FOUND**
The Monotonic Counter does not exist or has been invalidated.

**SGX_ERROR_MC_NO_ACCESS_RIGHT**
The enclave doesn't have the access right to specified Monotonic Counter.

**SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSION_INVALID**
Session is not created or has been closed by architectural enclave service.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE**
The AE service did not respond or the requested service is not supported.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT**
A request to the AE service timed out.

**SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE**
Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC**
There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
Indicates an unexpected error occurs.

**Description**
Calling `sgx_destroy_monotonic_counter` after a monotonic counter is not needed anymore.

The caller should call `sgx_create_pse_session` to establish a session with the platform service enclave before calling this API.

`sgx_destroy_monotonic_counter` fails if the calling enclave does not match the owner policy and the attributes specified in the call that created the monotonic counter.

Destroying a Monotonic Counter (MC) involves writing to the non-volatile memory available in the platform. Repeated write operations could cause the memory to wear out during the normal lifecycle of the platform. Intel(R) SGX prevents this by limiting the rate at which MC operations can be performed. If you exceed the limit, the MC operation may return `SGX_ERROR_BUSY` for several minutes.

Requirements

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</table>

`sgx_increment_monotonic_counter`

`sgx_increment_monotonic_counter` increments a monotonic counter value by 1.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_increment_monotonic_counter(
    const sgx_mc_uuid_t * counter_uuid,
    uint32_t * counter_value
);
```

Parameters

counter_uuid [in]
The Monotonic Counter ID to be incremented.

counter_value [out]
A pointer to the buffer that receives the Monotonic Counter value. The pointer cannot be NULL.

Return value
SGX_SUCCESS
Monotonic Counter is incremented successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER
Any of the pointers is invalid.

SGX_ERROR_BUSY
The requested service is temporarily not available.

SGX_ERROR_MC_NOT_FOUND
The Monotonic Counter does not exist or has been invalidated.

SGX_ERROR_MC_NO_ACCESS_RIGHT
The enclave does not have the access right to specified Monotonic Counter.

SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSION_INVALID
Session is not created or has been closed by architectural enclave service.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE
The AE service did not respond or the requested service is not supported.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT
A request to the AE service timed out.

SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE
Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC
There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
Indicates an unexpected error occurs.

Description
Call sgx_increment_monotonic_counter to increase a monotonic counter value by 1.
The caller should call \texttt{sgx\_create\_pse\_session} to establish a session with the platform service enclave before calling this API.

\texttt{sgx\_increment\_monotonic\_counter} fails if the calling enclave does not match the owner policy and the attributes specified in the call that created the monotonic counter.

Incrementing a monotonic counter (MC) involves writing to the non-volatile memory available in the platform. Repeated write operations could cause the memory to wear out during the normal lifecycle of the platform. Intel(R) SGX prevents this by limiting the rate at which MC operations can be performed. If you exceed the limit, the MC operation may return \texttt{SGX\_ERROR\_BUSY} for several minutes.

### Requirements

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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\texttt{sgx\_read\_monotonic\_counter} returns the value of a monotonic counter.

### Syntax

```
sgx\_status\_t\ sgx\_increment\_monotonic\_counter(  
    const sgx\_mc\_uuid\_t\ *\ counter\_uuid,  
    uint32\_t\ *\ counter\_value  
);  
```

### Parameters

**counter\_uuid [in]**

The monotonic counter ID to be read.

**counter\_value [out]**

A pointer to the buffer that receives the monotonic counter value. The pointer cannot be NULL.

### Return value

**SGX\_SUCCESS**

Monotonic counter is read successfully.
SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER
Any of the pointers is invalid.

SGX_ERROR_MC_NOT_FOUND
the Monotonic Counter does not exist or has been invalidated.

SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSION_INVALID
Session is not created or has been closed by the user or the Architectural Enclave service.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE
The AE service did not respond or the requested service is not supported.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT
A request to the AE service timed out.

SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE
Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC
There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
Indicates an unexpected error occurred.

Description
Call `sgx_read_monotonic_counter` to read the value of a monotonic counter.

The caller should call `sgx_create_pse_session` to establish a session with the platform service enclave before calling this API.

`sgx_read_monotonic_counter` fails if the calling enclave does not match the owner policy and the attributes specified in the call that created the monotonic counter.

Requirements
sgx_ra_init

The `sgx_ra_init` function creates a context for the remote attestation and key exchange process.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_ra_init(
    const sgx_ec256_public_t * p_pub_key,
    int b_pse,
    sgx_ra_context_t * p_context
);
```

**Parameters**

- **p_pub_key [in]** (Little Endian)
  The EC public key of the service provider based on the NIST P-256 elliptic curve.

- **b_pse [in]**
  If true, platform service information is needed in message 3. The caller should make sure a PSE session has been established using `sgx_create_pse_session` before attempting to establish a remote attestation and key exchange session involving platform service information.

- **p_context [out]**
  The output context for the subsequent remote attestation and key exchange process, to be used in `sgx_ra_get_msg1` and `sgx_ra_proc_msg2`.

**Return value**

- **SGX_SUCCESS**
  Indicates success.

- **SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
  Indicates an error that the input parameters are invalid.

- **SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation, or contexts reach the limits.

**SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSION_INVALID**

The session is invalid or ended by the server.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

Indicates that an unexpected error occurred.

**Description**

This is the first API user should call for a key exchange process. The context returned from this function is used as a handle for other APIs in the key exchange library.

**Requirements**

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</table>

**sgx_ra_init_ex**

The `sgx_ra_init_ex` function creates a context for the remote attestation and key exchange process while it allows the use of a custom defined Key Derivation Function (KDF).

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_ra_init_ex(
    const sgx_ec256_public_t * p_pub_key,
    int b_pse,
    sgx_ra_derive_secret_keys_t derive_key_cb,
    sgx_ra_context_t * p_context
);
```

**Parameters**

**p_pub_key [in] (Little Endian)**

The EC public key of the service provider based on the NIST P-256 elliptic curve.

**b_pse [in]**

If true, platform service information is needed in message 3. The caller should make sure a PSE session has been established using `sgx_create_pse_`
before attempting to establish a remote attestation and key exchange session involving platform service information.

**derive_key_cb [in]**

This a pointer to a call back routine matching the function prototype of `sgx_ra_derive_secret_keys_t`. This function takes the Diffie-Hellman shared secret as input to allow the ISV enclave to generate their own derived shared keys (SMK, SK, MK and VK).

**p_context [out]**

The output context for the subsequent remote attestation and key exchange process, to be used in `sgx_ra_get_msg1` and `sgx_ra_proc_msg2`.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

Indicates success.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

Indicates an error that the input parameters are invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation, or contexts reach the limits.

**SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSION_INVALID**

The session is invalid or ended by the server.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

Indicates that an unexpected error occurred.

**Description**

This is the first API user should call for a key exchange process. The context returned from this function is used as a handle for other APIs in the key exchange library.

**Requirements**

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</table>
sgx_ra_get_keys

The sgx_ra_get_keys function is used to get the negotiated keys of a remote attestation and key exchange session. This function should only be called after the service provider accepts the remote attestation and key exchange protocol message 3 produced by sgx_ra_proc_msg2.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_ra_get_keys(
    sgx_ra_context_t context,
    sgx_ra_key_type_t type,
    sgx_ra_key_128_t *p_key
);
```

Parameters

context [in]
Context returned by sgx_ra_init.

type [in]
The type of the keys, which can be SGX_RA_KEY_MK, SGX_RA_KEY_SK, or SGX_RA.VK.

If the RA context was generated by sgx_ra_init, the returned SGX_RA_KEY_MK, SGX_RA_KEY_SK or SGX_RA.VK is derived from the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element between the service provider and the application enclave using the following Key Derivation Function (KDF):

\[
KDK = AES-CMAC(key0, \text{gab \ x-coordinate})
\]

\[
\text{SGX_RA_KEY.VK} = AES-CMAC(KDK, \text{0x01}||'VK'||0x00||0x80||0x00)
\]

\[
\text{SGX_RA_KEY.MK} = AES-CMAC(KDK, \text{0x01}||'MK'||0x00||0x80||0x00)
\]

\[
\text{SGX_RA_KEY.SK} = AES-CMAC(KDK, \text{0x01}||'SK'||0x00||0x80||0x00)
\]

The key0 used in the key extraction operation is 16 bytes of 0x00. The plain text used in the Key derivation calculation is the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element in Little Endian format. The plain text used in each key calculation includes:
• a counter (0x01)
• a label: the ASCII representation of one of the strings 'VK', 'MK' or 'SK' in Little Endian format
• a bit length (0x80)

If the RA context was generated by the `sgx_ra_init_ex` API, the KDF used to generate `SGX_RA_KEY_MK`, `SGX_RA_KEY_SK` and `SGX_RA.VK` is defined in the implementation of the call back function provided to the `sgx_ra_init_ex` function.

`p_key [out]`
The key returned.

Return value

`SGX_SUCCESS`
Indicates success.

`SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER`
Indicates an error that the input parameters are invalid.

`SGX_ERROR_INVALID_STATE`
Indicates this API is invoked in incorrect order, it can be called only after a success session has been established. In other words, `sgx_ra_proc_msg2` should have been called and no error returned.

Description

After a successful key exchange process, this API can be used in the enclave to get specific key associated with this remote attestation and key exchange session.

Requirements

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</table>

`sgx_ra_close`

Call the `sgx_ra_close` function to release the remote attestation and key exchange context after the process is done and the context isn't needed anymore.

Syntax
sgx_status_t sgx_ra_close(
    sgx_ra_context_t context
);

Parameters
context [in]
Context returned by sgx_ra_init.

Return value
SGX_SUCCESS
Indicates success.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER
Indicates the context is invalid.

Description
At the end of a key exchange process, the caller needs to use this API in an enclave to clear and free memory associated with this remote attestation session.

Requirements

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sgx_dh_init_session
Initialize DH secure session according to the caller’s role in the establishment.

Syntax
sgx_status_t sgx_dh_init_session(
    sgx_dh_session_role_t role,
    sgx_dh_session_t * session
);

Parameters
role [in]
Indicates which role the caller plays in the secure session establishment.
The value of role of the initiator of the session establishment must be SGX_DH_SESSION_INITIATOR.

The value of role of the responder of the session establishment must be SGX_DH_SESSION_RESPONDER.

**session [out]**

A pointer to the instance of the DH session which contains entire information about session establishment.

---

**NOTE**

The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

---

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

Session is initialized successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

Any of the input parameters is incorrect.

**Requirements**

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</table>

**sgx_dh_responder_gen_msg1**

Generates MSG1 for the responder of DH secure session establishment and records ECC key pair in session structure.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_dh_responder_gen_msg1(
    sgx_dh_msg1_t * msg1,
    sgx_dh_session_t * dh_session
);
```

**Parameters**

**msg1 [out]**
A pointer to an `sgx_dh_msg1_t` msg1 buffer. The buffer holding the msg1 message, which is referenced by this parameter, must be within the enclave.

The DH msg1 contains the responder's public key and report based target info.

**dh_session [in/out]**

A pointer that points to the instance of `sgx_dh_session_t`. The buffer holding the DH session information, which is referenced by this parameter, must be within the enclave.

---

**NOTE**

As output, the DH session structure contains the responder's public key and private key for the current session.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

MSG1 is generated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

Any of the input parameters is incorrect.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_STATE**

The API is invoked in incorrect order or state.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**

The enclave is out of memory.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

An unexpected error occurred.

**Requirements**

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**sgx_dh_initiator_proc_msg1**

The initiator of DH secure session establishment handles msg1 sent by responder and then generates msg2, and records initiator's ECC key pair in DH session structure.
Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_dh_initiator_proc_msg1(
    const sgx_dh_msg1_t * msg1,
    sgx_dh_msg2_t * msg2,
    sgx_dh_session_t * dh_session
);
```

Parameters

**msg1 [in]**
Point to dh message 1 buffer generated by session responder, and the buffer must be in enclave address space.

**NOTE**
The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

**msg2 [out]**
Point to dh message 2 buffer, and the buffer must be in enclave address space.

**NOTE**
The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

**dh_session [in/out]**
Point to dh session structure that is used during establishment, and the buffer must be in enclave address space.

**NOTE**
The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**
msg1 is processed and msg2 is generated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
Any of the input parameters is incorrect.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_STATE**
The API is invoked in incorrect order or state.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
The enclave is out of memory.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
An unexpected error occurred.

**Requirements**

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**sgx_dh_responder_proc_msg2**
The responder handles msg2 sent by initiator and then derives AEK, updates session information and generates msg3.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_dh_responder_proc_msg2(
    const sgx_dh_msg2_t * msg2,
    sgx_dh_msg3_t * msg3,
    sgx_dh_session_t * dh_session,
    sgx_key_128bit_t * aek,
    sgx_dh_session_enclave_identity_t * initiator_identity
);
```

**Parameters**

**msg2 [in]**
Point to dh message 2 buffer generated by session initiator, and the buffer must be in enclave address space.

**NOTE**
The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

**msg3 [out]**
Point to dh message 3 buffer generated by session responder in this function, and the buffer must be in enclave address space.

**NOTE**
The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

**dh_session [in/out]**
Point to dh session structure that is used during establishment, and the buffer must be in enclave address space.

**NOTE**
The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

**aeck [out]**
A pointer that points to instance of `sgx_key_128bit_t`. The aek is derived as follows:

\[
\text{KDK} := \text{CMAC(key0, LittleEndian(gab x-coordinate))}
\]
\[
\text{AEK} = \text{AES-CMAC(KDK, 0x01||'AEK'||0x00||0x80||0x00)}
\]

The `key0` used in the key extraction operation is 16 bytes of `0x00`. The plain text used in the AES-CMAC calculation of the KDK is the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element in Little Endian format.

The plain text used in the AEK calculation includes:

- a counter (0x01)
- a label: the ASCII representation of the string 'AEK' in Little Endian format
- a bit length (0x80)

**NOTE**
The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

**initiator_identity [out]**
A pointer that points to instance of `sgx_dh_session_enclave_identity_t`. Identity information of initiator includes isv svn, isv product id, the enclave attributes, MRSIGNER, and MRENCLAVE. The buffer must be in enclave address space. The caller should check the identity of the peer and decide whether to trust the peer and use the aek.

**NOTE**
The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**
msg2 is processed and msg3 is generated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
Any of the input parameters is incorrect.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_STATE**
The API is invoked in incorrect order or state.

**SGX_ERROR_KDF_MISMATCH**
Indicates the key derivation function does not match.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
The enclave is out of memory.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
An unexpected error occurred.

**Requirements**

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</table>

**sgx_dh_initiator_proc_msg3**
The initiator handles msg3 sent by responder and then derives AEK, updates session information and gets responder's identity information.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_dh_initiator_proc_msg3(
    const sgx_dh_msg3_t *msg3,
    sgx_dh_session_t *dh_session,
    sgx_key_128bit_t *aek,
    sgx_dh_session_enclave_identity_t *responder_identity
);
```

**Parameters**
msg3 [in]
Point to dh message 3 buffer generated by session responder, and the buffer must be in enclave address space.

**NOTE**
The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

dh_session [in]
Point to dh session structure that is used during establishment, and the buffer must be in enclave address space.

**NOTE**
The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

aek [out]
A pointer that points to instance of sgx_key_128bit_t. The aek is derived as follows:

\[
KDK := \text{CMAC(key0, LittleEndian(gab x-coordinate))}
\]

\[
AEK = \text{AES-CMAC(KDK, 0x01||'AEK'||0x00||0x80||0x00)}
\]

The key0 used in the key extraction operation is 16 bytes of 0x00. The plain text used in the AES-CMAC calculation of the KDK is the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element in Little Endian format.

The plain text used in the AEK calculation includes:

- a counter (0x01)
- a label: the ASCII representation of the string 'AEK' in Little Endian format
- a bit length (0x80)

**NOTE**
The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

responder_identity [out]
Identity information of responder including isv svn, isv product id, the enclave attributes, MRSIGNER, and MRENCLAVE. The buffer must be in enclave address space. The caller should check the identity of the peer and decide
whether to trust the peer and use the aek or the msg3_body.additional_prop field of msg3.

**NOTE**
The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**
The function is done successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
Any of the input parameters is incorrect.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_STATE**
The API is invoked in incorrect order or state.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
The enclave is out of memory.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
An unexpected error occurred.

**Requirements**

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>sgx_dh.h</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Library</td>
<td>sgx_tservice.lib or sgx_tservice_sim.lib (simulation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**sgx_fopen**
The `sgx_fopen` function creates or opens a protected file.

**Syntax**

```c
SGX_FILE* sgx_fopen(
    const char* filename,
    const char* mode,
    const sgx_key_128bit_t *key
);
```

**Parameters**

**filename** [in]
The name of the file to be created or opened.

**mode [in]**
The file open mode string. Allowed values are any combination of ‘r’, ‘w’ or ‘a’, with possible ‘+’ and possible ‘b’ (since string functions are currently not supported, ‘b’ is meaningless).

**key [in]**
The encryption key of the file. This key is used as a key derivation key, used for deriving encryption keys for the file. If the file is created with `sgx_fopen`, you should protect this key and provide it as input every time the file is opened.

**Return value**
If the function succeeds, it returns a valid file pointer, which can be used by all the other functions in the Protected FS API, otherwise, NULL is returned and `errno` is set with an appropriate error code. See Protected FS Error Codes for more details about errors.

**Description**
`sgx_fopen` is similar to the C file API `fopen`. It creates a new Protected File or opens an existing Protected File created with a previous call to `sgx_fopen`. Regular files cannot be opened with this API.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the `fopen` documentation.

**Requirements**

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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>sgx_tprotected_fs.lib</td>
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</table>

**sgx_fopen_auto_key**
The `sgx_fopen_auto_key` function creates or opens a protected file.

**Syntax**

```c
SGX_FILE* sgx_fopen_auto_key(
    const char* filename,
    const char* mode
);
```

**Parameters**

**filename [in]**
The name of the file to be created or opened.

mode [in]
The file open mode string. Allowed values are any combination of ‘r’, ‘w’ or ‘a’, with possible ‘+’ and possible ‘b’ (since string functions are currently not supported, ‘b’ is meaningless).

Return value
If the function succeeds, it returns a valid file pointer, which can be used by all the other functions in the Protected FS API, otherwise, NULL is returned and errno is set with an appropriate error code. See Protected FS Error Codes for more details about errors.

Description
sgx_fopen_auto_key is similar to the C file API fopen. It creates a new Protected File or opens an existing Protected File created with a previous call to sgx_fopen_auto_key. Regular files cannot be opened with this API.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the fopen documentation.

Requirements
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</table>

sgx_fclose
The sgx_fclose function closes a protected file handle.

Syntax
int32_t sgx_fclose(
    SGX_FILE* stream
);  

Parameters
stream [in]
A file handle that is returned from a previous call to sgx_fopen or sgx_fopen_auto_key.

Return value
0
The file was closed successfully.

There were errors during the operation.

**Description**

`sgx_fclose` is similar to the C file API `fclose`. It closes an open Protected File handle created with a previous call to `sgx_fopen` or `sgx_fopen_auto_key`. After a call to this function, the handle is invalid even if an error is returned.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the `fclose` documentation.

**Requirements**

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**sgx_fread**

The `sgx_fread` function reads the requested amount of data from the file, and extends the file pointer by that amount.

**Syntax**

```c
size_t sgx_fread(
    void* ptr,
    size_t size,
    size_t count,
    SGX_FILE* stream
);
```

**Parameters**

**ptr[out]**

A pointer to a buffer of at least `size*count` bytes, to receive the data read from the file.

**size [in]**

The size of each block to be read.

**count [in]**

The number of blocks to be read.

**stream [in]**
A file handle that is returned from a previous call to \texttt{sgx\_fopen} or \texttt{sgx\_fopen\_auto\_key}.

\textbf{Return value}

The number of blocks of size \texttt{size} that were read from the file.

\textbf{Description}

\texttt{sgx\_fread} is similar to the C file API \texttt{fread}. In case of an error, \texttt{sgx\_ferror} can be called to get the error code.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the \texttt{fread} documentation.

\textbf{Requirements}

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</table>

\texttt{sgx\_fwrite}

The \texttt{sgx\_fwrite} function writes the given amount of data to the file, and extends the file pointer by that amount.

\textbf{Syntax}

\begin{verbatim}
size_t \texttt{sgx\_fwrite}(
    const void* \texttt{ptr},
    size_t \texttt{size},
    size_t \texttt{count},
    SGX\_FILE* \texttt{stream}
);
\end{verbatim}

\textbf{Parameters}

\texttt{ptr [in]}

A pointer to a buffer of at least \texttt{size*count} bytes, that contains the data to write to the file.

\texttt{size [in]}

The size of each block to be written.

\texttt{count [in]}

The number of blocks to be written.

\texttt{stream [in]}
A file handle that is returned from a previous call to `sgx_fopen` or `sgx_fopen_auto_key`.

**Return value**
The number of blocks of size `size` that were written to the file.

**Description**
`sgx_fwrite` is similar to the C file API `fwrite`. In case of an error, `sgx_ferror` can be called to get the error code.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the `fwrite` documentation.

**Requirements**

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</table>

**sgx_fflush**
The `sgx_fflush` function forces a cache flush, and if it returns successfully, it is guaranteed that your changes are committed to a file on the disk.

**Syntax**

```c
int32_t sgx_fflush(
    SGX_FILE* stream
);
```

**Parameters**

`stream` [in]
A file handle that is returned from a previous call to `sgx_fopen` or `sgx_fopen_auto_key`.

**Return value**
0
The operation completed successfully.
1
There were errors during the operation. `sgx_ferror` can be called to get the error code.

**Description**
sgx_fflush is similar to the C file API fflush. This function flushes all the modified data from the cache and writes it to a file on the disk. In case of an error, sgx_ferror can be called to get the error code. Note that this function does not clear the cache, but only flushes the changes to the actual file on the disk. Flushing also happens automatically when the cache is full and page eviction is required.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the fflush documentation.

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</table>

sgx_ftell

The sgx_ftell function creates or opens a protected file.

Syntax

```c
int64_t sgx_ftell(
    SGX_FILE* stream
);
```

Parameters

stream [in]

A file handle that is returned from a previous call to sgx_fopen or sgx_fopen_auto_key.

Return value

If the function succeeds, it returns the current value of the position indicator of the file, otherwise, -1 is returned and errno is set with an appropriate error code. See Protected FS Error Codes for more details about errors.

Description

sgx_ftell is similar to the C file API ftell.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the ftell documentation.

Requirements

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</table>
sgx_fseek

The `sgx_fseek` function sets the current value of the position indicator of the file.

**Syntax**

```c
int64_t sgx_fseek(
    SGX_FILE* stream,
    int64_t offset,
    int origin
);
```

**Parameters**

**stream** [in]

A file handle that was returned from a previous call to `sgx_fopen` or `sgx_fopen_auto_key`.

**offset** [in]

The new required value, relative to the origin parameter.

**origin** [in]

The origin from which to calculate the offset (`SEEK_SET`, `SEEK_CUR` or `SEEK_END`).

**Return value**

0

The operation completed successfully.

-1

There were errors during the operation. `sgx_errno` can be called to get the error code.

**Description**

`sgx_fseek` is similar to the C file API `fseek`.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the `fseek` documentation.

**Requirements**

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</table>
**sgxfeof**

The `sgxfeof` function tells the caller if the file's position indicator hit the end of the file in a previous read operation.

**Syntax**

```c
int32_t sgxfeof(SGX_FILE* stream);
```

**Parameters**

*stream [in]*

A file handle that was returned from a previous call to `sgxfopen` or `sgxfopen_auto_key`.

**Return value**

0

End of file was not reached.

1

End of file was reached.

**Description**

`sgxfeof` is similar to the C file API `feof`.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the `feof` documentation.

**Requirements**

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<td>Library</td>
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</table>

**sgxferror**

The `sgxferror` function returns the latest operation error code.

**Syntax**

```c
int32_t sgxferror(SGX_FILE* stream);
```

**Parameters**
stream [in]
A file handle that is returned from a previous call to sgx_fopen or sgx_fopen_auto_key.

Return value
The latest operation error code is returned. 0 indicates that no errors occurred.

Description
sgx_ferror is similar to the C file API ferror. In case the latest operation failed because the file is in a bad state, SGX_ERROR_FILE_BAD_STATUS will be returned.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the ferror documentation.

Requirements

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</table>

sgx_clearerr
The sgx_clearerr function attempts to repair a bad file status, and also clears the end-of-file flag.

Syntax
void sgx_clearerr(
    SGX_FILE* stream
);

Parameters
stream [in]
A file handle that is returned from a previous call to sgx_fopen or sgx_fopen_auto_key.

Return value
None

Description
sgx_clearerr is similar to the C file API clearerr. This function attempts to repair errors resulted from the underlying file system, like write errors to
the disk (resulting in a full cache that cannot be emptied). Call \texttt{sgx_ferror}
or \texttt{sgxfeof} after a call to this function to learn if it was successful or not.

\texttt{sgx_clearerr} does not repair errors resulting from a corrupted file, like
decryption errors, or from memory corruption, etc.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the \texttt{clearerr} doc-
umentation.

**Requirements**

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</table>

**sgx_remove**

The \texttt{sgx_remove} function deletes a file from the file system.

**Syntax**

```c
int32_t sgx_remove(
    const char* filename,
);
```

**Parameters**

**filename [in]**

The name of the file to delete.

**Return value**

0

The operation completed successfully.

1

An error occurred, check \texttt{errno} for the error code.

**Description**

\texttt{sgx_remove} is similar to the C file API \texttt{remove}.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the \texttt{remove doc}u-
mentation.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</table>
The `sgx_fexport_auto_key` function is used for exporting the latest key used for the file encryption. See File Transfer with the Automatic Keys API for more details.

**Syntax**

```c
int32_t sgx_fexport_auto_key(
    const char* filename,
    sgx_key_128bit_t *key
);
```

**Parameters**

- **filename [in]**
  
  The name of the file to be exported. This should be the name of a file created with the `sgx_fopen_auto_key` API.

- **key [out]**
  
  The latest encryption key.

**Return value**

- 0
  
  The operation completed successfully.

- 1
  
  An error occurred, check `errno` for the error code.

**Description**

`sgx_fexport_auto_key` is used to export the last key that was used in the encryption of the file. With this key you can import the file in a different enclave or system.

**NOTE:**

1. In order for this function to work, the file should not be opened in any other process.
2. This function only works with files created with `sgx_fopen_auto_key`.

See File Transfer with the Automatic Keys API for more details.

**Requirements**
sgx_fimport_auto_key

The `sgx_fimport_auto_key` function is used for importing a Protected FS auto key file created on a different enclave or platform. See File Transfer with the Automatic Keys API for more details.

**Syntax**

```c
int32_t sgx_fimport_auto_key(
    const char* filename,
    const sgx_key_128bit_t *key
);
```

**Parameters**

- **filename [in]**
  - The name of the file to be imported. This should be the name of a file created with the `sgx_fopen_auto_key` API, on a different enclave or system.

- **key [in]**
  - The encryption key, exported with a call to `sgx_fexport_auto_key` in the source enclave or system.

**Return value**

- 0
  - The operation completed successfully.

- 1
  - An error occurred, check `errno` for the error code.

**Description**

`sgx_fimport_auto_key` is used for importing a Protected FS file. After this call returns successfully, the file can be opened normally with `sgx_fexport_auto_key`.

**NOTE:**

1. In order for this function to work, the file should not be opened in any other process.
2. This function only works with files created with `sgx_fopen_auto_key`.

See File Transfer with the Automatic Keys API for more details.

**Requirements**

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</table>

**sgx_fclear_cache**

The `sgx_fclear_cache` function is used for clearing the internal file cache. The function scrubs all the data from the cache, and releases all the allocated cache memory.

**Syntax**

```c
int32_t sgx_fclear_cache(
    SGX_FILE* stream
);
```

**Parameters**

- **stream [in]**
  
  A file handle that is returned from a previous call to `sgx_fopen` or `sgx_fopen_auto_key`.

**Return value**

- 0
  
  The operation completed successfully.

- 1
  
  An error occurred, call `sgx_ferror` to get the error code.

**Description**

`sgx_fclear_cache` is used to scrub all the data from the cache and release all the allocated cache memory. If modified data is found in the cache, it will be written to the file on disk before being scrubbed.

This function is especially useful if you do not trust parts of your own enclave (for example, external libraries you linked against, etc.) and want to make sure there is as little sensitive data in the memory as possible before transferring control to the code they do not trust. Note, however, that the `SGX_FILE` struc-
ture itself still holds sensitive data. To remove all such data related to the file from memory completely, you should close the file handle.

Requirements

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<tr>
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Types and Enumerations

This topic introduces the types and error codes in the following topics:

- Type Descriptions
- Error Codes

Type Descriptions

This topic section describes the following data types provided by the Intel(R) SGX:

- sgx_enclave_id_t
- sgx_status_t
- sgx_launch_token_t
- sgx_exception_vector_t
- sgx_exception_type_t
- sgx_cpu_context_t
- sgx_exception_info_t
- sgx_exception_handler_t
- sgx_spinlock_t
- sgx_thread_t
- sgx_thread_mutex_t
- sgx_thread_mutexattr_t
- sgx_thread_cond_t
- sgx_thread_condattr_t
- sgx_thread_sync_object_handle_t
- sgx_misc_select_t
- sgx_attributes_t
- Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Developer Reference for Windows* OS -

- `sgx_misc_attribute_t`
- `sgx_isv_svn_t`
- `sgx_cpu_svn_t`
- `sgx_key_id_t`
- `sgx_key_128bit_t`
- `sgx_key_request_t`
- `sgx_measurement_t`
- `sgx_mac_t`
- `sgx_report_data_t`
- `sgx_prod_id_t`
- `sgx_target_info_t`
- `sgx_report_body_t`
- `sgx_report_t`
- `sgx_aes_gcm_data_t`
- `sgx_sealed_data_t`
- `sgx_epid_group_id_t`
- `sgx_basename_t`
- `sgx_quote_t`
- `sgx_quote_sign_type_t`
- `sgx_spid_t`
- `sgx_quote_nonce_t`
- `sgx_time_source_nonce_t`
- `sgx_time_t`
- `sgx_ps_cap_t`
- `sgx_ps_sec_prop_desc_t`
- `sgx_mc_uuid_t`
- `sgx_ra_context_t`
- `sgx_ra_key_128_t`
- `sgx_ra_derive_secret_keys_t`
- `sgx_ra_key_type_t`
- sgx_ra_msg1_t
- sgx_ra_msg2_t
- sgx_ra_msg3_t
- sgx_ecall_getGa_trusted_t
- sgx_ecall_get_msg3_trusted_t
- sgx_ecall_proc_msg2_trusted_t
- sgx_platform_info_t
- sgx_update_info_bit_t
- sgx_dh_msg1_t
- sgx_dh_msg2_t
- sgx_dh_msg3_t
- sgx_dh_msg3_body_t
- sgx_dh_session_enclave_identity_t
- sgx_dh_session_role_t
- sgx_dh_session_t
- sgx_device_status_t

**sgx_enclave_id_t**
An enclave ID, also referred to as an enclave handle. Used as a handle to an enclave by various functions.

Enclave IDs are locally unique, i.e. within the platform, and the uniqueness is guaranteed until the next machine restart.

**Syntax**

typedef uint64_t sgx_enclave_id_t;

**Requirements**

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**sgx_status_t**

Specifies the return status from an Intel SGX function call. For a list containing all possible values of this data type, see Error Codes.

**Syntax**
typedef enum _status_t {...} sgx_status_t;

Requirements

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sgx_launch_token_t
An opaque type used to hold enclave launch information. Used by sgx_create_enclave to initialize an enclave. The license is generated by the Launch Enclave.

See more details in Loading and Unloading an Enclave.

Syntax

typedef uint8_t sgx_launch_token_t[1024];

Requirements

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sgx_exception_vector_t
The sgx_exception_vector_t enumeration contains the enclave supported exception vectors. If the exception vector is #BP, the exception type is SGX EXCEPTION SOFTWARE; otherwise, the exception type is SGX EXCEPTION HARDWARE.

Syntax

typedef enum _sgx_exception_vector_t
{
    SGX_EXCEPTION_VECTOR_DE = 0, /* DIV and DIV instructions */
    SGX_EXCEPTION_VECTOR_DB = 1, /* For Intel use only */
    SGX_EXCEPTION_VECTOR_BP = 3, /* INT 3 instruction */
    SGX_EXCEPTION_VECTOR_BR = 5, /* BOUND instruction */
    SGX_EXCEPTION_VECTOR_UD = 6, /* UD2 instruction or reserved opcode */
    SGX_EXCEPTION_VECTOR_MF = 16, /* x87 FPU floating-point or WAIT/FWAI instruction */
    SGX_EXCEPTION_VECTOR_AC = 17, /* Any data reference in memory */
    SGX_EXCEPTION_VECTOR_XM = 19, /* SSE/SSE2/SSE3 instruction */
} sgx_exception_vector_t;

Requirements
**sgx_exception_type_t**

The `sgx_exception_type_t` enumeration contains values that specify the exception type. If the exception vector is #BP (BreakPoint), the exception type is `SGX_EXCEPTIONSOFTWARE`; otherwise, the exception type is `SGX_EXCEPTION_HARDWARE`.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef enum _sgx_exception_type_t
{
    SGX_EXCEPTION_HARDWARE = 3,
    SGX_EXCEPTIONSOFTWARE = 6,
} sgx_exception_type_t;
```

**Requirements**

**Header** | `sgx_trts_exception.h`

---

**sgx_cpu_context_t**

The `sgx_cpu_context_t` structure contains processor-specific register data. Custom exception handling uses `sgx_cpu_context_t` structure to record the CPU context at exception time.

**Syntax**

```c
#ifdef (_M_X64) || defined (__x86_64__)
    typedef struct _cpu_context_t
    {
        uint64_t rax;
        uint64_t rcx;
        uint64_t rdx;
        uint64_t rbx;
        uint64_t rdx;
        uint64_t r8;
        uint64_t r9;
        uint64_t r10;
        uint64_t r11;
        uint64_t r12;
        uint64_t r13;
        uint64_t r14;
        uint64_t r15;
    }
#endif
```
typedef struct _cpu_context_t {
    uint64_t rflags;
    uint64_t rip;
} sgx_cpu_context_t;
#else
    typedef struct _cpu_context_t {
        uint32_t eax;
        uint32_t ecx;
        uint32_t edx;
        uint32_t ebx;
        uint32_t esp;
        uint32_t ebp;
        uint32_t esi;
        uint32_t edi;
        uint32_t ebp;
        uint32_t esi;
        uint32_t edi;
        uint32_t eflags;
        uint32_t eip;
    } sgx_cpu_context_t;
#endif

Members
rax, rcx, rdx, rbx, rsp, rbp, rsi, rdi, r8 – r15
64-bit general purpose registers
rflags
64-bit program status and control register
rip
64-bit instruction pointer
eax, ecx, edx, ebx, esp, ebp, esi, edi
32-bit general purpose registers
eflags
32-bit program status and control register
eip
32-bit instruction pointer

Requirements

| Header       | sgx_trts_exception.h |
sgx_exception_info_t
A structure of this type contains an exception record with a description of the exception and processor context record at the time of exception.

Syntax

typedef struct _exception_info_t
{
    sgx_cpu_context_t cpu_context;
    sgx_exception_vector_t exception_vector;
    sgx_exception_type_t exception_type;
} sgx_exception_info_t;

Members

cpu_context
The context record that contains the processor context at the exception time.

exception_vector
The reason the exception occurs. This is the code generated by a hardware exception.

exception_type
The exception type.

SGX_EXCEPTION_HARDWARE(3) indicates a HW exception.
SGX_EXCEPTION_SOFTWARE(6) indicates a SW exception.

Requirements

| Header         | sgx_trts_exception.h |

sgx_exception_handler_t
Callback function that serves as a custom exception handler.

Syntax

typedef int (* sgx_exception_handler_t) (sgx_exception_info_t *info);

Members

info
A pointer to `sgx_exception_info_t` structure that receives the exception information.

**Return value**

**EXCEPTION_CONTINU&Eacute;_SEARCH (0)**
The exception handler did not handle the exception and the RTS should call the next exception handler in the chain.

**EXCEPTION_CONTINU&Eacute;_EXECUTION (-1)**
The exception handler handled the exception and the RTS should continue the execution of the enclave.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_trts_exception.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_spinlock_t**

Data type for a trusted spin lock.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef volatile uint32_t sgx_spinlock_t;
```

**Members**

`sgx_spinlock_t` defines a spin lock object inside the enclave.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_spinlock.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_thread_t**

Data type to uniquely identify a trusted thread.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef uintptr * sgx_thread_t;
```

**Members**

`sgx_thread_t` is an opaque data type with no member fields visible to users. This data type is subject to change. Thus, enclave code should not rely on the contents of this data object.

**Requirements**
**Header**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>sgx_thread_mutex_t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Data type for a trusted mutex object.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef struct sgx_thread_mutex
{
    size_t m_refcount;
    uint32_t m_control;
    volatile uint32_t m_lock;
    sgx_thread_t m_owner;
    sgx_thread_queue_t m_queue;
} sgx_thread_mutex_t;
```

**Members**

**m_control**

Flags to define whether a mutex is recursive or not.

**m_refcount**

Reference counter of the mutex object. It will be increased by 1 if the mutex is successfully acquired, and be decreased by 1 if the mutex is released.

**NOTE**

The counter will be greater than one only if the mutex is recursive.

**m_lock**

The spin lock used to guarantee atomic updates to the mutex object.

**m_owner**

The thread that currently owns the mutex writes its unique thread identifier in this field, which otherwise is NULL. This field is used for error checking, for instance to ensure that only the owner of a mutex releases it.

**m_queue**

Ordered list of threads waiting to acquire the ownership of the mutex. The queue itself is a structure containing a head and a tail for quick insertion and removal under FIFO semantics.

**Requirements**
**Header**

| sgx_thread.h |

**sgx_thread_mutexattr_t**

Attribute for the trusted mutex object.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef struct sgx_thread_mutex_attr
{
    unsigned char m_dummy;
} sgx_thread_mutexattr_t;
```

**Members**

**m_dummy**

Dummy member not supposed to be used.

**Requirements**

| Header | sgx_thread.h |

**sgx_thread_cond_t**

Data type for a trusted condition variable.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef struct sgx_thread_cond
{
    sgx_spinlock_t m_lock;
    sgx_thread_queue_t m_queue;
} sgx_thread_cond_t;
```

**Members**

**m_lock**

The spin lock used to guarantee atomic updates to the condition variable.

**m_queue**

Ordered list of threads waiting on the condition variable. The queue itself is a structure containing a head and a tail for quick insertion and removal under FIFO semantics.
**Requirements**

| Header   | sgx_thread.h |

**sgx_thread_condattr_t**

Attribute for the trusted condition variable.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef struct sgx_thread_cond_attr
{
    unsigned char m_dummy;
} sgx_thread_condattr_t;
```

**Members**

**m_dummy**

Dummy member not supposed to be used.

**Requirements**

| Header   | sgx_thread.h |

**sgx_thread_sync_object_handle_t**

Data type for Intel(R) SGX thread synchronization object handle.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef struct _sgx_thread_sync_object_t *sgx_thread_sync_object_handle_t;
```

**Requirements**

| Header   | sgx_thread.h |

**sgx_misc_select_t**

Enclave misc select bits. The value is 4 byte in length. Currently all the bits are reserved for future extension.

**Requirements**

| Header   | sgx_attributes.h |

**sgx_attributes_t**

Enclave attributes definition structure.
NOTE
When specifying an attributes mask used in key derivation, at a minimum the flags that should be set are INITED, DEBUG and RESERVED bits.

NOTE
The XGETBV instruction can be executed to determine the register sets which are part of the XSAVE state which corresponds to the xfrm value of attributes. Since the save state is dependent on the host system and operating system, an attributes mask generally does not include these bits (XFRM is set to 0).

Syntax

typedef struct _sgx_attributes_t
{
    uint64_t flags;
    uint64_t xfrm;
} sgx_attributes_t;

Members

flags
Flags is a combination of the following values.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SGX_FLAGS_INITTED 0x0000000000000001ULL</td>
<td>The enclave is initialized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGX_FLAGS_DEBUG 0x0000000000000002ULL</td>
<td>The enclave is a debug enclave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGX_FLAGS_MODE64BIT 0x0000000000000004ULL</td>
<td>The enclave runs in 64 bit mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGX_FLAGS_PROVISION_KEY 0x0000000000000010ULL</td>
<td>The enclave has access to a provision key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGX_FLAGS_ENITTOKEN_KEY 0x0000000000000020ULL</td>
<td>The enclave has access to a launch key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGX_FLAGS_RESERVED 0xFFFFFFFFFFFC8ULL</td>
<td>A mask used to ensure that reserved bits are zero. Reserved bits are bit 3 and bits 6-63.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

xfrm
Similar to XCR0, xfrm is a combination of the following values.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SGX_XFRM_LEGACY 0x0000000000000003ULL</td>
<td>FPU and Intel(R) Streaming SIMD Extensions states are saved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGX_XFRM_AVX 0x0000000000000006ULL</td>
<td>Intel(R) Advanced Vector Extensions state is saved</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Requirements**

Header `sgx_attributes.h`

`sgx_misc_attribute_t`

Enclave `misc_select` and attributes definition structure.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef struct _sgx_misc_attributes_t
{
    sgx_attributes_t secs_attr;
    sgx_misc_select_t misc_select;
} sgx_misc_attribute_t;
```

**Members**

`secs_attr`

The Enclave attributes.

`misc_select`

The Enclave misc select configuration.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th><code>sgx_attributes.h</code></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

`sgx_isv_svn_t`

ISV security version. The value is 2 bytes in length. Use this value in key derivation and obtain it by getting an enclave report (`sgx_create_report`).

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th><code>sgx_key.h</code></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

`sgx_cpu_svn_t`

`sgx_cpu_svn_t` is a 128-bit value representing the CPU security version. Use this value in key derivation and obtain it by getting an enclave report (`sgx_create_report`).
Syntax
#define SGX_CPUSVN_SIZE 16
typedef struct _sgx_cpu_svn_t {
    uint8_t svn[SGX_CPUSVN_SIZE];
} sgx_cpu_svn_t;

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{sgx_key_id_t}

\textit{sgx_key_id_t} is a 256 bit value used in the key request structure. The value is generally populated with a random value to provide key wear-out protection.

Syntax
#define SGX_KEYID_SIZE 32
typedef struct _sgx_key_id_t {
    uint8_t id[SGX_KEYID_SIZE];
} sgx_key_id_t;

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{sgx_key_128bit_t}

A 128 bit value that is the used to store a derived key from for example the \texttt{sgx_get_key} function.

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{sgx_key_request_t}

Data structure of key request which is used for selecting the appropriate key and any additional parameters required in the derivation of that key. This is the input parameter for the \texttt{sgx_get_key} function.

Syntax
typedef struct _key_request_t {
    uint16_t key_name;
    uint16_t key_policy;
    sgx_isv_svn_t isv_svn;
    uint16_t reserved1;
    sgx_cpu_svn_t cpu_svn;
    sgx_attributes_t attribute_mask;
    sgx_key_id_t key_id;
    sgx_misc_select_t misc_mask;
    uint8_t reserved2[436];
} sgx_key_request_t;

Members

key_name

The name of the key requested. Possible values are below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Name</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SGX_KEYSELECT_EINITTOKEN</td>
<td>0x0000</td>
<td>Launch key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGX_KEYSELECT_PROVISION</td>
<td>0x0001</td>
<td>Provisioning key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGX_KEYSELECT_PROVISION_SEAL</td>
<td>0x0002</td>
<td>Provisioning seal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGX_KEYSELECT_REPORT</td>
<td>0x0003</td>
<td>Report key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGX_KEYSELECT_SEAL</td>
<td>0x0004</td>
<td>Seal key</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

key_policy

Identify which inputs are required to be used in the key derivation. Possible values are below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key policy name</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SGX_KEYPOLICY_MRENCLAVE</td>
<td>0x0001</td>
<td>Derive key using the enclave's ENCLAVE measurement register</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGX_KEYPOLICY_MRSIGNER</td>
<td>0x0002</td>
<td>Derive key using the enclave's SIGNER measurement register</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE
If MRENCLAVE is used, then that key can only be rederived by that particular enclave.

**NOTE**
If MRSIGNER is used, then another enclave with the same ISV_SVN could derive the key as well which is useful for applications that instantiate more than one enclave and would like to pass data. The key derived could be used in the encryption process for the data passed between the enclaves.

**isv_svn**
The ISV security version number that should be used in the key derivation.

**reserved1**
Reserved for future use. Must be zero.

**cpu_svn**
The TCB security version number that should be used in the key derivation.

**attribute_mask**
The attributes mask used to determine which enclave attributes must be included in the key. It only impacts the derivation of seal key, provisioning key and provisioning seal key. See the definition of sgx_attributes_t.

**key_id**
Value for key wear-out protection. Generally initialized with a random number.

**misc_mask**
The misc mask used to determine which enclave misc select must be included in the key. Reserved for future function extension.

**reserved2**
Reserved for future use. Must be set to zero.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_key.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_measurement_t**
sgx_measurement_t is a 256-bit value representing the enclave measurement.

**Syntax**

#define SGX_HASH_SIZE 32
typedef struct _sgx_measurement_t {
    uint8_t m[SGX_HASH_SIZE];
} sgx_measurement_t;

Requirements

Header | sgx_report.h

sgx_mac_t

This type is utilized as storage for the 128-bit CMAC value of the report data.

Requirements

Header | sgx_report.h

sgx_report_data_t

This type is utilized as storage for the 128-bit CMAC value of the report data.

Syntax

#define SGX_REPORT_DATA_SIZE 64
typedef struct _sgx_report_data_t {
    uint8_t d[SGX_REPORT_DATA_SIZE];
} sgx_report_data_t;

Requirements

Header | sgx_report.h

sgx_prod_id_t

A 16-bit value representing the ISV enclave product ID. This value is used in the derivation of some keys.

Requirements

Header | sgx_report.h

sgx_target_info_t

Data structure of report target information. This is an input to function sgx_create_report and sgx_init_quote which is used to identify the
enclave (its measurement and attributes) which will be able to verify the REPORT that is generated.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef struct _targe_info_t
{
    sgx_measurement_t mr_enclave;
    sgx_attributes_t attributes;
    uint8_t reserved1[4];
    sgx_misc_select_t misc_select;
    uint8_t reserved2[456];
} sgx_target_info_t;
```

**Members**

- **mr_enclave**
The enclave hash of the target enclave

- **attributes**
The attributes of the target enclave

- **reserved1**
Reserved for future use. Must be set to zero.

- **misc_select**
The misc select bits for the target enclave. Reserved for future function extension.

- **reserved2**
Reserved for future use. Must be set to zero.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_report.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_report_body_t**

This data structure, which is part of the `sgx_report_t` structure, contains information about the enclave.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef struct _report_body_t
{
    sgx_cpusvn_t cpu_svn;
} sgx_report_body_t;
```
sgx_misc_select_t misc_select;
uint8_t reserved1[28];
sgx_attributes_t attributes;
sgx_measurement_t mr_enclave;
uint8_t reserved2[32];
sgx_measurement_t mr_signer;
uint8_t reserved3[96];
sgx_prod_id_t isv_prod_id;
sgx_isv svn_t isv svn;
uint8_t reserved4[60];
sgx_report_data_t report_data;
} sgx_report_body_t;

**Members**

**cpu_svn**
The security version number of the host system TCB (CPU).

**misc_select**
The misc select bits for the target enclave. Reserved for future function extension.

**reserved1**
Reserved for future use. Must be set to zero.

**attributes**
The attributes for the enclave. See `sgx_attributes_t` for the definitions of these flags.

**mr_enclave**
The measurement value of the enclave.

**reserved2**
Reserved for future use. Must be set to zero.

**mr_signer**
The measurement value of the public key that verified the enclave.

**reserved3**
Reserved for future use. Must be set to zero.

**isv_prod_id**
The ISV Product ID of the enclave.
**isv_svn**
The ISV security version number of the enclave.

**reserved4**
Reserved for future use. Must be set to zero.

**report_data**
A set of data used for communication between the enclave and the target enclave.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_report.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_report_t**
Data structure that contains the report information for the enclave. This is the output parameter from the `sgx_create_report` function. This is the input parameter for the `sgx_init_quote` function.

**Syntax**

typedef struct _report_t
{
    sgx_report_body_t body;
    sgx_key_id_t key_id;
    sgx_mac_t mac;
} sgx_report_t;

**Members**

**body**
The data structure containing information about the enclave.

**key_id**
Value for key wear-out protection.

**mac**
The CMAC value of the report data using report key.

**Requirements**

| Header | sgx_report.h |
**sgx_aes_gcm_data_t**
The structure contains the AES GCM* data, payload size, MAC* and payload.

**Syntax**
```c
typedef struct _aes_gcm_data_t
{
    uint32_t payload_size;
    uint8_t reserved[12];
    uint8_t payload_tag[SGX_SEAL_TAG_SIZE];
    uint8_t payload[];
} sgx_aes_gcm_data_t;
```

**Members**

**payload_size**
Size of the payload data which includes both the encrypted data followed by the additional authenticated data (plain text). The full payload array is part of the AES GCM MAC calculation.

**reserved**
Padding to allow the data to be 16 byte aligned.

**payload_tag**
AES-GMAC of the plain text, payload, and the sizes

**payload**
The payload data buffer includes the encrypted data followed by the optional additional authenticated data (plain text), which is not encrypted.

**NOTE**
The optional additional authenticated data (MAC or plain text) could be data which identifies the seal data blob and when it was created.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_tseal.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_sealed_data_t**
Sealed data blob structure containing the key request structure used in the key derivation. The data structure has been laid out to achieve 16 byte alignment. This structure should be allocated within the enclave when the seal
operation is performed. After the seal operation, the structure can be copied outside the enclave for preservation before the enclave is destroyed. The sealed_data structure needs to be copied back within the enclave before unsealing.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef struct _sealed_data_t
{
    sgx_key_request_t key_request;
    uint32_t plain_text_offset;
    uint8_t reserved[12];
    sgx_aes_gcm_data_t aes_data;
} sgx_sealed_data_t;
```

**Members**

**key_request**
The key request used to derive the seal key.

**plain_text_offset**
The offset within the aes_data structure payload to the start of the optional additional MAC text.

**reserved**
Padding to allow the data to be 16 byte aligned.

**aes_data**
Structure contains the AES GCM data (payload size, MAC, and payload).

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sgx_tseal.h</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**sgx_epid_group_id_t**
Type for Intel(R) EPID group id

**Syntax**

```c
typedef uint8_t sgx_epid_group_id_t[4];
```

**Requirements**
**Header**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_quote.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_basename_t**

Type for base name used in `sgx_quote`.

**Syntax**

typedef struct _basename_t

{  
    uint8_t name[32];
} sgx_basename_t;

**Members**

**name**

The base name used in `sgx_quote`.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_quote.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_quote_t**

Type for quote used in remote attestation.

**Syntax**

typedef struct _quote_t

{  
    uint16_t version;
    uint16_t sign_type;
    sgx_epid_group_id_t epid_group_id;
    sgx_isv svn_t qe svn;
    sgx_isv svn_t pce svn;
    uint32 xeid;
    sgx_basename_t basename;
    sgx_report_body_t report_body;
    uint32_t signature_len;
    uint8_t signature[];
} sgx_quote_t;

**Members**

**version**
The version of the quote structure.

**sign_type**
The indicator of the Intel(R) EPID signature type.

**epid_group_id**
The Intel(R) EPID group id of the platform belongs to.

**qe_svn**
The svn of the QE.

**pce_svn**
The svn of the PCE.

**extended_epid_group_id**
The extended Intel(R) EPID group ID.

**basename**
The base name used in sgx_quote.

**report_body**
The report body of the application enclave.

**signature_len**
The size in byte of the following signature.

**signature**
The place holder of the variable length signature.

**Requirements**

| Header     | sgx_quote.h |

**sgx_quote_sign_type_t**
Enum indicates the quote type, linkable or un-linkable

**Syntax**

typedef enum {
    SGX_UNLINKABLE_SIGNATURE,
    SGX_LINKABLE_SIGNATURE
} sgx_quote_sign_type_t;
### Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_quote.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### sgx_spid_t

Type for a service provider ID.

**Syntax**

typedef struct _spid_t
{
    uint8_t id[16];
} sgx_spid_t;

**Members**

- **id**
  - The ID of the service provider.

### sgx_quote_nonce_t

This data structure indicates the quote nonce.

**Syntax**

typedef struct _sgx_quote_nonce
{
    uint8_t rand[16];
} sgx_quote_nonce_t;

**Members**

- **rand**
  - The 16 bytes random number used as nonce.

### sgx_time_source_nonce_t

Nonce of time source. It's opaque to users.
Syntax

typedef uint8_t sgx_time_source_nonce_t[32];

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_tae_service.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_time_t**
Type for trusted time.

Syntax

typedef uint64_t sgx_time_t;

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_tae_service.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_ps_cap_t**
Type indicating the platform service capability.

Syntax

typedef struct _sgx_ps_cap_t
{
    uint32_t ps_cap0;
    uint32_t ps_cap1;
} sgx_ps_cap_t;

Members

**ps_cap0**

Bit 0 : Trusted Time service
Bit 1 : Monotonic Counter service
Bit 2 : Reserved
Bit 3 : Secure Message service
Bit 4-31 : Reserved

**ps_cap1**

Bit 0-31 : Reserved
Requirements
Header | sgx_uae_service.h

sgx_ps_sec_prop_desc_t
Security property descriptor of platform service. It's opaque to users.

Syntax
typedef struct _ps_sec_prop_desc
{
    uint8_t sgx_ps_sec_prop_desc[256];
} sgx_ps_sec_prop_desc_t;

Requirements
Header | sgx_tae_service.h

sgx_ps_sec_prop_desc_ex_t
Security property descriptor of platform service with extended platform service information.

Syntax
typedef struct _ps_sec_prop_desc_ex
{
    sgx_ps_sec_prop_desc_t ps_sec_prop_desc;
    sgx_measurement_t pse_mrsigner;
    sgx_prod_id_t pse_prod_id;
    sgx_isvsvn_t pse_isvsvn;
} sgx_ps_sec_prop_desc_ex_t;

Requirements
Header | sgx_tae_service.h

sgx_mc_uuid_t
The data structure of a monotonic counter.

Syntax
#define SGX_MC_UUID_COUNTER_ID_SIZE 3
#define SGX_MC_UUID_NONCE_SIZE 13
typedef struct _mc_uuid
{
    uint8_t counter_id[SGX_MC_UUID_COUNTER_ID_SIZE];
    uint8_t nonce[SGX_MC_UUID_NONCE_SIZE];
} sgx_mc_uuid_t;

Members
counter_id
ID number of the monotonic counter.
nonce
Nonce associated with the monotonic counter.

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_tae_service.h</th>
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</thead>
</table>

sgx_ra_context_t
Type for a context returned by the key exchange library.

Syntax
typedef uint32_t sgx_ra_context_t;

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_key_exchange.h</th>
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</thead>
</table>

sgx_ra_key_128_t
Type for 128 bit key used in remote attestation.

Syntax
typedef uint8_t sgx_ra_key_128_t[16];

Requirements

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<thead>
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<th>sgx_key_exchange.h</th>
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</table>

sgx_ra_derive_secret_keys_t
The sgx_ra_derive_secret_keys_t function should take the Diffie-Hellman shared secret as input to allow the ISV enclave to generate their own
derived shared keys (SMK, SK, MK and VK). Implementation of the function should return the appropriate return value.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef sgx_status_t(*sgx_raderive_secret_keys_t)(
    const sgx_ec256_dh_shared_t* p_shared_key,
    uint16_t kdf_id,
    sgx_ec_key_128bit_t* p_smk_key,
    sgx_ec_key_128bit_t* p_sk_key,
    sgx_ec_key_128bit_t* p_mk_key,
    sgx_ec_key_128bit_t* p_vk_key
);
```

**Parameters**

- **p_shared_key [in]**
The Diffie-Hellman shared secret.

- **kdf_id [in]**
Key Derivation Function ID.

- **p_smk_key [out]**
The output SMK.

- **p_sk_key [out]**
The output SK.

- **p_mk_key [out]**
The output MK.

- **p_vk_key [out]**
The output VK.

**Return value**

- **SGX_SUCCESS**
  Indicates success.

- **SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
  Indicates an error that the input parameters are invalid.

- **SGX_ERROR_KDF_MISMATCH**
  Indicates key derivation function does not match.
**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation, or contexts reach the limits.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

Indicates that an unexpected error occurred.

**Description**

A pointer to a call back routine matching the function prototype.

**Requirements**

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</table>

**sgx_ra_key_type_t**

Enum of the key types used in remote attestation.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef enum _sgx_ra_key_type_t
{
    SGX_RA_KEY_SK = 1,
    SGX_RA_KEY_MK,
    SGX_RA_KEY_VK,
} sgx_ra_key_type_t;
```

**Requirements**

<table>
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<th>sgx_key_exchange.h</th>
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</thead>
</table>

**sgx_ra_msg1_t**

This data structure describes the message 1 that is used in remote attestation and key exchange protocol.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef struct _sgx_ra_msg1_t
{
    sgx_ec256_public_t g_s;
    sgx_epid_group_id_t gid;
} sgx_ra_msg1_t;
```
Members

g_a (Little Endian)
The public EC key of an application enclave, based on NIST P-256 elliptic curve.

 gid (Little Endian)
ID of the Intel(R) EPID group of the platform belongs to.

Requirements

| Header | sgx_key_exchange.h |

sgx_ra_msg2_t
This data structure describes the message 2 that is used in the remote attestation and key exchange protocol.

Syntax

```c
typedef struct _sgx_ra_msg2_t
{
    sgx_ec256_public_t g_b;
    sgx_spid_t spid;
    uint16_t quote_type;
    uint16_t kdf_id;
    sgx_ec256_signature_t sign_gb_ga;
    sgx_mac_t mac;
    uint32_t sig_r1_size;
    uint8_t sig_r1[];
} sgx_ra_msg2_t;
```

Members

g_b (Little Endian)
Public EC key of service provider, based on the NIST P-256 elliptic curve.

spid
ID of the service provider

quote_type (Little Endian)
Indicates the quote type, linkable (1) or un-linkable (0).

kdf_id (Little Endian)
Key derivation function id.

**sign_gb Ga (Little Endian)**

ECDSA Signature of \((g_b||g_a)\), using the service provider's ECDSA private key corresponding to the public key specified in `sgx_ra_init` or `sgx_ra_init_ex` function, where \(g_b\) is the public EC key of the service provider and \(g_a\) is the public key of application enclave, provided by the application enclave, in the remote attestation and key exchange message 1.

**mac**

AES-CMAC of \(gb\), `spid` 2-byte TYPE, 2-byte KDF-ID, and `sign_gb_ga` using SMK as the AES-CMAC key. SMK is derived as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
KDK &= \text{AES-CMAC}(key0, \text{LittleEndian}(gab\ x-coordinate)) \\
SMK &= \text{AES-CMAC}(KDK, 0x01||'SMK'||0x00||0x80||0x00)
\end{align*}
\]

The `key0` used in the key extraction operation is 16 bytes of \(0x00\). The plain text used in the AES-CMAC calculation of the KDK is the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element in Little Endian format.

The plain text used in the SMK calculation includes:

- a counter \((0x01)\)
- a label: the ASCII representation of the string 'SMK' in Little Endian format
- a bit length \((0x80)\)

If the ISV needs to use a different KDF than the default KDF used by Intel(R) SGX PSW, the ISV can use the `sgx_ra_init_ex` API to provide a callback function to generate the remote attestation keys used in the SIGMA protocol (SMK) and returned by the API `sgx_ra_get_keys` (SK, MK, and VK).

**sig_rl_size**

Size of the `sig_rl`, in bytes.

**sig_rl**

Pointer to the Intel(R) EPID Signature Revocation List Certificate of the Intel(R) EPID group identified by the `gid` in the remote attestation and key exchange message 1.

**Requirements**

| Header          | `sgx_key_exchange.h` |
sgx_ra_msg3_t
This data structure describes message 3 that is used in the remote attestation and key exchange protocol.

Syntax

typedef struct __sgx_ra_msg3_t
{
    sgx_mac_t mac;
    sgx_ec256_public_t g_a;
    sgx_ps_sec_prop_desc_t ps_sec_prop;
    uint8_t quote[];
} sgx_ra_msg3_t;

Members

mac
AES-CMAC of g_a, ps_sec_prop, GID, and quote[], using SMK. SMK is derived follows:
KDK = AES-CMAC(key0, LittleEndian(gab x-coordinate))
SMK = AES-CMAC(KDK, 0x01||’SMK’||0x00||0x80||0x00)

The key0 used in the key extraction operation is 16 bytes of 0x00. The plain text used in the AES-CMAC calculation of the KDK is the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element in Little Endian format.

The plain text used in the SMK calculation includes:

- a counter (0x01)
- a label (the ASCII representation of the string ‘SMK’ in Little Endian format)
- a bit length (0x80)

If the ISV needs to use a different KDF than the default KDF used by Intel(R) SGX PSW, the ISV can use the sgx_ra_init_ex API to provide a callback function to generate the remote attestation keys used in the SIGMA protocol (SMK) and returned by the API sgx_ra_get_keys (SK, MK, and VK).

g_a (Little Endian)
Public EC key of application enclave

ps_sec_prop
Security property of the Intel(R) SGX Platform Service. If the Intel(R) SGX Platform Service security property information is not required in the remote attestation and key exchange process, this field will be all 0s.

**quote**

Quote returned from `sgx_get_quote`. The first 32-byte `report_body.report_data` field in Quote is set to SHA256 hash of ga, gb and VK, and the second 32-byte is set to all 0s. VK is derived from the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element between the service provider and the application enclave:

KDK= AES-CMAC(key0, LittleEndian(gab x-coordinate))
SMK = AES-CMAC(KDK, 0x01||’VK’||0x00||0x80||0x00)

The `key0` used in the key extraction operation is 16 bytes of 0x00. The plain text used in the AES-CMAC calculation of the KDK is the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element in Little Endian format.

The plain text used in the SMK calculation includes:

- a counter (0x01)
- a label (the ASCII representation of the string 'SMK' in Little Endian format)
- a bit length (0x80).

If the ISV needs to use a different KDF than the default KDF used by Intel(R) SGX PSW, the ISV can use the `sgx_ra_init_ex` API to provide a callback function to generate the remote attestation keys used in the SIGMA protocol (SMK) and returned by the API `sgx_ra_get_keys` (SK, MK, and VK).

**Requirements**

| Header | sgx_key_exchange.h |

**sgx_ecall_get_ga_trusted_t**

Function pointer of proxy function generated from `sgx_tkey_exchange.edl`.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef sgx_status_t (* sgx_ecall_get_ga_trusted_t)(
    sgx_enclave_id_t eid,
    int* retval,
    sgx_ra_context_t context,
    sgx_ec256_public_t *g_a // Little Endian
```
Note that the 4th parameter this function takes should be in little endian format.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_ukey_exchange.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_ecall_proc_msg2_trusted_t**

Function pointer of proxy function generated from `sgx_tkey_exchange.edl`.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef sgx_status_t (* sgx_ecall_proc_msg2_trusted_t)(
    sgx_enclave_id_t eid,
    int* retval,
    sgx_ra_context_t context,
    const sgx_ra_msg2_t *p_msg2,
    const sgx_target_info_t *p_qe_target,
    sgx_report_t *p_report,
    sgx_quote_nonce_t *p_nonce
);
```

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_ukey_exchange.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_ecall_get_msg3_trusted_t**

Function pointer of proxy function generated from `sgx_tkey_exchange.edl`.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef sgx_status_t (* sgx_ecall_get_msg3_trusted_t)(
    sgx_enclave_id_t eid,
    int* retval,
    sgx_ra_context_t context,
    uint32_t quote_size,
    sgx_report_t* qe_report,
    sgx_ra_msg3_t *p_msg3,
    uint32_t msg3_size
);
```

**Requirements**
Header  |  sgx_ukey_exchange.h

**sgx_platform_info_t**
This opaque data structure indicates the platform information received from Intel Attestation Server.

**Syntax**
```
#define SGX_PLATFORM_INFO_SIZE 101
typedef struct _platform_info
{
    uint8_t platform_info[SGX_PLATFORM_INFO_SIZE];
} sgx_platform_info_t;
```

**Members**
- **platform_info**
The platform information.

**Requirements**

Header  |  sgx_quote.h

**sgx_update_info_bit_t**
Type for information of what components of Intel SGX need to be updated and how to update them.

**Syntax**
```
typedef struct _update_info_bit
{
    int ucodeUpdate;
    int csmeFwUpdate;
    int pswUpdate;
} sgx_update_info_bit_t;
```

**Members**
- **ucodeUpdate**
  Whether the ucode needs to be updated.
- **csmeFwUpdate**
  Whether the csme firmware needs to be updated.
pswUpdate

Whether the platform software needs to be updated.

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_quote.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

sgx_dh_msg1_t

Type for MSG1 used in DH secure session establishment.

Syntax

typedef struct _sgx_dh_msg1_t
{
    sgx_ec256_public_t g_a;
    sgx_target_info_t target;
} sgx_dh_msg1_t;

Members

g_a (Little Endian)

Public EC key of responder enclave of DH session establishment, based on the NIST P-256 elliptic curve.

target

Report target info to be used by the peer enclave to generate the Intel(R) SGX report in the message 2 of the DH secure session protocol.

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_dh.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

sgx_dh_msg2_t

Type for MSG2 used in DH secure session establishment.

Syntax

typedef struct _sgx_dh_msg2_t
{
    sgx_ec256_public_t g_b;
    sgx_report_t report;
    uint8_t cmac[SGX_DH_MAC_SIZE];
} sgx_dh_msg2_t;
Members

g_b (Little Endian)
Public EC key of initiator enclave of DH session establishment, based on the NIST P-256 elliptic curve.

report
Intel(R) SGX report of initiator enclave of DH session establishment. The first 32-byte of the report_data field of the report is set to SHA256 hash of g_a and g_b, where g_a is the EC Public key of the responder enclave and g_b is the EC public key of the initiator enclave. The second 32-byte of the report_data field is set to all 0s.

cmac[SGX_DH_MAC_SIZE]
AES-CMAC value of g_b,report, 2-byte KDF-ID, and 0x00s using SMK as the AES-CMAC key. SMK is derived as follows:

\[
\text{KDK} = \text{AES-CMAC}(\text{key0}, \text{LittleEndian}(\text{gab x-coordinate}))
\]
\[
\text{SMK} = \text{AES-CMAC}(\text{KDK}, 0x01||'SMK'||0x00||0x80||0x00)
\]

The key0 used in the key extraction operation is 16 bytes of 0x00. The plain text used in the AES-CMAC calculation of the KDK is the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element in Little Endian format.

The plain text used in the SMK calculation includes:

- a counter (0x01)
- a label: the ASCII representation of the string 'SMK' in Little Endian format
- a bit length (0x80)

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_dh.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

\text{sgx\_dh\_msg3\_t}
Type for MSG3 used in DH secure session establishment.

Syntax

typedef struct \_\text{sgx\_dh\_msg3\_t}
{


uint8_t cmac[SGX_DH_MAC_SIZE];
sgx_dll_msg3_body_t msg3_body;
} sgx_dll_msg3_t;

**Members**

**cmac[SGX_DH_MAC_SIZE]**
CMAC value of message body of MSG3, using SMK as the AES-CMAC key. SMK is derived as follows:

KDK = AES-CMAC(key0, LittleEndian(gab x-coordinate))
SMK = AES-CMAC(KDK, 0x01 || 'SMK' || 0x00 || 0x80 || 0x00)

The key0 used in the key extraction operation is 16 bytes of 0x00. The plain text used in the AES-CMAC calculation of the KDK is the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element in Little Endian format.

The plain text used in the SMK calculation includes:

- a counter (0x01)
- a label: the ASCII representation of the string 'SMK' in Little Endian format
- a bit length (0x80)

**msg3_body**
Variable length message body of MSG3.

**Requirements**

| Header   | sgx_dll.h |

**sgx_dll_msg3_body_t**
Type for message body of the MSG3 structure used in DH secure session establishment.

**Syntax**

typedef struct _sgx_dll_msg3_body_t
{
    sgx_report_t report;
    uint32_t additional_prop_length;
    uint8_t additional_prop[0];
} sgx_dll_msg3_body_t;
Members

report

Intel(R) SGX report of responder enclave. The first 32-byte of the report_data field of the report is set to SHA256 hash of g_b and g_a, where g_a is the EC Public key of the responder enclave and g_b is the EC public key of the initiator enclave. The second 32-byte of the report_data field is set to all 0s.

additional_prop_length

Length of additional property field in bytes.

additional_prop[0]

Variable length buffer holding additional data that the responder enclave may provide.

Requirements

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</table>

**sgx_dh_session_enclave_identity_t**

Type for enclave identity of initiator or responder used in DH secure session establishment.

Syntax

```c
typedef struct _sgx_dh_session_enclave_identity_t
{
    sgx_cpusvn_t cpu_svn;
    uint8_t reserved_1[32];
    sgx_attributes_t attributes;
    sgx_measurement_t mr_enclave;
    uint8_t reserved_2[32];
    sgx_measurement_t mr_signer;
    uint8_t reserved_3[96];
    sgx_prod_id_t isv_prod_id;
    sgx_isvsvn_t isv_svn;
} sgx_dh_session_enclave_identity_t;
```

Members

cpu_svn

Security version number of CPU.
reserved_1[32]
Reserved 32 bytes.

attributes
Intel SGX attributes of enclave.

mr_enclave
Measurement of enclave.

reserved_2[32]
Reserved 32 bytes.

mr_signer
Measurement of enclave signer.

reserved_3[96]
Reserved 96 bytes.

isv_prod_id (Little Endian)
Product ID of ISV enclave.

isv_svn (Little Endian)
Security version number of ISV enclave.

Requirements

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sgx_dh.h</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

sgx_dh_session_role_t
Type for role of establishing a DH secure session used in DH secure session establishment.

Syntax

```c
typedef enum _sgx_dh_session_role_t
{
    SGX_DH_SESSION_INITIATOR,
    SGX_DH_SESSION_RESPONDER
} sgx_dh_session_role_t;
```

Members
SGX_DH_SESSION_INITIATOR
Initiator of a DH session establishment.

SGX_DH_SESSION_RESPONDER
Responder of a DH session establishment.

Requirements

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<tr>
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</thead>
</table>

sgx_dh_session_t
Type for session used in DH secure session establishment.

Syntax

```c
typedef struct _sgx_dh_session_t
{
    uint8_t sgx_dh_session[SGX_DH_SESSION_DATA_SIZE];
} sgx_dh_session_t;
```

Members

sgx_dh_session
Data of DH session.

The array size of sgx_dh_session SGX_DH_SESSION_DATA_SIZE is defined as 200 bytes.

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
</table>

sgx_device_status_t
Type for the status of Intel(R) SGX device after the dynamic enabling.

Syntax

```c
typedef enum _sgx_device_status_t
{
    SGX_ENABLED,
    SGX_DISABLED_REBOOT_REQUIRED,
    SGX_DISABLED_LEGACY_OS,
    SGX_DISABLED,
    SGX_DISABLED_SCI_AVAILABLE,
```
Members

**SGX_ENABLED**
Intel SGX device is enabled.

**SGX_DISABLED_REBOOT_REQUIRED**
Intel SGX device is disabled and a reboot is required to enable it.

**SGX_DISABLED_LEGACY_OS**
The operating system is a legacy system and does not support enabling Intel SGX device dynamically.

**SGX_DISABLED**
Intel SGX device is disabled.

**SGX_DISABLED_SCI_AVAILABLE**
Intel SGX device is disabled, but a Software Control Interface is available to enable it dynamically.

**SGX_DISABLED_MANUAL_ENABLE**
Intel SGX device is disabled, but can be enabled manually in the BIOS setup.

**SGX_DISABLED_HYPERV_ENABLED**
An unsupported version of Windows* 10 is detected with Hyper-V enabled.

**SGX_DISABLED_UNSUPPORTED_CPU**
Intel SGX is not supported by this CPU.

Requirements

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</table>

Error Codes

Table 15 Error code

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<thead>
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<th>Value</th>
<th>Error Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0000</td>
<td>SGX_SUCCESS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0001</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0002</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0003</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0004</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_ENCLAVE_LOST</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0005</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_INVALID_STATE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0007</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR HYPERV_ENABLED</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0008</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x1001</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_INVALID_FUNCTION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x1003</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_TCS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x1006</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_ENCLAVE_CRASHED</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x1007</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR ECALL_NOT_ALLOWED</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x1008</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_OCALL_NOT_ALLOWED</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2000</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_UNDEFINED</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An unexpected error.

The parameter is incorrect.

There is not enough memory available to complete this operation.

The enclave is lost after power transition.

The API is invoked in incorrect order or state.

Incompatible versions of Windows* 10 OS and Hyper-V* are detected. In this case, you need to disable Hyper-V on the target machine.

The feature has been deprecated and is not longer supported.

The ECALL/OCALL function index is incorrect.

The enclave is out of TCS.

The enclave has crashed.

ECALL is not allowed at this time. For examples:
* ECALL is not public.
* ECALL is blocked by the dynamic entry table.
* A nested ECALL is not allowed during global initialization.

OCALL is not allowed during exception handling.

The enclave contains an import table.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SYMBOL</th>
<th>SGX_ERROR</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x2001</td>
<td>INVALID_ENCLAVE</td>
<td>The enclave image is incorrect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2002</td>
<td>INVALID_ENCLAVE_ID</td>
<td>The enclave ID is invalid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2003</td>
<td>INVALID_SIGNATURE</td>
<td>The signature is invalid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2004</td>
<td>NDEBUG_ENCLAVE</td>
<td>The enclave is signed as product enclave and cannot be created as a debuggable enclave.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2005</td>
<td>OUT_OF_EPC</td>
<td>There is not enough EPC available to load the enclave or one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete the operation requested.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2006</td>
<td>NO_DEVICE</td>
<td>Cannot open device.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2007</td>
<td>MEMORY_MAP_CONFLICT</td>
<td>Page mapping failed in driver.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2009</td>
<td>INVALID_METADATA</td>
<td>The metadata is incorrect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x200C</td>
<td>DEVICE_BUSY</td>
<td>Device is busy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x200D</td>
<td>INVALID_VERSION</td>
<td>Metadata version is inconsistent between uRTS and sgx_sign or the uRTS is incompatible with the current platform.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x200E</td>
<td>MODE_INCOMPATIBLE</td>
<td>The target enclave (32/64 bit or HS/Sim) mode is incompatible with the uRTS mode.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x200F</td>
<td>ENCLAVE_FILE_ACCESS</td>
<td>Can't open enclave file.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2010</td>
<td>INVALID_MISC</td>
<td>The MiscSelect/MiscMask settings are incorrect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x3001</td>
<td></td>
<td>Indicates report verification error.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Additional Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x3002</td>
<td>MAC_MISMATCH (SGX_ERROR_INVALID ATTRIBUTE)</td>
<td>The enclave is not authorized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x3003</td>
<td>MAC_MISMATCH (SGX_ERROR_INVALID_CPUSVN)</td>
<td>The CPU SVN is beyond the CPU SVN value of the platform.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x3004</td>
<td>MAC_MISMATCH (SGX_ERROR_INVALID_ISVSVN)</td>
<td>The ISV SVN is greater than the ISV SVN value of the enclave.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x3005</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_INVALID_KEYNAME</td>
<td>Unsupported key name value.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4001</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE</td>
<td>AE service did not respond or the requested service is not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4002</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT</td>
<td>The request to AE service timed out.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4003</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_AE_INVALID_EPIDBLOB</td>
<td>Indicates an Intel(R) EPID blob verification error.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4004</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_INVALID_PRIVILEGE</td>
<td>Enclave has no privilege to get launch token.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4005</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_EPID_MEMBER_REVOKED</td>
<td>The Intel(R) EPID group membership has been revoked. The platform is not trusted. Updating the platform and retrying will not remedy the revocation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4006</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_UPDATE_NEEDED</td>
<td>Intel(R) SGX needs to be updated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4007</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE</td>
<td>Network connecting or proxy setting issue is encountered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4008</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSION_INVALID</td>
<td>The session is invalid or ended by server.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>SGX_Error</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x400a</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_BUSY</td>
<td>The requested service is temporarily not available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x400c</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_MC_NOT_FOUND</td>
<td>The Monotonic Counter does not exist or has been invalidated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x400d</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_MC_NO_ACCESS_RIGHT</td>
<td>The caller does not have the access right to the specified VMC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x400e</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_MC_USED_UP</td>
<td>No monotonic counter is available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x400f</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_MC_OVER_QUOTA</td>
<td>Monotonic counters reached quota limit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4011</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_KDF_MISMATCH</td>
<td>Key derivation function does not match during key exchange.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4012</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_PLATFORM</td>
<td>Intel(R) EPID Provisioning failed because the platform was not recognized by the back-end server.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4013</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_SM_SERVICE_CLOSED</td>
<td>The secure message service instance was closed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4014</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_SM_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE</td>
<td>The secure message service applet does not have an existing session.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4015</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_SM_SERVICE_UNCAUGHT_EXCEPTION</td>
<td>The secure message service instance was terminated with an uncaught exception.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4016</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_SM_SERVICE_RESPONSE_OVERFLOW</td>
<td>The response data of the service applet is too large.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4017</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_SM_SERVICE_INTERNAL_ERROR</td>
<td>The secure message service got an internal error.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x5002</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_NO_PRIVILEGE</td>
<td>You do not have enough privileges to perform the operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x7001</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_</td>
<td>The file is in a bad status, run sgx_clearerr to try and fix it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FILE_BAD_STATUS</td>
<td>The Key ID field is all zeros, cannot re-generate the encryption key.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x7002</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_FILE_NO_KEY_ID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x7003</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_FILE_NAME_MISMATCH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x7004</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_FILE_NOT_SGX_FILE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x7005</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_FILE_CANT_OPEN_RECOVERY_FILE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x7006</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_FILE_CANT_WRITE_RECOVERY_FILE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x7007</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_FILE_RECOVERY_NEEDED</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x7008</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_FILE_FLUSH_FAILED</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x7009</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_FILE_CLOSE_FAILED</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x8001</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_IPLDR_NOTENCRYPTED</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x8002</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_IPLDR_MAC_MISMATCH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x8003</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_IPLDR_ENCRYPTED</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CODE**

sgx_create_encrypted_enclave was called, but the enclave file is not encrypted.

sgx_create_encrypted_enclave was called but there was a verification error when decrypting the data.

sgx_create_enclave was called, but the enclave file is encrypted.
Appendix
This topic provides the following reference information:

- **Unsupported MSVC* Options for Enclaves**
- **Unsupported Intel(R) Compiler Options for Enclaves**
- **Unsupported Intel(R) C++ Compiler Libraries**
- **Unsupported Intrinsics**
- **Unsupported C Standard Functions**
- **Unsupported C++ Standard Classes and Functions**
- **Unsupported C and C++ Keywords**
- **C11 Support on Windows* Operating System**
- **C++11 Support on Windows* Operating System**

**Unsupported MSVC* Options for Enclaves**
The following MSVC* compiler options are not supported to build enclaves:

**Table 16 Unsupported MSVC Compiler Options**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Remark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>/clr</td>
<td>Enables applications and components to use features of the common language runtime.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/MD</td>
<td>Selects run-time library.</td>
<td>Linking of DLL’s within enclave not allowed. Instead, use Intel(R) SGX trusted libraries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/MDd</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/MT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/MTd</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/EHa</td>
<td>Exception handling model that catches both asynchronous (structured) and synchronous (C++) exceptions.</td>
<td>C++ exceptions are supported inside an enclave, but SEH is not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/fp</td>
<td>Specify the floating-point behavior.</td>
<td>Not supported in the Intel(R) SGX version of the Intel(R) numeric library.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/Qimprecise_</td>
<td>Removes fwait com-</td>
<td>Not supported in the Intel(R) SGX</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* MSVC: Microsoft Visual C++
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><code>fwaits</code></td>
<td>mandins inside try blocks</td>
<td>version of the Intel numeric library.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>/Qpar</code></td>
<td>Enables the compiler’s auto-parallelizer feature to automatically parallelize loops in the code.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>/Qpar-report</code></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>/Fx</code></td>
<td>Produces a copy of each source file with injected code merged into the source.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>/GZ</code></td>
<td>Performs the same operations as the <code>/RTC (Run-Time Error Checks)</code> option.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>/RTC</code></td>
<td>Used to enable and disable the run-time error checks feature, in conjunction with the <code>runtime_checks pragma</code>.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>/openmp</code></td>
<td>Causes the compiler to process <code>#pragma omp</code>.</td>
<td>Microsoft® OpenMP® library needs to be linked, which is not self-contained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>/LN</code></td>
<td>Specifies that an <code>assembly manifest</code> should not be inserted into the output file.</td>
<td>This option is related to common language runtime (<code>/clr</code>) option. As Intel(R) SGX does not support the <code>/clr</code> option, this option will not be supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>/analyze</code></td>
<td>Enable code analysis.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>/hotpatch</code></td>
<td>Create <strong>Hotpatchable Image</strong>.</td>
<td>Enclave code cannot be changed after it has been loaded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>/QIPF_B</code></td>
<td>Causes compiler not to generate the corresponding instructions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>/QIPF_C</code></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>/QIPF_fr32</code></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>/QIPF_noPIC</code></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>/QIPF_restrict_labels</code></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Unsupported Intel(R) Compiler Options for Enclaves

The following Intel(R) compiler options are not supported to build enclaves:

Table 17 Unsupported Intel(R) Compiler Options

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>/hotpatch[:n]</td>
<td>This code generation option is not applicable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/Qxcode</td>
<td>This option does not apply in Intel(R) SGX because for this check to be effective, the source file containing the main program or the dynamic library main function should be compiled with this option enabled. Since this compiler option does not have the intended behavior (host architecture check), then the /Qax or /arch options are recommended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/Qcilk-serialize</td>
<td>These advanced optimization options are not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/Qguide-file[:filename]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/Qguide-file-append[:filename]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/Qipp[:lib]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/Qopt-matmul[-]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/Qtbb</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/Qinstrument-functions[-]</td>
<td>These profile guided optimizations (PGO) options are not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/Qprof-data-order[-]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/Qprof-dir dir</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/Qprof-file file</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/Qprof-func-order[-]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/Qprof-gen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/Qprof-hotness-threshold:n</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/Qprof-src-dir[-]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/Qprof-src-root:dir</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```
/Qprof-src-root-cwd
/Qprof-use[:keyword]
/Qprof-use-
/Qprof-value-profiling [:keyword]
/Qprofile-functions
/Qprofile-loops:keyword
/Qprofile-loops-report[:n]
/Qcov-dir:dir
/Qcov-file:filename
/Qcov-gen[-]
/Qfnsplit[-]

/Qtcollect[:lib]
/Qtcollect-filter:filename
/Qtcheck

/Qopenmp
/Qopenmp-stubs
/Qopenmp-report[:n]
/Qopenmp-lib:type
/Qopenmp-task:model
/Qopenmp-threadprivate:-type
/Qpar-affinity:[modifier,...]type[,permute][,offset]
/Qpar-num-threads:n
/Qpar-report[n]
/Qpar-runtime-control[n]
/Qpar-runtime-control-
```

These optimization report options are not supported.

These OpenMP* and parallel processing options are not supported.
The inlining option is not supported.

The language option is not supported.

The 80-bit long double type is not supported.

## Unsupported Intel(R) C++ Compiler Libraries

The Intel(R) C++ Compiler libraries that are not supported within an enclave are:

### Table 18 Unsupported Intel C++ Compiler Libraries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Remark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cilkrts.lib</td>
<td>Intel® Cilk™ runtime system.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libchkp.lib</td>
<td>Run-time pointer checker libraries.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libchkpwrap.lib</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libiomp5mt.lib,</td>
<td>OpenMP* libraries.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libiompprof5mt.lib,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libiompstubs5mt.lib</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libipgo.lib</td>
<td>Profile-Guided Optimization (PGO) runtime support library.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pdbx.lib,</td>
<td>Intel(R) Parallel Debugger Extension runtime libraries.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pdbxinst.lib</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libicaio.lib</td>
<td>Asynchronous I/O library.</td>
<td>I/O is not supported in an enclave.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libbfp754.lib</td>
<td>Binary floating-point math library.</td>
<td>It is not utilized by the compiler.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
libmatmul.lib Matrix multiplication library. It depends on the OpenMP library.

Unsupported Intrinsics

The majority of the intrinsics are valid within an enclave. The Microsoft standard intrinsic header file `<intrin.h>` can be included. However, not all the intrinsics that are defined are valid within an enclave. All math and advanced instruction set intrinsics can be used within an enclave. The intrinsics which are NOT valid within an enclave are consistent with instructions that are not supported within an enclave. They generally fall into the following categories:

- I/O related.
- Instructions requiring ring 0 privilege or could change privilege level.
- Operating system or system related functions.
- Intrinsics which are considered non-secure and have secure alternatives.

NOTE

The Intel(R) SGX SDK has stub implementations, `sgx_intrin.h` for the intrinsics that are not valid within an enclave. These stubs will cause a compiler warning when an unsupported intrinsic is used.

The following intrinsics should not be used within an enclave:

**Table 19 Unsupported MSVC Compiler Intrinsics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not Supported: FS/GS related</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><code>__addgsbyte</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__incgsbyte</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__writegsbyte</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__addfsbyte</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__incfsbyte</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__writefsbyte</code></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not Supported: Interrupt/Debug related</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><code>_enable</code></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not Supported: I/O related</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><code>_inp, inp</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>_out, out</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>_inbyte</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>_outbyte</code></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Not Supported: VMX related

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>__vmx_off</td>
<td>__vmx_on</td>
<td>__vmx_vmclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__vmx_vmptrld</td>
<td>__vmx_vmptrst</td>
<td>__vmx_vmread</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__vmx_wmwrite</td>
<td>__nvreg_save_fence</td>
<td>__nvreg_restore_fence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__svm_clgi</td>
<td>__svm_invlpg</td>
<td>__svm_skinit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__svm_vmload</td>
<td>__svm_vmrun</td>
<td>__svm_vmsave</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Not Supported: Architectural State related (many require ring 0 privilege)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>__rdtsc</td>
<td>__rdtscp</td>
<td>__readpmc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__readcr0</td>
<td>__readcr2</td>
<td>__readcr3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__readcr8</td>
<td>__readdr</td>
<td>__writedr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__writecr0</td>
<td>__writecr3</td>
<td>__writecr4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__writecr8</td>
<td></td>
<td>__invpcid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__readeflags</td>
<td>__writeeflags</td>
<td>__setjmp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__readmsr</td>
<td>__writemsr</td>
<td>__sidt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__getcallerseflags</td>
<td>__segmentlimit</td>
<td>__lidt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__AddressOfReturnAddress</td>
<td>ReturnAddress</td>
<td>__wbinvd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>__invlpg</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Not Supported: Non-secure (use secure alternative)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>__strset</td>
<td>strcat</td>
<td>strcpy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__wcsset</td>
<td>wcscat</td>
<td>wcscpy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:**

Even though the CPUID instruction is illegal inside enclaves, the intrinsics __cpuid and __cpuidex are supported because they are replaced with calls to functions sgx_cpuid and sgx_cpuidex.

### Unsupported C Standard Functions

You cannot use the following Standard C functions within an enclave; otherwise, the compilation would fail.

**Table 20 Unsupported C Standard Functions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header file</th>
<th>Header file in Intel® SGX?</th>
<th>Unsupported definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Macros/Types</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Header</td>
<td>Support</td>
<td>Functions/Headers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>complex.h</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Support is enabled only when you use the Intel® Compiler 16.0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inttypes.h</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>SCNdN, SCNiiN, SCNNoN, SCNiiN, SCNxxN, SCNdLEASTN, SCNiiLEASTN, SCNNoLEASTN, SCNxxLEASTN, SCNdFASTN, SCNiiFASTN, SCNNoFASTN, SCNxxFASTN, SCNdMAX, SCNiiMAX, SCNNoMAX, SCNxxMAX, SCNnpTR, SCNiiPTR, SCNNoPTR, SCNxxPTR, wcstol(), wcstoul()</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>locale.h</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>LC_ALL, LC_COLLATE, LC_CTYPE, LC_MONETARY, LC_NUMERIC, LC_TIME, struct lconv, setlocale(), localeconv()</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>signal.h</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>sig_atomic_t, SIG_DFL, SIG_ERR, SIG_IGN, SIGABRT, SIGFPE, SIGILL, SIGINT, signal(), raise()</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Header File</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td><strong>#include</strong> Headers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stdatomic.h</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>ATOMIC_&lt;TYPE&gt;<em>LOCK_FREE, atomic</em>&lt;data-type&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stdio.h</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>FILE, _IOFBF, _IOLBF, _IONBF, FILENAME_MAX, FOPEN_MAX, L_tmpnam, SEEK_CUR, SEEK_END, SEEK_SET, TMP_MAX, stderr, stdin, stdout, remove(), rename(), tmpfile(), tmpnam(), fclose(), fflush(), fopen(), fopen_s(), freopen(), freopen(), freopen_s(), setbuf(), setvbuf(), fprintf(), fprintf_s(), fscanf(), fscanf_s(), printf(), scanf(), scan_s(), snprintf_s(), sprintf(), sprintf_s(), sscanf_s(), scanf(), scanf_s(), vfprintf(), vfprintf_s(), vfscanf(), vfscanf_s(), vprintf(), vprintf_s(), vscanf(), vscanf_s(), vsnprintf_s(), vsprintf(), vsprintf_s(), vsscanf(), vsscanf_s(), fgetc(), fgets(), fputc(), fputs(), getc(), getchar(), gets(), gets_s(), putc(), putchar(), puts(), ungetc(), fread(), fwrite(), fgetpos(), fseek(), fsetpos(), ftell(), rewind(), clearerr(), feof(), ferror(), perror()</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stdlib.h</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>rand(), srand(), atexit(), exit(), <em>Exit(), quick_exit(), at_quick_exit(), getenv(), getenv</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Header</td>
<td>Include</td>
<td>Result</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>string.h</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td><code>memcpy_s()</code>, <code>memmove_s()</code>, <code>strcpy()</code>, <code>strcpy_s()</code>, <code>strncpy_s()</code>, <code>strcat()</code>, <code>strcat_s()</code>, <code>strstr()</code>, <code>strtok_s()</code>, <code>strerror_s()</code>, <code>strlen_s()</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>threads.h</td>
<td>No</td>
<td><code>thrd_t</code>, <code>thrd_success</code>, <code>thrd_timeout</code>, <code>thrd_busy</code>, <code>thrd_nomem</code>, <code>thrd_error</code>, <code>thrd_start_t</code>, <code>mtx_t</code>, <code>mtx_plain</code>, <code>mtx_recursive</code>, <code>mtx_timed</code>, <code>cnd_t</code>, <code>tss_t</code>, <code>TSS_DTOR_ITERATIONS</code>, <code>tss_dtor_t</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>time.h</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td><code>timespec</code>, <code>clock()</code>, <code>mktime()</code>, <code>time()</code>, <code>asctime_s()</code>, <code>ctime()</code>, <code>ctime_s()</code>, <code>gmtime()</code>, <code>gtime_s()</code>, <code>localtime()</code>, <code>localtime_s()</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>uchar.h</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td><code>__STDC_UTF_16__</code>, <code>__STDC_UTF_32__</code>, <code>mbtowc()</code>, <code>wctomb()</code>, <code>mbstowcs()</code>, <code>wctomb_s()</code>, <code>mbstowcs_s()</code>, <code>wcstombs()</code>, <code>wcstombs_s()</code>, <code>mbrtoc16()</code> <code>c16rtomb()</code> <code>mbrtoc32()</code> <code>c32rtomb()</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Header</td>
<td>Support</td>
<td>Functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wchar.h</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>fwprintf(), fwscanf(), swscanf(), vfwprintf(), vfwscanf(), vsscanff(), vwchar(), vfastcall(), fgetwc(), fgetws(), fputwc(), fputws(), fwrite(), getwc(), getwchar(), putw(), putwchar(), ungetw(), wcstod(), wcstof(), wcstold(), wcstol(), wcstoll(), wcstoul(), wcstoull(), wcscpy(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), wcscpy_s()</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wctype.h</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>iswalnum(), iswalpha(), iswblank(), iswcntrl(), iswdigit(), iswgraph(), iswlower(), iswpunct(), iswspace(), iswupper(), isxdigit(), wctype(), towlower(), towupper(), towctrans(), wcrrans()</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) The trusted standard C library does not support char strstr(const char*, const char*). The trusted standard C library supports the variant const char* strstr (const char*, const char*).
In addition to the ‘C’ standard `memset()` function, the trusted ‘C’ library (`sgx_tstdc`) also supports `memset_s()`. The following is a note on the recommended use of `memset()` versus `memset_s()`.

**NOTE**
Trusted C library is enhanced to avoid format string attacks. Any attempts to use `%n` in printf-family functions such as `snprintf` will result in a run-time error.

It is appropriate to use `memset()` to initialize buffers and clear buffers that do not contain secret data. If the purpose is to clear a buffer that contained secret data before deletion of the that buffer, you should not use the `memset()` function and should use the `memset_s()` function instead. The problem with using `memset()` in this scenario is that the compiler can optimize out the write to memory to clear the buffer so that it will not be performed (the compiler does this since it recognizes the subsequent deletion of the buffer).

The use of `memset_s()` guarantees the compiler will not optimize away the write to memory and thus ensuring the secret data is cleared. However, it is not recommended that `memset_s()` should always be used in place of `memset()` since the implementation of `memset_s()` is not performance optimized.

**Unsupported C++ Standard Classes and Functions**
The following table lists unsupported C++11 classes and functions inside the enclave.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header File</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Unsupported Classes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cstdlib</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>csignal</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>csetjmp</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cstdarg</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>typeinfo</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>typeindex</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>type_traits</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bitset</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>functional</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>utility</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 22 Dynamic memory management

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header File</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Unsupported Classes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>memory</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>new</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scoped_allocator</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 23 Numeric limits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header File</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Unsupported Classes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cfloat</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cinttypes</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>climits</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cstdint</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>limits</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 24 Error handling

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header File</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Unsupported Classes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cassert</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cerrno</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exception</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>nested_exception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stdexcept</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>system_error</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 25 Strings library

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header File</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Unsupported Classes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cctype</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cstring</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cuchar</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cwchar</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cwctype</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>string</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 26 Containers library
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header File</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Unsupported Classes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>array</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dequeue</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>forward_list</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>list</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>map</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>queue</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>set</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stack</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unordered_map</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unordered_set</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vector</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 27 Algorithms library

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header File</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Unsupported Classes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>algorithm</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 28 Iterators library

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header File</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Unsupported Classes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>iterator</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 29 Numerics library

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header File</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Unsupported Classes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cfenv</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>complex</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>numeric</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>random</td>
<td>No</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ratio</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>valarray</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 30 Input/Output library

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header File</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Unsupported Classes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cstdio</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fstream</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iomanip</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support</td>
<td>Unsupported Classes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ios</td>
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<td>streambuf</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stringstream</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 31 Localization library**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Unsupported Classes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>clocale</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>codecvt</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>locale</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 32 Regular expressions library**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Unsupported Classes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>regex</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 33 Atomic operations library**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Unsupported Classes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>atomic</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 34 Thread library**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Unsupported Classes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>condition_variable</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>future</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mutex</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>timed_mutex, recursive_timed_mutex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>thread</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 35 C compatibility headers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Unsupported Classes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ccomplex</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ciso646</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>This header file is empty in a conforming implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Unsupported Keywords</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structured Exception Handling</td>
<td>__try, __except, __finally, __leave</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managed Extension</td>
<td>__abstract, __box, __sealed, __value, __delegate, __gc, __nogc, __property, __try_cast, __pin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Language Runtime</td>
<td>__identifier, value class, delegate, enum class*, typeid, enum struct*, generic, event, finally, initonly, ‘for each, in’, ref struct, friend_as, gcnew, safecast, interface class, interface struct, ref class, interior_ptr, literal, value struct, property</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timing and Event</td>
<td>__event, __hook, __unhook, __raise, event</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Keywords</td>
<td>dllimport, __unaligned, __w64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following keywords are not supported in an enclave:

(*) The Visual Studio extensions enum class and enum struct are not supported, see https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/a6csk49.aspx. However, the C++11 enum class and enum struct features are supported.

C11 Support on Windows* Operating System

Although C11 is considered the baseline, the availability of certain C11 features depend on the Visual Studio* and compiler version and/or a specific compiler option.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C11 Language Feature</th>
<th>Supported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anonymous struct and union</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atomic operations</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macros for complex values</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New macros in float.h</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>static_assert</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TYPedef redefinition</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unicode strings</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>uchar.h</td>
<td>Partially</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_Alignas, _Alignof, max_align_t, stdalign.h</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_Atomic</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_Generic</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_Noreturn, stdnoreturn.h</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>STDC_VERSION</strong> == 201112L</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_Static_assert</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_Thread_local</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aligned_alloc</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) You may enable these C11 features using the Intel® Compiler 16.0 with the compiler option /Qstd=c11.

**C++11 Support on Windows® Operating System**

Although C++11 is considered the baseline, the availability of certain C++11 features depend on the Visual Studio® and compiler version and/or a specific compiler option.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C++11 Language Feature</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Additional type traits*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alias templates</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alignment (alignas, alignof)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allow typename outside of templates</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attributes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bidirectional fences*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C99 preprocessor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conversions of lambdas to function pointers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data-dependency ordering*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data-dependency ordering: function annotation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Default template arguments for function templates</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defaulted and deleted functions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### C++11 Language Feature

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Delegating constructors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explicit conversion operators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expression SFINAE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended friend declarations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended sizeof</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extern templates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forward declared enums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inheriting constructors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initialization of class objects by rvalues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initializer lists*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inline namespaces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lambdas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local and unnamed types as template arguments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magic statics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memory model*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimal support for garbage collection*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-static data member initializers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-value references</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range-based for-loop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw string literals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reworded sequence points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right angle brackets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard-layout and trivial types*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong compare and exchange*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly typed enums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thread-local storage (thread_local)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type traits*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unicode strings literals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universal character names in literals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unrestricted unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>User-defined literals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variadic templates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>auto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>char16_t/char32_t*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constexpr*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
C++11 Language Feature

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>decltype</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>long long</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nullptr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>noexcept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>override and final</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>static_assert</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) These features are only available when compiling an enclave with Intel® Compiler 16.0 within Visual Studio 2015 and linking the enclave with `sgx tcxx.lib` as the standard C++ library. In other words, if you link the enclave with the STLport version of the standard C++ library (`sgx_tstdcxx.lib`), these features will not be available. You do not need to use the compiler option `/Qstd=c++11` to access any of these features if you develop with the Intel Compiler and Visual Studio 2015.

**Supported C Secure Functions**

The following table lists supported C secure functions inside the enclave.

Table 1 Supported C Secure Functions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header file</th>
<th>Supported C Secure Functions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mbusafecrt.h</td>
<td>strcat_s(), wcscat_s(), strncat_s(), wcsncat_s(), strncpy_s(), strcpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), strncpy_s(), wcsncpy_s(), strtof_s(), wcstof_s(), wcscslen(), _itoa_s(), _itow_s(), _ltoa_s(), _ltow_s(), _ultoa_s(), _ultow_s(), _i64toa_s(), _i64tof_s(), _ui64toa_s(), _ui64tof_s(), sprintf_s(), swprintf_s(), _snprintf_s(), _snwprintf_s(), _vsprintf_s(), _vsnprintf_s(), _vswprintf_s(), _vsnwprintf_s(), memcpy_s(), memmove_s()</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>