Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) is an indirect branch control mechanism that restricts speculation of indirect branches. A processor supports IBRS if it enumerates CPUID.(EAX=7H,ECX=0):EDX as 1.
Processors that support IBRS provide the following guarantees without any enabling by software:
- The predicted targets of near indirect branches executed in an enclave (a protected container defined by Intel® Software Guard Extensions (Intel® SGX) cannot be controlled by software executing outside the enclave.
- If the default treatment of system-management interrupt (SMI) and system-management mode (SMM) is active, software executed before an SMI cannot control the predicted targets of indirect branches executed in SMM after the SMI.
Support Based on Software Enabling
IBRS provides a method for critical software to protect indirect branch predictions.
If software sets IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS to 1 after a transition to a more privileged predictor mode, predicted targets of indirect branches executed in that predictor mode with IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS = 1 cannot be controlled by software that was executed in a less privileged predictor mode1. Additionally, when IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS is set to 1, the predicted targets of indirect branches cannot be controlled by another logical processor.
If IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS is already 1 before a transition to a more privileged predictor mode, some processors may allow the predicted targets of indirect branches executed in that predictor mode to be controlled by software that executed before the transition. Software can avoid this by using WRMSR on the IA32_SPEC_CTRL MSR to set the IBRS bit to 1 after any such transition, regardless of the bit’s previous value. It is not necessary to clear the bit first; writing it with a value of 1 after the transition suffices, regardless of the bit’s original value.
Setting IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS to 1 does not suffice to prevent the predicted target of a near return from using an RSB entry created in a less privileged predictor mode. Software can avoid this by using a Return Stack Buffer (RSB) overwrite sequence2 following a transition to a more privileged predictor mode.
It is not necessary to use such a sequence following a transition from user mode to supervisor mode if supervisor-mode execution prevention (SMEP) is enabled. SMEP prevents execution of code on user mode pages, even speculatively, when in supervisor mode. User mode code can only insert its own return addresses into the RSB; not the return addresses of targets on supervisor mode code pages. On parts without SMEP where separate page tables are used for the OS and applications, the OS page tables can map user code as no-execute. The processor will not speculatively execute instructions from a translation marked no-execute.
Enabling IBRS does not prevent software from controlling the predicted targets of indirect branches of unrelated software executed later at the same predictor mode (for example, between two different user applications, or two different virtual machines). Such isolation can be ensured through use of the Indirect Branch Predictor Barrier (IBPB) command.
Enabling IBRS on one logical processor of a core with Intel® Hyper-Threading Technology may affect branch prediction on other logical processors of the same core. For this reason, software should disable IBRS (by clearing IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS) prior to entering a sleep state (e.g., by executing MWAIT or HLT) and re-enable IBRS upon wakeup and prior to executing any indirect branch.
Some processors may enhance IBRS by simplifying software enabling and improving performance.
Enhanced IBRS supports an ‘always on’ model in which IBRS is enabled once (by setting IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS) and never disabled. If IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS = 1 on a processor with enhanced IBRS, the predicted targets of indirect branches executed cannot be controlled by software that was executed in a less privileged predictor mode or on another logical processor.
As a result, software operating on a processor with enhanced IBRS need not use WRMSR to set IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS after every transition to a more privileged predictor mode. Software can isolate predictor modes effectively simply by setting the bit once. On parts that enumerated enhanced IBRS, software need not disable IBRS or STIBP prior to entering a sleep state such as MWAIT or HLT.
On processors with enhanced IBRS, an RSB overwrite sequence may not suffice to prevent the predicted target of a near return from using an RSB entry created in a less privileged predictor mode. Software can prevent this by enabling SMEP (for transitions from user mode to supervisor mode) and by having IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS set during VM exits. Processors with enhanced IBRS still support the usage model where IBRS is set only in the OS/VMM for OSes that enable SMEP. To do this, such processors will ensure that guest behavior cannot control the RSB after a VM exit once IBRS is set, even if IBRS was not set at the time of the VM exit.
If the guest has cleared IBRS, the hypervisor should set IBRS after the VM exit, just as it would do on processors supporting IBRS but not enhanced IBRS. As with IBRS, enhanced IBRS does not prevent software from affecting the predicted target of an indirect branch executed at the same predictor mode. For such cases, software should use the IBPB command.
- A transition to a more privileged predictor mode through an INIT# is an exception to this and may not be sufficient to prevent the predicted targets of indirect branches executed in the new predictor mode from being controlled by software operating in a less privileged predictor mode.
- An RSB overwrite sequence is a sequence of instructions that includes 32 more near CALL instructions with non-zero displacements than it has near RETs.
Note References in this article to indirect branches are only to near call indirect, near jump indirect, and near return instructions. Refer to Speculative Execution Side Channel Mitigations for further details.
Product and Performance Information
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